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Abstract 
 
Across nine studies, donation decisions towards charitable causes were investigated 
under a salient group membership.  In studies 1 to 3, participants were told of a disaster 
that had occurred and a novel contribution was made by experimentally varying 
perpetrator group membership to investigate an ingroup bias, i.e. whether more 
donations would be associated when the disaster was supposedly caused by an ingroup 
member.  In study 4, perpetrator group membership and victim group membership 
were manipulated together in the same design to demonstrate a novel interaction.  
Overall, the results indicated that perpetrator group membership can play an important 
role in affecting donation decisions; and moreover, that perpetrator groups can interact 
with victim groups to amplify prosociality towards ingroup members.   
In study 5, cognitive reasoning styles were primed in order to investigate helping 
towards ingroup victims; while in study 6, reasoning style was primed alongside an 
anonymity manipulation to investigate helping towards outgroup victims.  The results 
suggested an original finding; that an analytical reasoning style can in some cases 
result in increased prosociality towards victims that are presented as a statistical 
number. 
Studies 7 to 9 manipulated the facial attractiveness of the victim in order to investigate 
donation decisions towards ingroup/outgroup members.  There was some evidence 
that physical appearance can affect donation decisions and also interact with victim 
group membership.     
Overall, the findings demonstrate the importance of considering intergroup processes 
in a charitable context, through selective emphasis of salient group memberships. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction and contextualisation 
 
Charitable giving and generosity 
In 2014, individuals in the United Kingdom donated approximately 10.6 
billion pounds to charities, and in 2013 they donated approximately 10.8 billion 
pounds (Charities Aids Foundation, 2014).  In the same year in the United States, 
individual donations were approximately 258.5 billion dollars (Giving USA, 2015).  
Of course, economic wealth of nations varies greatly across the globe, and a better 
index of charitable giving may be the percentage of people who chose to donate in a 
particular country.  In the 2014 World Giving Index (Charities Aid Foundation, 2014), 
Myanmar was ranked first with 91% of donors reporting having made a donation in 
the last 12 months.  Malta came second (78%), followed by Thailand (77%), Ireland 
and the UK (74%), Canada (71%), Iceland and the Netherlands (70%), and the USA 
(68%).  Cross-country comparisons of giving are misleading however, largely due to 
methodological differences in survey data collection (e.g. sampling methods), 
alongside differences in the operational definition of charitable giving (e.g., whether 
street begging or church taxes were included).  This latter issue of monetary 
contributions to religious organisations is  a pertinent issue, with approximately one 
third of charitable giving in the U.S. directed towards organisations based within ones 
faith (Giving USA, 2015), while U.K. figures for church based donations are 
approximately 12% (Charities Aids Foundation, 2014).  Regardless, at face value, 
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these figures suggest that individuals and nations around the globe are remarkably 
generous. 
However, despite what appears to be a high level of generosity on the surface, 
there are compelling reasons to remain dissatisfied with levels of giving; and 
compelling reasons to conduct empirical research into understanding the 
psychological processes behind monetary donations.  For example, despite the sums 
given by donors in the U.K., overall giving represents as little as 0.8% of the U.K.’s 
gross domestic product (Brodie, Bhati, Jochum & Wilding, 2011).  Again, the U.K. is 
not atypical in this regard, as only 6 of the 20 countries in global giving rankings are 
members of the Group of Twenty (G20), which comprises of 19 of the world’s 
wealthiest nations defined in terms of gross domestic product (Charities Aids 
Foundation, 2014). To put another way, giving levels across the globe do not appear 
to be related to the level of wealth in different nations.     
Interestingly, this disjunction between levels of income and giving has been 
observed not only at an international level, but also at an individual level.  In the U.K., 
those who are financially poorer donate over 3% of what wealth they have available, 
compared to the richest in society who give around 1% of their discretionary income 
(Mckenzie & Pharoah, 2011).  These trends have been observed over several decades 
in both the U.K. and in the U.S. (Banks & Tanner, 1997; Bennett, 2012; Brooks, 2008; 
Vazquez, 2011; Wiepking, 2007).   
Despite so many individuals making private donations, and despite relative 
historical stability in donation levels, it is dangerous to assume that individual levels 
of philanthropy will remain high.  For example, although it appears that individual 
donations are fairly robust in the face of brief economic recession (Charities Aid 
Foundation & NCVO, 2011) it is also true that donations in the UK and abroad have 
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fallen considerably in the past, and that economic predictions for charitable donations 
are currently flat (HM Government, 2011; Smith, 2012).   
There may also be generational differences in attitudes towards philanthropy, 
a concern highlighted by the fact that the most generous donor group are the over 65s 
(Charities Aid Foundation & NCVO, 2011; Cowley, Smith, Mckenzie, & Pharoah, 
2008; Pharoah & Tanner, 1997; Smith, 2012).  Cowley, McKenzie, Pharoah and Smith 
(2011) and Smith (2012) have speculated that older generations, who were more 
closely affected by WW2 and are historically associated with the formation of strong 
social policies (e.g. the founding of the NHS in 1948), have stronger philanthropic 
values.  There is also a concern that a younger ‘generation me’ will be less giving, 
perhaps growing up outside the shadow of WW2, and more under a spotlight of 
individualism and consumerism.  One can only guess as to whether the younger 
generation will become more philanthropic as they age and match the donation levels 
of the current older generations.   
There are also gender differences in relation to generosity and average 
donation amounts.  Even amongst the most generous donor category, the over 65s, 
there is a large gender difference.  Women are more likely to give, and also give a 
greater median amount (£20 per month compared to £12 per month) (Charities Aid 
Foundation & National Council for Voluntary Organisations, 2011).  However, there 
is research to suggest that men may prefer to donate greater amounts but to fewer 
charities, perhaps in order to make the most impact (Andreoni, Brown, & Rischall, 
2003).  Regardless, these type of considerations led Breeze (2010; 2013) to argue that 
charitable donations cannot be predicted by a straightforward model based on the level 
of help needed, the level of media exposure, or the frequency of charitable 
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solicitations.  Rather, her qualitative interviews suggest that donors often give for 
personal and emotive reasons as opposed to more practical considerations.   
It is certainly the case in the U.K. that there are systematic differences in 
donations between types of charitable organisations.  Medical, hospital and children's 
charities consistently receive more than appeals towards the homeless, the elderly, or 
overseas (Charities Aid Foundation & National Council for Voluntary Organisations, 
2011).  This latter point is of great concern.  Approximately 870 million individuals, 
some 15% of the world's population, are severely undernourished and suffer from a 
life threatening lack of food (Food and Agricultural Organization of the United 
Nations, 2012).  The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs highlights that over 1 billion individuals are suffering from hunger, that 
humanitarian disasters occur more frequently than once per day, and that such disasters 
are on the increase due to climate change and political conflict (United Nations Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2012).  These figures suggest that 
Breeze (2013) is correct in suggesting that donors are not concerned with a 
straightforward analysis of the level of need.   
It is clear from the context presented so far that charitable donations are not 
only of vital importance to local communities, but that they are also of international 
concern.  There is an interesting moral distinction here.  Charitable giving can be 
directed locally towards individuals and groups in our own country, or directed 
outward towards individuals and groups in other countries.  This latter measure is 
perhaps a more accurate measure of unselfish altruistic behaviour (if one assumes that 
such a thing as human altruism exists).  Unfortunately, as I have already alluded to, 
individual donors are not so generous with their donations towards other countries, 
and therefore towards other national groups.  In the U.K., only 10% of donations are 
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towards overseas causes (Dobbs, Harrison, Jochum, Smith, & Wilding, 2012), and 
only 3% of donations go to overseas causes in the U.S. (Charities Aid Foundation, 
2006).  Thus, the observation can be made that even though we can be generous, we 
tend to be more generous to our own country, and to our own social groups.   
The present thesis 
The importance of social groups in the context of charitable donations is one 
of the reasons I adopt a social psychological approach in my exploration of what drives 
people to donate to charitable causes.  Although the study of monetary donations is a 
truly cross-disciplinary subject (and I will continue to cite literature from disciplines 
such as experimental economics, business, and marketing), social psychology has a 
unique contribution to offer.  This is not a new observation.  Kurt Lewin argued in  
1939 for the importance of social psychology in understanding broad societal issues 
(Lewin, 1997).  It is in social psychology that the effects of group membership have 
been studied in many contexts, and over many decades.  Despite this, there are 
relatively few studies to date in social psychology that have used experimental 
paradigms to investigate the psychology of monetary giving.  Those studies have 
demonstrated that giving is not necessarily a rational process (e.g. donors give more 
when asked to focus on a single victim, even when their donation could benefit a larger 
group (Kogut & Ritov, 2005).  Moreover, much of the past social psychological 
literature on charitable giving has emphasized interpersonal contexts, and few studies 
have investigated intergroup processes (for a review, Zagefka & James, 2015).  Hence, 
there are clear gaps in our knowledge about the social psychological processes 
prompting individuals to donate money to charity, and it is these gaps which the 
current thesis aims to address.   
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It should be noted that donating is one type of helping behaviour.  While there 
has been much research into other helping behaviours from a social psychological 
perspective, particularly in an interpersonal context, e.g. emergency helping in 
bystander contexts (Latane & Nida, 1981), there is much less research in this field that 
has investigated donation decisions.  Charitable giving, I argue, is a special form of 
helping for a number of reasons.  It is presumed that donors will not meet the victims 
they help, that their actions will not provide instant relief to victims, and that donors 
are donating to an organisation who will aid specific groups on their behalf.  In this 
way, donation behaviour is often focused on helping other groups in need, in contrast 
to helping specific individuals in emergency situations.  As a consequence, although 
the literature on interpersonal helping is useful, one can assume that the psychological 
processes involved in helping groups will be somewhat different.  Moreover, donors 
generally have more time to consider charitable appeals, to encounter solicitations 
from charities on a more regular basis, to absorb media coverage, and to choose one 
appeal over another using a variety of cognitive and/or affective mechanisms.  Indeed, 
many donors contribute a certain amount towards charitable giving as part of their 
household budget (Andreoni et al., 2003), and in this sense, financial donations can be 
considered a planned economic activity.  There is also an applied distinction here, as 
monetary donations form the currency that charities need.  Blood donations, 
volunteering, or donating unwanted clothes, are useful in some situations, but it is 
funds that charities require most.  Moreover, it is unclear whether donating unwanted 
items such as clothes, or volunteering (where the volunteer has much to gain 
themselves), can always be considered forms of charitable helping.  Overall, there are 
various reasons why one must assume that monetary donations present a special case, 
and should be studied in their own right.  
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As stated above, I adopt a social psychological perspective to the study of 
charitable donations, and a novel contribution is made by considering the role that 
salient group memberships can play in donation decisions.  Chapter 2 reviews the 
literature relevant to this question.  It begins with a discussion of the social identity 
approach.  This approach allows for a group level perspective and is an important 
theoretical approach that I adopt throughout this thesis.  Chapter 3 reviews research in 
the domain of reasoning styles in helping behaviour, while chapter 4 reviews research 
pertaining to the prosocial effects of facial attractiveness.  Chapters 2 – 4 were written 
with an emphasis on theories and research which are directly relevant to the empirical 
components of this thesis, although they do also provide summaries of some of the 
most prominent theoretical accounts of prosociality, since no thesis related to this topic 
should ignore the most well developed and well known accounts.  
Chapters 6, 7, and 8 are the empirical chapters.  Chapter 6 presents four 
experiments that investigate helping under salient group memberships, and a novel 
contribution is made by focusing on the effects of a shared perpetrator group 
membership on donation decisions.  Chapter 7 presents two experiments where 
reasoning style is manipulated, either alongside a salient group membership, or 
alongside a reputation manipulation.  Chapter 8 presents three experiments where the 
facial attractiveness of ingoup members (same nationality) and outgroup members 
(other nationality) are manipulated.  All studies emphasise group memberships by 
considering the nationality of the recipient and/or (where applicable) the perpetrator.  
Chapter 8 ends with a discussion that summarises the results, acknowledges 
limitations, and presents possibilities for future research.    
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Chapter Two 
How did we learn to help other groups? 
 
Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Self-Categorisation Theory (SCT): Helping the 
self and helping the group 
In chapter 1, I argued that many of the world’s wealthiest countries by GDP 
index are not the most generous.  In making this claim, I do not argue that these 
countries are somehow less moral or less prosocial, but instead my claim is that these 
countries do not give as generously to overseas causes as one might expect given their 
relative wealth.  Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971) 
may serve to explain this.  Fundamental to SIT is the importance of group 
memberships to the individual.  According to SIT, individuals have social identities 
which are formed by the social groups that they are members of.  Moreover, these 
social groups contribute to an individual’s sense of identity and self-worth, and often 
prescribe social norms (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002; Hogg & Reid, 2006; 
Rutland, Hitti, Mulvey, Abrams, & Killen, 2015).  This implies that we have a vested 
interest in making favourable intergroup comparisons, and promoting the ingroup 
where possible, as doing so is linked to our self-esteem (Brewer, 1979, 1999; Tafjfel 
& Turner, 2004; Turner, 1975).  SIT was originally born out of a desire to understand 
the intergroup atrocities in WW2; however, it can be applied to prosocial behaviour.  
If our social groups are so important to our self-esteem, and if a group that we belong 
to does well, then by some measure we have also done well (Hogg et al, 1995).  In this 
sense, helping the ingroup becomes tantamount to helping the self.   
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SIT offers a compelling account of group memberships, but it does so broadly 
and without attention to more fine-grained psychological processes.  In order to 
elaborate upon the cognitive mechanisms underlying SIT, Self-Categorization Theory 
(henceforth SCT) (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994; Turner, 1987) was 
developed.  According to SCT, people have a distinct cognitive capacity to consider 
themselves separately, e.g. ‘I’, or as a collective, e.g. ‘we’.  Moreover, the use of 
cognitive schemas allows easier mental processing of our environments by allowing 
us to construe the social landscape as consisting of groups to which we do, or do not, 
belong to.  This results in a categorisation process, where the individual attempts to 
assign people (including the self) to a relevant social group.  This categorisation 
process is influenced by cognitive factors related to the accessibility of information at 
hand (e.g. visual cues, context), as well as the comparative fit of the category (Turner 
et al., 1994; Turner, 1987).   
The categorisation process can be thought of as a cognitive method of 
simplifying the vast amounts of information around us by contrasting groups in such 
a way that group boundaries are made distinct, and so that groups are seen as separate 
entities (Hogg, Terry, & White, 1995).  This process encourages minimisation of intra-
group differences, and maximisation of inter-group differences, i.e. groups are 
simplified both in terms of what they constitute, and in terms of how related they are.  
This encourages a ‘black and white’ view of social group categories that in turn leads 
to the simple mental stereotype of ingroup vs. outgroup.  Moreover, this cognitive 
need to simplify and categorise the world into distinct social groups can lead to a 
process of deindividuation.  Put simply, it is easier to categorise the world into social 
groups than to attempt to hold accessible the vast array of information that can be 
associated with any one individual.  Importantly, the self is not excluded from this 
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cognitive process, and once an ingroup is made salient, we can see ourselves as part 
of that group and adhere to what we perceive to be relevant prototypical behaviour 
(Hogg et al., 1995; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987).  A by-product 
of the categorisation process is seeing other ingroup members as similar to the self, as 
‘we’ in some sense, and seeing outgroup members as dissimilar, or as ‘them’.  
Crucially, once a group membership is made salient, individuals can be seen and 
judged by their group category, rather than as an individual.  The concept of salience 
is fundamental to SCT, which considers group memberships to be fluid.  We are all 
members of a wide variety of groups, and whether deindividuation occurs depends on 
the salience of the group at any particular time.   
Several studies lend support to the importance of group memberships in 
prosociality. Cuddy, Rock and Norton (2007) conducted a study following Hurricane 
Katrina in the U.S. and investigated the helping intentions of locals who lived or 
worked in affected areas.  Locals reported lower helping intentions towards outgroup 
members (distinguished in this study by race, white vs. black/Latino).  Decreased 
helping intentions towards outgroup members appeared to be driven by participants 
believing that outgroup members felt less negative emotion after the disaster (e.g. 
anguish and grief), suggesting that outgroup members were dehumanised.   
The importance of group memberships in helping behaviour is also 
demonstrated in experimental work.  Research in the domain of emergency bystander 
intervention has found that onlookers were more likely to help ingroup victims in need, 
and that other bystanders only influenced helping behaviours when they were also 
ingroup members (Levine, Cassidy, Brazier, & Reicher, 2002).  In a similar paradigm 
that utilised rival football groups, a confederate who collapsed in a public area was 
more likely to be helped if they wore an ingroup team shirt compared to a rival team 
18 
shirt (Levine, Prosser, Evans, & Reicher, 2005).  Importantly, helping was also less 
likely to occur if the confederate wore an unbranded (neutral) shirt, and in line with 
the social identity approach, helping only occurred when group memberships were 
made salient.  According to the social identity approach, these results can be explained 
in terms of participants feeling that they have more in common with ingroup members, 
and crucially, that fellow ingroup members are similar to the self.  Dovidio et al. 
(1997) emphasize the concept of ‘we-ness’1 as a sense of connectedness with one’s 
own group that encourages acts of ingroup favoritism and helping (see also Brewer, 
1999).  Dovidio and colleagues found that participants were more willing to help when 
the target had been recategorised to a common ingroup.  Participants were also more 
willing to self-disclose personal information and offer more positive evaluations to 
members of a common ingroup.   
Many studies that have investigated the effects of group membership on 
prosociality have focused on prosociality other than donations, e.g. following a similar 
format to that used by Levine et al. (2005).  However, there is some research that has 
investigated the effects of group membership specifically on charitable donations. 
Levine and Thompson (2004) manipulated whether a fictitious earthquake occurred in 
Europe or South America and measured subsequent hypothetical donation amounts.  
                                                 
 
 
1 The concept of ‘we-ness’ is somewhat similar to more recent work on ‘fusion’ (Burhmester & 
Swan, 2015; Fredman, Burhmester, & Gomez, et al., 2015). However, fusion can be considered a 
more extreme form of we-ness that is based on deontological principles, is resistant to change, and 
can involve a great level of self-sacrifice – particularly towards ingroup members who are seen as 
being fused to the self.
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Interestingly, British participants donated more to the European relief fund, but only 
when they had been previously primed with European group membership.  Again, this 
demonstrates not only the importance of group memberships in prosociality, but more 
specifically the importance of a salient group membership.  Donation levels from 
British participants were indifferent to the nationality involved, and thereby to the 
location of the disaster, unless those British participants had been reminded of the 
superordinate national category of Europe which connected them to the recipients.   
The importance of group memberships such as nationality in helping behaviour 
should not be overlooked as appeals to nationalistic pride can be an effective method 
of increasing prosociality.  In a study involving Dutch helping intentions (ingroup) 
towards Jews (outgroup), appeals to collective pride were more effective than guilt 
appeals for high identifiers (van Leeuwen, van Dijk, & Kaynak, 2013).  These results 
are in keeping with the social identity approach.  High identifiers are likely to react 
strongly to negative connotations that are associated with the psychologically very 
important ingroup.  Moreover, the results appeared to be driven by increased levels of 
empathy for the outgroup that were generated when high identifiers were exposed to 
the pride appeal.  In a separate study, van Leeuwen (2007) demonstrated that making 
salient a relevant national expertise (Dutch water management) increased the 
likelihood of overseas aid following the Asian tsunami of 2004.  Moreover, aid was 
more likely to be supported when Dutch national identity was threatened by alleged 
assimilation of the Dutch into a common EU identity.   
In sum, consideration of group memberships goes some way to understanding 
why nationalities and other group memberships can be so important when it comes to 
helping behaviours, and why countries give relatively little to foreign aid.  In the 
United States, a country that donated over $300 billion in 2012, only 6% went to 
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overseas causes (Giving USA, 2013).  On the face of it, this behaviour might be 
surprising, but it is in line with expectations if one reconsiders U.S. donation behaviour 
under a social identity lens.  Helping the ingroup is a typical behaviour, one that is 
expected, and local appeals to help fellow ingroup members are likely to be more 
effective in gathering support than overseas causes.  One aim of the present thesis was 
to test the ubiquity of this ingroup helping preference, by studying it across a range of 
different settings.  
The importance of the missing perpetrator in charitable donations: Human 
involvement and donor responsibility 
I now turn to what I term the ‘missing perpetrator’ in charitable research.  Until 
recently, the importance of the perpetrator (I define this as whoever/whatever is 
perceived to be at fault for the negative event) has been neglected.  For example, the 
field of bystander intervention, which has been developing since the brutal attack on 
Kitty Genovese in 1964, has only recently acknowledged the role of the perpetrator in 
emergency helping (Wilson, 2011).  Given that perpetrator group membership has 
only recently been considered in a prosocial research field that has been under 
investigation since the 1960s (Latané, & Darley, 1968), it is not surprising that the role 
of the perpetrator has remained largely unstudied in charitable research.  More 
importantly, there is reason to suspect that causal attributions related to perpetrator 
group membership may play a vital role.   
Firstly, in comparison to when disasters are believed to be caused naturally, 
there is evidence that participants are less prosocial when human involvement is 
highlighted in a negative event or disaster (Zagefka, Noor, Brown, de Moura, & 
Hopthrow, 2011). Moreover, the degree of intentionality by a human agent can also 
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affect prosociality.  Ames and Fiske (2013) utilised two different contexts (fraud and 
drought) and demonstrated that if the human perpetrator behaved intentionally, then 
perceptions of financial harm were magnified.  These irrational beliefs were increased 
even when participants were incentivised to make accurate predictions.  These 
experimental findings can be explained at least in part by work by Lagnado and 
Channon (2008) into blame attributions.  They demonstrated that intentional acts were 
rated as more causal, and thereby more blameworthy, than unintentional acts.  Their 
results were explained partly due to foreseeability, with participants viewing human 
intentional acts as more foreseeable, and thereby more preventable and presumably 
less worthy of aid.  Taken together, it appears that the presence of a human perpetrator 
can affect human prosociality negatively, with more pronounced effects likely to 
emerge when human acts are perceived to be intentional.   
Although the findings above suggest that the mere presence of a human 
perpetrator can affect helping behaviour, the group membership of the perpetrators – 
i.e. who the perpetrators were in relation to the respondent – was not considered.  
However, it is plausible that perpetrator group membership has an important function 
as to how individuals donate.  After all, if it matters to potential donors whether a 
human perpetrator is involved, then surely it will also matter who that perpetrator is, 
and more specifically, whether the donor sees the perpetrator as an ingroup or 
outgroup member.   
Empirical research outside of the prosociality domain has demonstrated that 
the relationship between respondent and perpetrator can be vital.  In a study conducted 
after the assassination of Dutch critic Theo van Gogh by a Muslim extremist, Dutch 
non-Muslim participants were more likely than Muslim participants to view the 
Muslim perpetrator as ‘evil’; i.e. lend weight to internal rather than external 
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motivations for the tragedy (Doosje, Zebel, Scheermeijer, & Mathyi, 2007).  Dutch 
non-Muslim participants were also more likely to view the perpetrator as typical of a 
Muslim outgroup, with both findings reversed for Muslim participants.  Finally, 
recategorising perpetrator groups to an inclusive category, e.g. ‘human’, has been 
shown to increase forgiveness of national groups for historical atrocities (Wohl & 
Branscombe, 2005).   
While outgroup perpetrators are viewed more negatively, ingroup perpetrators 
are more likely to benefit from leniency.  Studies have demonstrated an increase in 
secondary victim blame (where the victim is blamed in part for their plight by others 
not involved in the incident directly) when the perpetrator belonged to the ingroup.  
Bal and van den Bos (2010) demonstrated that when a perpetrator accused of rape 
shared group similarity with the participant, there was an increase in victim blame and 
victim derogation.  These findings are in accordance with the social identity approach, 
where one might expect increased favouritism and greater leniency towards ingroup 
perpetrators.  However, findings in this regard have been mixed.  While some studies 
have demonstrated leniency towards ingroup perpetrators in a race context (Sommers 
& Ellsworth, 2000; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2001), as well as in a gender context 
(Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2006); others have found no difference (Mazzella & 
Feingold, 1994; Williams & Holcomb, 2001).  Moreover, some studies have even 
demonstrated outgroup leniency (Feather & Souter, 2002; Gordon, 1993).  Braun and 
Gollwitzer (2012) argue that outgroup perpetrator leniency is a result of reputation 
concerns relating to prejudice and egalitarianism.  In a study investigating leniency 
towards a perpetrator from a majority group in Germany (Caucasian) who had 
committed an offence against an ethnic minority group (South-east Asian), they 
demonstrated that the outgroup leniency effect could be negated if white participants 
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were reminded beforehand that their group had done much to help the minority group 
in the past.    
The concept of an ingroup perpetrator is related to that of an ingroup deviant, 
a term used to describe someone who violates a group norm but not necessarily a state 
law.  In some cases, deviants too can receive increased punishment.  These 
observations have often been thought of in terms of the black sheep effect (Marques, 
Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988), where ingroup deviants are presumably punished in order 
to protect the positive social identity that individuals derive.  Although research into 
the black sheep effect was born out of a desire to understand a lack of prosociality 
towards a fellow ingroup member, it is possible to reinterpret the effect as an extreme 
form of prosociality.  Punishing the ingroup member can be considered prosocial if 
one does not conflate prosociality with niceness.  McKay and Whitehouse (2015) 
argue that there are less ‘sanitised’ forms of prosociality that do not always involve 
being nice to others. This type of moral backbone can include punishing offenders, 
and even using violence if necessary, to uphold important values.  In this sense, the 
black sheep effect can be considered a type of altruistic punishment where one 
punishes and controls the ingroup member in order to do ‘good’, and thereby to benefit 
the larger group, as well as to maintain the norms and values pertaining to that group.   
Importantly, there is also evidence that ingroup perpetrators might trigger a 
heightened desire in other group members of wanting to ‘atone’ for the evil deeds 
which have been committed (Brown, González, Zagefka, Manzi, & Cehajic, 2008).  
After all, according to SIT, if an ingroup member caused a problem, under conditions 
of salient group membership this can psychologically equate to the self having caused 
the problem.  Hence, actions committed by an ingroup perpetrator might be associated 
with guilt, perceived responsibility, and motivation to make reparations.   
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In sum, there is a considerable amount of research suggesting that ingroup or 
outgroup memberships of human perpetrators can influence the psychological 
responses to their actions.  One aim of this thesis was to present an inaugural 
exploration of these effects in the context of monetary donations.   
Social learning and imitation 
So far it has been argued, consistent with the social identity approach, that 
group memberships can play an important role in prosocial behaviour.  But how do 
we learn to help the ingroup?  One could attempt to explain ingroup helping as entirely 
driven by the aforementioned processes of SCT.  This would suggest that ingroup 
helping is a by-product of cognitive categorisation processes, where one 
deindividuates group members to ingroup and outgroup categories, and where helping 
the ingroup becomes a process akin to helping the self.  While this is possible, it is 
also probable that culture and learning play a role in determining how we respond to 
ingroup members in need, as well as how we distinguish which groups we belong to, 
and which groups are worthy of joining.  To elaborate, if I identify as British, then I 
may have an inclination to help fellow Brits, and this is particularly true if the shared 
nationality is made salient by the context, e.g. in a helping situation abroad.  However, 
in order for this process to be initiated, at some point I would have needed to learn that 
national identities exist, learn which characteristics signal Britishness (e.g. speech, 
appearance), and learn to see Britishness as an important and valuable group identity.  
These considerations lead us to early theories in social psychology that can help 
explain how we learn to help the ingroup, e.g. social learning theory (Bandura, 1977).   
If donation behaviour were to be interpreted under social learning theory, then 
charitable giving would depend greatly on the social learning environment.  The extent 
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to which acts of donation behaviour were reinforced, perhaps through social media or 
through peer group approval, would inform the extent to which those donation acts 
were adhered to.  For example, a young child in one country may observe and 
subsequently model acts of charitable giving, but a young child in another culture may 
be exposed to and model other prosocial behaviours that are not related to monetary 
giving.   
Evidence in support of social learning is provided not only by seminal 
experiments into playful child behaviour (Bandura & Huston, 1961), but also through 
research that has demonstrated the importance and prevalence of imitation in general 
learning.  For example, Weeks and Anderson (2000) demonstrated that when learning 
how to serve legally in volleyball, adult participants who interspersed practice with 
observation outperformed a control group which focused on practice alone.  Similarly, 
Adank, Hagoort and Bekkering (2010) found that participants who mimicked 
unfamiliar accents showed significant advantages in language learning.  It seems clear 
that observation and imitation are linked to learning.  Interestingly, Bird, Orsini and 
Heyes (2010) found that those in a prosocial priming condition produced a larger 
automatic imitation effect than those in the antisocial or neutral conditions.  The 
researchers argue that there is a bidirectional relationship between imitation and 
prosocial behaviour.  Not only do we learn through imitating, but we automatically 
imitate when in a prosocial frame of mind.    
Importantly, social learning and imitation do not necessarily occur 
consciously.  Infants as young as 18 months old have shown increases in prosocial 
behaviour after being imitated (Over & Carpenter, 2009).  Focusing on adult 
populations, Chartrand and Bargh (1999) demonstrated that confederates who covertly 
mimicked participants’ hand and foot tapping behaviours were subsequently rated as 
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more trusting and likeable; even though participants did not report being aware of the 
imitation.  Van Baaren, Holland, Steenaert and van Knippenberg (2003) found that 
waitresses who mimicked their customers received higher tips.  Researchers have even 
demonstrated that computerised avatars which mimic participants’ head movements 
are subsequently rated as more persuasive and trusting (Bailenson & Yee, 2005).   
Social learning theory, and research into automatic and unconscious imitation, 
offer an explanation as to why prosocial tendencies are observed in young children, as 
well as why much helping behaviour may be instinctual.  We must learn how to 
function in society, and one can assume that this learning involves cultural information 
relating to how we interact and help others.  A desire to help ingroup charities and 
ingroup victims in need might be socially learnt.  The following section considers in 
more detail how cultural norms are relevant to prosociality. 
Social norms  
If one assumes that there are cultural differences in the expression of 
prosociality, then social learning theory can help to explain variations in giving 
behaviours.  Chapter 1 provided descriptive evidence in the form of a world index of 
charitable giving, where some countries appear to have a culture of philanthropy and 
consistently report higher levels of individual donations.  A possible explanation for 
these donation patterns is that there are different cultural social norms of giving that 
have become prevalent in different societies.   
Social norm theory (Perkins & Berkowitz, 1986) was originally developed in 
order to explain drinking behaviour in U.S. college students, but may help to 
understand prosociality.  The theory argues that excessive drinking behaviours such 
as binge drinking may be the result of a social norm, where excessive drinking 
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behaviour while at college is permissible or even encouraged.  A student may observe 
other students drinking and jump to the (false) conclusion that all students engage in 
heavy drinking behaviour.  Irrespective of the veracity of this observation, a social 
norm of excessive drinking has been created.  This erroneous reasoning can be 
described as a ‘false consensus’ effect (for a review see Mullen et al. (1985); also, 
Gilovich, 1990).   
Social norms that are conveyed through observation of behaviour may be 
considered a direct extension of social learning theory and imitation.  However, as 
with the example above, social norms can be created directly (e.g. engaging in heavy 
drinking to fit with the student stereotype), or indirectly (e.g. by not challenging the 
assumption that most students drink heavily).  It is easy to see how the drinking 
example could be applied to prosocial behaviour such as charitable donations.  Norms 
can be created that relate to everyday acts of helping or generosity. These may then 
become universal norms, encouraging donations that are in line with real or perceived 
peer behaviour.   
The social norms approach can be nuanced further by fractionating social 
norms into three distinct types: personal norms, descriptive norms, and injunctive 
norms (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004).  The first type of norm refers to a personal sense 
of moral acceptable behaviour in a specific situation, and may also reflect personal 
values.  Personal norms may or may not be in line with evidence; however, the ‘false 
consensus’ effect argues that personal norms may become perceived as more general 
social norms if they are not challenged by others.  Descriptive norms are essentially 
the general social norms discussed in the previous paragraph that apply to a particular 
social group, and that describe typical expected behaviours in a given context.  Finally, 
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injunctive norms define moral behaviour by expressing what people ought, or ought 
not, do in society.        
Social norms have been found to influence a wide range of pro- or antisocial 
behaviour such as alcohol use (Walters & Neighbors, 2005), safe-sex practices (van 
Empelen, Gok, Jansen & Hoebe, 2001) and littering (Cialdini, Reno & Kallgren, 
1990).  There have also been a few studies which have directly investigated the role 
of social norms and charitable giving.  Frey and Meier (2004) manipulated social 
norms on a university campus and found that the creation of a pseudo injunctive social 
norm increased donations in a subsequent fundraising campaign. Croson, Handy and 
Shang (2009), and Croson and Shang (2011), found that descriptive social norms of 
donating increased donations to a charity appeal advertised on a public radio station.  
Hysenbelli, Rubaltelli, and Rumiati (2013) gave participants information on prior 
donation amounts and demonstrated that ingroup member donation information was 
particularly influential in increasing prosociality.  These studies suggest that ingroup 
social norms are particularly important when it comes to creating norms that 
subsequently affect donation behaviour.  According to the SIT approach, group 
memberships provide us with social norms in the form of prototypical behaviour.  Not 
only are we expected to help our ingroup more, but other ingroup members can be 
influential in affecting the amount that we choose to donate.   
As seen above, social norms clearly influence donation behaviour.  An 
interesting question, however, is the extent to which this influence is 
automatic/intuitive or conscious/deliberate.  In order for social norms to affect 
behaviour, those social norms must be made salient (Kallgren, Reno, & Cialdini, 
2000).  This suggests that social norms are not always instinctively adhered to, but 
that they sometimes need to be brought to awareness to be effective.  The theory of 
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planned behaviour (TPB: Azjen, 1985) also conceives of behaviour as deliberate.  TPB 
essentially argues that human behaviour is intentional and depends upon at least three 
factors: 1) the individual’s personal intentions, attitudes and values; 2) the social 
norms of the situation as described above; and 3) the individual’s perception of their 
own self-efficacy to make a difference.  Hence, it is likely that donation behaviour is 
sometimes instinctive (as outlined previously), and sometimes consciously intentional 
(in line with research on social norms and TPB).   
Moreover, even when donations are consciously intentional, donation 
decisions are not necessarily rational.  Fetherstonhaugh et al., (1997) and Slovic (2007) 
have demonstrated that increasing the number of statistical victims actually results in 
less financial aid being donated.  Other researchers have found that quick affective 
decisions result in higher donations than instructions to participants to deliberate and 
use reason (Dickert, 2008; Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007).  There is also a 
substantial body of research on the ‘identifiable victim’ effect.  These studies have all 
demonstrated that participants prefer to donate to a single identifiable victim rather 
than to a group of victims (Friedrich & McGuire, 2010; Genevsky, Västfjäll, Slovic, 
& Knutson, 2013; Hsee, Zhang, Lu, & Xu, 2013; Kogut & Kogut, 2013a; Kogut & 
Ritov, 2005b; Small & Loewenstein, 2003).  Research pertaining to judgment and 
decision making will be touched upon again in chapter 3 but for now the ‘take home’ 
message is that donor rationality can be questioned.     
Notwithstanding these considerations, social norm theory may help to explain 
systematic differences in donation behaviour.  In fact, social norms might help explain 
some of the patterns outlined in chapter 1.  Chapter 1 highlighted that poorer 
households donate a greater proportion of what wealth they have compared to 
wealthier households, and this appears to be true not only for charitable giving but also 
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for acts of trusting and general helpfulness (Piff, Kraus, Côté, Cheng, & Keltner, 
2010).  This could be explained with the existence of different social norms in different 
segments of the populations.   
Empathy as a proximate ingroup helping mechanism 
Earlier in section 2.1, I argued that donors have a preference for ingroup 
helping, and in doing so I also hinted that empathy is more strongly associated with 
ingroup helping.  One explanation for increased ingroup helping is that we experience 
increased levels of empathic concern for ingroup victims in need.  This present section 
provides an overview of the evidence for the link between empathy and prosociality 
in general, while the next section considers evolutionary accounts as to why empathy 
may be directed more towards the ingroup. 
To begin, defining empathy is no easy task as there are varying definitions and 
conceptualisations.  In an early meta-analysis, Eisenberg and Miller (1987) concluded 
that empathy was in conceptually muddy waters, with some researchers measuring 
empathy through affective measures of personal distress, others through cognitive 
measures of perspective taking, while others conflated empathy with sympathy.  They 
also argued that differences in how empathy was defined and measured could explain 
why a previous meta-analysis by Underwood and Moore (1982) had found a non-
conclusive relationship between empathy and prosocial behaviour in developmental 
research.  Empathy may be measured situationally or via dispositional measures, but 
Eisenberg and Miller (1987) found the best empathic predictors to be situational 
measures.  Studies which measured empathy using situational measures have typically 
found effect sizes between empathy and helping at around 36%, while dispositional 
measures tended to have much lower effect sizes of around 10%.  This is not surprising 
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since situational empathy is not only a measure of dispositional empathy (dispositional 
empathy has been shown to correlate with situational empathy (Otten, Penner, & 
Altabe, 1991) but also a measure of the specific experimental context as well.  
Notwithstanding various definitional issues, empathy remains a strong predictor of 
prosociality across a wide range of contexts.  For example, empathy has been shown 
to be an important predictor of donations to a telethon (Davis, 1983), as well as to 
victims of natural disasters (Marjanovic, Struthers, & Greenglass, 2012).   
Interestingly, there is also some evidence to suggest that there might be an 
innate or biological basis to empathy.  For example, empathy has been shown to be 
connected to feelings of attachment that are developed through infancy (Eisenberg, 
Fabes, Guthrie & Reiser (2000).  Eisenberg and colleagues found that children who 
demonstrated higher levels of dispositional empathy were more likely to help, 
provided they could regulate their negative emotions and not feel overwhelmed.  
Further, adult empathy traits have been found to correlate with empathy ratings taken 
during childhood (Eisenberg et al., 2000), and children who demonstrated early 
temperament behaviours classified as ‘resilient’ were significantly more likely to 
volunteer during adulthood (Atkins, Hart & Donnelly, 2004).  Finally, infants as young 
as 5 months old have been shown to prefer individuals who act prosocially (Hamlin & 
Wynn, 2011).   
Although the developmental findings above suggest a biological basis, it is of 
course possible for these behaviours to be developed socially even at a very early age.  
There is however evidence from neuroscientific studies to suggest empathy may be 
innate.  Neural activity in the mesolimbic reward areas of the brain (an area associated 
with feelings of pleasure and reward) has been demonstrated during donation 
behaviour.  Increased activity in mesolimbic brain regions was observed when 
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participants were asked to make a charity donation, and further, these activations occur 
in a similar pattern to the activity observed when financial rewards were received 
(Moll et al., 2006).  Harbaugh et al. (2007) also found activations in reward areas of 
the brain when individuals were asked to consider making a tax donation to a 
charitable cause, with a more pronounced (self-reported) pleasurable effect when the 
giving was voluntary.  Overall, these findings suggest that helping behaviour is 
rewarded through neural mechanisms that reward certain behaviours, and therefore 
support the idea of a biological basis to giving behaviours.  However, neural activity 
can be widespread and common to a range of tasks (for philosophical criticism of 
recent neuroeconomics research on questions related to human altruism, see 
Mukherjee (2013).  Moreover, these particular studies do not provide evidence that 
empathy is necessarily involved.   
In terms of a neural basis for empathy, donation behaviour has been associated 
with neural regions more commonly associated with attachment and perspective 
taking.  For example, Ma, Wang and Han (2011) observed that watching others in pain 
generated activity in areas of the brain that are assumed to be associated with empathy, 
and this activation subsequently led to increased donations to an anonymous charity.  
Furthermore, EEG analyses of infants have found greater left frontal cortical activation 
associated with comforting tasks, and greater right temporal activation associated with 
helping tasks (Paulus, Kühn-Popp, Licata, Sodian, & Meinhardt, 2013).  Taken 
together, these results suggest that empathy may have some neurological basis and is 
linked to prosocial behaviour.   
There is a general agreement, then, that helping behaviour is demonstrated at 
an early age (which some might argue indicates a genetic basis), and that this 
behaviour continues into adulthood.  However, there is less agreement as to whether 
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empathy leads to selfish egoistic helping (e.g. where the goal is to alleviate one’s 
personal distress or improve one’s reputation), or whether empathy can lead to non-
selfish helping (where the goal is entirely to help the other person in need).  Batson 
(1987) has argued that many researchers have conceptualised human altruism as 
primarily selfish in nature and arising from egoistic motivations.  However, he has 
challenged this view with what he and colleagues have termed the empathy-altruism 
hypothesis; this hypothesis argues that humans can be truly altruistic and this can be 
demonstrated through feelings of empathic concern and distress for others in need.     
To demonstrate the empathy-altruism hypothesis, Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, 
Buckley and Birch (1981) manipulated empathy (by telling participants that the target 
in need was similar to them), while also manipulating the ostensible difficulty of 
leaving the experiment and thereby not helping a confederate in distress.  Their logic 
was that if participants were selfish altruists, entirely focused on reducing their own 
personal distress, then they would not continue with the experiment when it was easy 
to leave and avoid discomfort.  By contrast, high empathisers would help irrespective 
of the difficulty of doing so.  The results appeared to support the predictions.  High 
empathisers stayed even when they were allowed to leave the experiment, suggesting 
that empathy results in a genuine desire to help others.  Cialdini et al. (1987) disagreed 
with this interpretation. They argued that high empathisers were likely to experience 
increased feelings of sadness, and that this emotion could not be alleviated by simply 
leaving or turning ‘off’ the visual cues for the need for help.  In their replication of the 
Batson study, they demonstrated that negative affect such as sadness could explain 
helping behaviour, and that when sadness was relieved (e.g. when the participant was 
given a prize before being asked to help the confederate), high empathisers were no 
longer significantly more helpful.  Cialdini and colleagues refer to this behaviour as 
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the negative-state relief model, and place it in opposition to the empathy-altruism 
hypothesis (however, see Batson et al. (1989) for a rebuttal of the Cialdini 
experiment).   
Irrespective of whether empathy leads to altruistic helping or ‘selfish’ helping, 
empathy has been shown to be a more important motivator of helping behaviour than 
the desire to alleviate guilt (Batson, 1988), to avoid social disapproval (Fultz et al. 
1986) or to experience feelings of joy (Batson & Shaw, 1991).  However, not all 
researchers are convinced of the fundamental role of empathy, and again, Cialdini has 
been vocal amongst the critics.  Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce and Neuberg (1997) 
argued that one cannot generalise the laboratory findings for empathic concern across 
all situations.  For example, empathy may be proven to be a more important factor 
than guilt avoidance in one experimental paradigm, but it does not follow that guilt 
avoidance cannot explain helping behaviour better than empathy in other situations.  
Evidence for an empathy-altruism hypothesis would be stronger if empathy was 
considered alongside other competing variables simultaneously in the same design.  
Cialdini et al. (1997) did precisely this, using a regression model, and demonstrated 
that the extent to which the participant felt as ‘one’ with the target person was a more 
important predictor than empathy.  Indeed, perceived ‘oneness’ mediated empathy 
effects in their model and was a stronger predictor of helping behaviour.   
There appears to be at least two competing views with regards to empathy and 
altruistic behaviour, but there is evidence to support both the egoistic and altruistic 
accounts of helping.  In the aftermath of 9/11, egoistic motivations to relieve personal 
distress were effective predictors of helping behaviour; however, only non-egoistic 
explanations were predictive of sustained giving behaviour (Piferi, 2006).  It is 
unlikely that a consensus can be reached about the fundamental philosophical question 
35 
of whether human nature is truly altruistic or not.  However, although there is still 
debate over the nature of human altruism, there is a general consensus that empathy is 
often an important predictor of helping.   
Last but not least, it is important to mention that evidence has been generated 
to suggest that empathy is a proximate predictor of helping ingroup members, but not 
of helping outgroup members (Stürmer, Snyder, Kropp, & Siem, 2006).  This suggests 
that it might be instructive to further study the effects of empathy in intergroup 
contexts.  One aim of this research, as will become clear below, was to do precisely 
that.  
Helping the ingroup: An evolutionary perspective 
Chapter 2 will, somewhat peculiarly, be concluded with a discussion of the 
ultimate origin of prosociality, that is, its evolutionary roots.  I will suggest that 
evolutionary and social psychological perspectives on prosociality can be 
complimentary.  I will also briefly consider how an ingroup helping tendency may 
have evolved.   
Just why would an individual engage in donation behaviour that apparently 
offers little self-directed benefit, and that appears to contradict Darwin’s maxim of 
natural selection (Darwin, 1859)?  Monetary giving, on the face of it, is an irrational 
economic behaviour.  If one accepts that human behaviour is egoistically motivated, 
giving up wealth for the benefit of others, particularly for outgroup members who may 
never be met, makes little sense.  Indeed, any form of altruistic behaviour could be 
considered irrational if humans are in competition for resources.  There are, however, 
at least two evolutionary theories which develop Darwin’s theory, and which can 
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account for altruistic behaviour in humans.  These theories are kin altruism (Hamilton, 
1964) and reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971).     
 Firstly, to understand kin altruism theory, it is helpful to imagine a scenario 
where organisms do not possess a biological tendency to help others in need.  In this 
scenario, which could occur during the early origins of the human species, there are 
no reproductive advantages, and all have similar odds for survival and successful 
procreation.  If a genetic mutation were to be introduced to this environment, one 
which encouraged the altruistic helping of kin, then the situation has changed.  This 
genetic mutation would entail that parents (and possibly siblings) would show 
increased prosociality and concern towards their family.  As a consequence, offspring 
with altruistic parents would have greater odds of survival relative to other offspring 
that had less caring parents.  The altruistic gene would also increase the survival odds 
of any siblings, who have a 50% chance of carrying the genetic mutation themselves.  
They, in turn, would show increased care towards their siblings, and later, towards 
their own children.  With such a strong reproductive advantage, those alleles that did 
not contain the altruistic variation would not be competitive, resulting in the gene pool 
becoming saturated with the altruistic gene.  In this hypothetical scenario, it is now 
common for kin to show altruistic behaviour towards each other (i.e. to their ingroup).   
There are several studies that have found behaviour consistent with kin 
altruism theory.  Burnstein, Crandall and Kitayama (1994) found that participants 
were more likely to aid closer, rather than more distant kin, as well as more likely to 
help more fertile or younger individuals.  Webster (2003) found that participants were 
more likely to allocate resources to blood relatives and to allocate increased resources 
when a kin relationship was more certain.  These results are in line with inheritance 
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donations patterns that show that close kin, and more fertile kin, benefit the most from 
family legacies (Smith, Kish, & Crawford, 1987).   
There are several misunderstandings in social psychology related to kin 
altruism theory, and authors have written extensively on the matter (Dawkins, 1979; 
Park, 2007).   For example, it does not follow from the theory that individuals would 
consciously demonstrate altruistic behaviour only towards kin.  Altruistic acts towards 
kin are more likely to be an instinctive behaviour, something which becomes accepted 
in society as normal.  With regards to giving behaviour, this would suggest that such 
behaviour may be driven by non-conscious processes.  Interestingly, such a view is 
convergent with the social psychological findings relating to social learning and 
imitation (see section 2.3).  A second misunderstanding relates to ubiquity of helping.  
It does not follow that saturation of the gene pool with the altruistic gene would result 
in universal philanthropy.  Any form of universal altruism would not remain as 
competitive as the more selfish and focused kin/proximity altruism mechanism.  This 
can help to explain why individuals may go to great lengths to help certain people, but 
ignore the suffering of others.  In terms of donation behaviour, there is an evolutionary 
advantage to helping those in our ingroup, while there is little advantage in helping 
those in an outgroup.    
 With the above discussion in mind, kin altruism is useful in that it offers a 
theory that explains why altruistic behaviour is not contradictory to Darwin’s view of 
evolution.  Moreover, kin altruism goes some way to explain how biological and 
cultural tendencies to help the ingroup may have been evolved.  It appears that we all 
have the capacity to give and to help others, even if some approaches suggest that in 
doing so we will favour our own kin.   
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Moving on to the theory of reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971), this theory too 
uses the principle of reproductive success as a mechanism which is essential to 
prosocial behaviour becoming widespread.  However, reciprocal altruism theory is 
more directly concerned with reputation and reciprocity.  This focus allows the theory 
to understand why we help others who are psychologically distant from us.  Genes that 
encouraged reciprocal helping in our evolutionary past would have been more 
competitive since favours would be returned, thus resulting in mutual helping and 
improved reproductive success.   
Of course, in order for the reciprocal gene to flourish there would need to be a 
mechanism for identifying those individuals who would reciprocate.  I would argue 
that group membership serves this function admirably.  Note that in section 2.1, 
instances of emergency helping due to group membership were triggered by the 
confederate wearing a symbol that indicated ingroup membership (e.g. a football 
shirt).  In section 2.2, we saw that human beings not only have the capacity to form 
groups, but also to identify those groups to which they belong.  This is important if 
one takes an evolutionary lens to helping behaviour. If helping the ingroup is an act 
that is more likely to be reciprocated, group membership could be one important 
marker which signals likely reciprocity, allowing actors to choose their interaction 
partners to maximise instances of reciprocal altruism.  Another important marker of 
likely reciprocity is reputation.  There is a great deal of research that has linked 
positive reputation with prosociality; however, as much of this research is concerned 
with how reputation affects individual reasoning in a strategic manner (cf. van 
Leeuwen & Täuber, 2010), this evidence will be discussed in the next chapter.     
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Conclusion 
Chapter 2 began by considering how the donation figures in chapter 1, and more 
specifically the lack of overseas donations, could be explained using a social identity 
approach.  I concluded that donors are driven to help the ingroup, and that outgroup 
members are more likely to be helped for other strategic motives.  I also briefly 
considered group memberships of other actors, e.g. perpetrators.  Further, in order to 
better understand the preference for ingroup helping, I considered the role that social 
learning may play, and how such learning occurs in early infancy.  Moreover, the way 
that we learn to help the ingroup is not necessarily a conscious process.  Imitation is 
strongly linked to learning, and much of the robust research on imitation effects and 
prosociality has highlighted the involuntary and automatic nature of imitation.  I also 
discussed evidence that we learn to help the ingroup through cultural and social norms.  
Chapter 2 also presented research related to empathic concern.  Empathy has been 
demonstrated to be an important affective variable that can explain helping behaviour.  
Importantly, empathy has been more strongly associated with ingroup helping.  
Finally, in considering the adaptive benefits of ingroup helping, we came full circle 
by suggesting that social psychological theories of prosociality and evolutionary 
accounts can be considered complementary in some ways, at least when it comes to 
understanding why we help the ingroup.     
An important ‘take home’ message in chapter 2 is that in order to better 
understand how or why donors give to overseas causes, we must consider the group 
relationships of those involved.  This is especially true if one considers the ‘missing 
perpetrator’ in charity research.  Charities themselves are adept at focusing on the 
victim, on their suffering and on their need, but often the more complex issue of who 
is responsible is avoided.  There is ‘good news’ and ‘bad news’ in chapter 2.  On the 
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one hand, we can see that people are evolved to help, and that we may learn to help 
others instinctively.  On the other hand, it appears that we learn to help certain others, 
and that we can become indifferent to the suffering of those who we feel are dissimilar 
to ourselves.   
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Chapter Three 
The role of reasoning in helping (or not helping) the outgroup 
 
Reputation, anonymity, and strategic motives for helping 
In this section, I will discuss the impact of ‘reasoning’ on donations.  By this, 
I refer to how donors may consciously (or even non-consciously) evaluate donation 
appeals and take into consideration factors that may influence their donation decisions.  
I will start with one type of reasoning already touched upon in previous sections, 
‘reputation’.  I will now discuss evidence of the importance of reputation effects in 
prosociality in more detail.   
To begin, there is evidence from experimental economics that reputation has 
an important role in monetary giving.  Clark (2002) found that informing participants 
of an overall donation contribution (measured over 10 rounds) did not increase 
individual donations, but knowledge of individual donation amounts in individual 
rounds did increase contributions.  Andreoni and Petri (2004) demonstrated a similar 
effect, using an economic game where participants were asked to invest small sums 
into a charitable fund.  They found that if participants knew that their identity would 
be visible alongside their donation amount, then this increased their contribution by 
59%.  The authors speculate that identity visibility led to participants being motivated 
to establish their reputation and moral credentials; i.e. donating became a self-serving 
behaviour.  Furthermore, the increase in donations was more pronounced when 
participants were given the option of donating anonymously.  Although very few 
participants chose to make an anonymous donation, having the choice of making a 
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public or anonymous donation appeared to make the reputational benefit of donating 
more salient, which in turn led to increased giving.  Finally, not behaving prosocially 
can negatively affect one’s reputation, e.g. in a cooperation game.  Participants 
financially punished non co-operators, and this punishment appeared to be driven by 
negative emotions towards ‘free-riders’ (Fehr & Gächter, 2002).  Interestingly, 
participants would punish non co-operators even when it resulted in an economic loss 
for them, a phenomenon that the researchers called ‘altruistic punishment’.  
Above, it was suggested that some participants made large donations for 
reputational benefits, and there is evidence that this strategy was not misguided.  A 
highly rated reputation has been shown to increase instances of cooperation and giving 
behaviour from others (Barclay, 2012).  Research using a reciprocity game has 
demonstrated that those who develop a reputation for giving benefit in both current 
and subsequent rounds; i.e. a reputational advantage is not only beneficial due to 
eliciting a direct reciprocal ‘tit-for-tat’ strategy from others, but also due to having 
lasting effects on how others cooperate in future rounds (Wedekind & Braithwaite, 
2002).  Milinski, Semmann and Krambeck (2002) found that donors gained political 
reputation benefits, and were subsequently more likely to be elected as group 
representatives. These findings are supported by cooperation games where participants 
appear to trust those with altruistic reputations over others (Barclay, 2004)2.   
                                                 
 
 
2 Evolutionary psychologists would make the distinction between direct reciprocity where one 
cooperates for reciprocal benefits from one’s interaction partner, and indirect reciprocity where one 
aims to establish a positive reputation in the eyes of others.  For the purposes of this thesis, 
motivations based on both direct and indirect reciprocity should result in less prosociality in 
anonymous situations.  Evidence to support this position is discussed on the next page.  
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Moreover, individuals appear to understand the social benefits of having a 
good reputation.  For example, the desire to gain a good reputation has been shown to 
be an effective predictor of bystander intervention, over and above other trait variables 
such as tendency to cooperate and sensitivity to social norms (Bereczkei, Birkas, & 
Kerekes, 2007).  In terms of charitable giving, donating appears to be internalised by 
most laypersons as a good deed, provided such behaviour is not construed as self-
serving (Horne, 2003).  Therefore, one can reason that monetary donations are an 
effective method of enhancing one’s reputation.  This is most evident when one 
considers donation behaviour that is linked to conspicuous displays of giving.  Grace 
and Griffin (2006) demonstrated in a field study that conspicuous donations, such as 
those that involve displaying charity pins and ‘empathy’ ribbons, are popular due to 
being ostentatious.  Such donation behaviour has been labelled as ‘conspicuous 
compassion’ (West, 2004).  Overall, it seems that there are clear benefits to 
establishing a reputation through donating behaviour, and donors appear aware of the 
benefits of pursuing such a strategy.   
I would now like to consider another variable that is theoretically related to 
reputation, and that is often manipulated in order affect reputational concerns, i.e. 
anonymity.  If reputation is, in line with the evolutionary account of reciprocal 
altruism, considered a signal marker identifying those likely to return survival 
benefits, then giving and helping in anonymous situations should be less likely to 
occur.  This was indeed the pattern found by Andreoni and Petri (2004), where donors 
avoided making anonymous donations, and there is further evidence.  Reyniers (2013) 
manipulated whether donations were made anonymously (alone) or publicly (in pairs).  
The manipulation resulted in what Reyniers called, ‘reluctant altruism’, a term coined 
to indicate the phenomenon of pairs donating more frequently but less generously.  
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Presumably, participants in pairs felt more social pressure to do a good deed since 
their actions affected their reputation, but they did not truly wish to donate their 
resources.  In support of this interpretation, another study found that prosociality is 
diminished towards outgroup members if ingroup reputation is bolstered beforehand 
(Braun & Gollwitzer, 2012).   
The relationship between anonymity, reputation, and giving behaviour is 
further highlighted in field experiments that demonstrate the increased likelihood of 
giving when potential donors are part of a group, as opposed to when individuals are 
solicited for donations alone (Knutsson, Martinsson & Wollbrant, 2013; Martinsson 
& Alpizar, 2013).  In these studies, individuals who were approached as they arrived 
at a national park in Costa Rica were significantly more likely to donate if they were 
asked in a group than if they had arrived alone.  This ties in with earlier field research 
which found that donations made publicly were significantly higher than privately 
made donations (Alpizar, Carlsson & Johansson-Stenman, 2008).  These findings also 
support earlier field research in social psychology that found anonymous donations 
reduced both the frequency and amount of contributions, irrespective of the method of 
solicitation or the picture and/or message framing of the appeal (Thornton, Kirchner, 
& Jacobs, 1991).  Overall, it seems that anonymity it strongly linked to reputation, and 
that anonymous situations decrease the likelihood of prosocial behaviour.   
The link between anonymity, reputation, and prosociality, may also explain 
why the presence of eye images can dramatically increase donations.  In one field 
study, the presence of eye images on a supermarket collection tin increased donations 
by approximately 40% relative to a control image (Powell, Roberts, & Nettle, 2012).  
In a non-exhaustive list, eye-images have also been found to have general prosocial 
effects relating to bicycle theft (Nettle, Nott, & Bateson, 2012), supermarket recycling 
45 
(Ekström, 2011), littering (Ernest-Jones, Nettle, & Bateson, 2011) and online 
cooperation (Bateson, Nettle, & Roberts, 2006).  Interestingly, these effects occurred 
with stylised eye images and also when the eye images had a non-conscious effect, i.e. 
when the participant did not report awareness of the eye stimuli (Haley & Fessler, 
2005).  The effect of eye images on prosocial behaviour may be due to the feeling of 
being watched, and this feeling is presumably linked to reputational concerns.   
At this point, it seems prudent to offer an alternative explanation to the findings 
above.  Researchers have also taken the position that the positive effect of religious 
and secular moral primes on prosociality is due to the sense of being watched by a 
supernatural agent that enhances motivation (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Harrison 
& Mckay, 2013; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007).  Thus, the sense of being watched 
elicited by the eye images mentioned above, and the subsequent benefits for donation 
levels, might not have to do with reputation concerns, social norms, or a sense of being 
watched by other people.  It might instead be related to a sense of being watched by a 
supernatural power, and/or to the increased salience of moral values and moral 
behaviour.  Regardless, evidence suggests that non-anonymous situations will lead to 
increased helping behaviour.   
Before ending this discussion of reputation and anonymity, I would like to 
briefly consider reputation effects at a broader level.  Thus far, the evidence pointing 
to reputational concerns as a prosocial motivator has been situated mainly at the 
interpersonal level.  However, this thesis is largely concerned with group level helping 
or, at the very least, individual helping when group relationships are made salient.  The 
importance of reputation for the group has already been mentioned in chapter 2, during 
the discussion of ingroup perpetrator leniency, and there is further evidence of the role 
of reputation at the group level.  Hopkins et al. (2007) demonstrated that participants 
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will help outgroup members in order to refute negative ingroup stereotypes from other 
groups (meta-stereotypes) related to being mean.  Moreover, increasing the salience 
of a negative meta-stereotype increased the level of helping.  Van Leeuwen and Täuber 
(2010) have argued that results such as these can be explained by strategic motives 
related to reputational concerns.  A good reputation often comprises of ingroup 
warmth and competence, which encourages the positive group distinctiveness that is 
so important to the social identity approach.  If this is true, and helping sometimes 
occurs due to such strategic motives, then we should expect to see situations where 
the outgroup is helped more than the ingroup.  Van Leeuwen, Oostenbrink and Twilt 
(2014) found increased outgroup helping (in this case a confederate who needed help 
with directions) when a meta-stereotype (presumably negative) had been activated 
beforehand.  Moreover, concern over one’s ingroup image following a salient negative 
meta-stereotype has been shown to predict helping towards an outgroup (Van 
Leeuwen & Tauber, 2012).  Interestingly, in this latter study, concern for one’s 
personal reputation was not a strong predictor of outgroup helping, suggesting that 
concerns for the group’s reputation are paramount.  Although there are other strategic 
motives relevant to outgroup helping, e.g. maintaining group power and autonomy 
(Nadler, 2002), or maintaining group distinctiveness (cf. Van Leeuwen & Täuber, 
2010), reputation management is clearly an important motive to consider in intergroup 
helping. 
Cost-reward considerations and the crowding-out effect 
If conscious reasoning is involved in helping behaviour, then one might expect 
individuals to appreciate the costs and rewards involved in helping.  Indeed, this idea 
has been a focus in the domain of bystander emergency intervention.  The Arousal: 
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Cost Reward Model (Dovidio, Piliavin, Gaertner, Schroeder & Clark, 1991) proposes 
that bystanders engage in a deliberate cost-reward evaluation while also experiencing 
negative arousal associated with the emergency situation.  The observation of a person 
in desperate need causes negative arousal which can motivate the bystander to help 
(thereby reducing their negative emotions).  However, whether help occurs is at least 
partly dependent on cognitive considerations. Therefore, although help is proposed to 
be a function of negative arousal, bystanders also engage in a weighing-up of the costs 
and rewards involved.  Costs may include perceived danger, time involvement, 
physical effort, as well as emotional costs such as the blame and guilt associated with 
not helping.  Piliavin and Piliavin (1972) had a confederate collapse in a subway 
station, either with or without a trickle of blood from the mouth, and found that 
participants in the blood condition were less willing to help.  They argued that the 
presence of blood increased the perceived costs, which included fear and revulsion.  
In another study testing the effects of costs, there was evidence that when under time 
pressure (e.g. when late for a meeting), bystanders were less likely to help a 
confederate slumped in a doorway (Darley & Batson, 1973).   
Much of the cost-reward research from a social psychological perspective has 
been focused in the area of bystander intervention, but there is also evidence that cost-
reward considerations are important for other forms of helping.  Economists have 
investigated the effects of subsidies and pricing on subsequent donations.  A recent 
meta-analysis of these studies shows that higher suggestive donation amounts are 
usually negatively correlated with actual donations, although the effect size can vary 
widely between studies (Peloza & Steel, 2005).  In addition, donation requests have 
been found to be more effective when the solicited amount is smaller (Andreoni & 
Miller, 2002; Eckel & Grossman, 2003, 2004).  The importance of costs and benefits 
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in prosociality is therefore at least partly evinced by studies conducted in experimental 
economics.   
In discussing economic research, it is worth noting that a traditional approach 
has been to associate costs with the potential donor, while rewards (benefits) are 
typically associated with the person in need.  Thus, the donor may weigh up costs to 
themselves with the general utility and benefit of helping.  However, it is also possible 
to think of benefits in terms of gains to the individual donor (as indeed Dovidio, 
Piliavin et al.’s model advocates).  From the viewpoint of an economist, as financial 
benefits to the individual increase, e.g. in the form of tax breaks, so too should the 
likelihood of that individual making a donation.  However, it has been observed in 
numerous studies that as benefits to the individual increase, giving may, rather 
counterintuitively, decrease.  Heyman and Ariely (2004) demonstrated the effect in 
three experimental economic studies where financial rewards to the donor were 
manipulated and where donors demonstrated less helping as rewards increased.  
Experimental dictator games have also shown that factors such as religious and 
altruistic values had a greater effect on helping behaviour than monetary rewards 
(Eckel & Grossman, 2000).  Additionally, economic field studies have shown that 
subsidies can result in a temporary donation boost, but that such subsidies can have a 
negative effect by lowering contributions in the long-run once the incentivisation is 
removed (Meier, 2007).  This deleterious effect has been labelled the ‘crowding-out’ 
effect (Titmuss, 1970), and is not solely limited to a reduction in economic giving.  
For instance, research has also found a decrease in church attendance, a morally 
normative activity, after a financial reward incentive was made available to encourage 
church-going (Gruber et al., 2004).   
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So why do we sometimes see a crowding-out effect?  Titmuss (1970) argued 
that a helping act such as donating blood to a person in need is intrinsically motivated.  
However, this intrinsic desire to help another in need will decrease if replaced by an 
extrinsic motivation (e.g. donating blood in order to receive a cash incentive).  
Therefore, a possible explanation for the crowding-out effect may involve the moral 
perceptions of the donor.  One may intend to do a good deed for the intangible and 
non-economic benefit of ‘feeling good’ or ‘doing the right thing’.  Then, when an 
extrinsic reward is introduced, the donation act shifts from a moral arena to a financial 
one.  Whereas the donor previously had an intrinsic motivation (I’m doing this because 
it’s right), they now have a financial motivation (I’m doing this to get value).  Since a 
donor is always financially better off not giving, the psychological motivation to help 
is ‘crowded-out’ (Heymann & Ariely, 2004).   
Crowding-out does not always have predictable effects, and some studies have 
not been able to demonstrate it (Brooks, 1999; Marcuello & Salas, 2001). While other 
studies have found financial incentives to be effective in increasing the overall number 
of contributors, although not necessarily the total donation amount (Brooks, 2003; 
Kropf & Knack, 2003).  The precise conditions for the emergence of the crowding-out 
effect are still unclear.  However, the presence of the effect does highlight that 
government incentives such as tax aids are not always an effective strategy.   
In sum, it would seem that costs and benefits are mechanisms which can be 
tangible (e.g. involving time or money) or intangible (e.g. providing benefits to 
reputation).  Cost-reward approaches offer an intuitive or ‘common sense’ explanation 
for when people help. Despite this, as the discussion of the crowding-out effect 
demonstrates, such models may struggle to account for inconsistencies in observed 
helping behaviour.  The Arousal Cost-Reward Model (Piliavin et al, 1981) goes some 
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way to include affect and arousal alongside cognitive factors.  But, even in this model 
Piliavin acknowledges that in some cases individuals will bypass the cognitive 
considerations entirely and act instinctively.   
Three factors that may affect donation reasoning: donation need, donation 
effectiveness, and donation impact 
It is reasonable to assume that donors of charitable donations have more time 
to consider cost-benefit factors than those helping in the emergency situations 
typically studied in bystander research.  As such, the remainder of this section 
considers three important factors that may influence a donors’ reasoning. These are 
the perceived need that victims have for a donation, the perceived efficacy of donating 
to a particular charity, and the perceived impact of individual donations to make a 
difference.   
Firstly, I would like to consider the role of perceived need in helping a victim.  
One might assume that the level of need largely explains giving behaviour; that is, 
increased need will result in a greater likelihood that a donation will be made, as well 
as increased giving amounts.  There is some evidence to support this intuition with 
perceived need correlating with donations towards disabled individuals (Levitt & 
Kornhaber, 1977), alumni contributions (Diamond & Kashyap, 1997), and intentions 
towards international relief organisations (Cheung & Chan, 2000).  Media coverage 
of an earthquake has also been found to be positively correlated with contributions 
(Simon, 1997), and hours spent watching television (presumably increasing the 
awareness of need for public events) correlates with amounts donated to disaster relief 
(Bennett & Kottasz, 2005).   
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However, it does not necessarily follow that increased donation amounts are 
caused by an increased awareness of need.  For example, as outlined above, medical 
charities receive the highest level of donations in the U.K.  One could therefore assume 
that the recipients of medical donations are likely to be viewed as the neediest.  
However, a previous study found that manipulating perceived need increased the 
likelihood of donating but, counterintuitively, lowered average contributions 
(Dolinski, Grzyb, Olejnik, Prusakowski, & Urban, 2005).  Of course, we could 
interpret these findings as expressions of ‘reluctant altruism’ or reputational concerns 
related to social norm expectations.  However, there is further evidence that need and 
donation behaviour are not so perfectly correlated.  In order to realise that perceived 
need cannot fully account for giving behaviour, we need only look back to two recent 
disaster appeals.  In 2004, two global humanitarian appeals received widespread media 
coverage, the Asian ‘Boxing Day’ tsunami, and the violent civil unrest in Darfur, 
Sudan.  The latter had been described as the world’s worst humanitarian crisis (UN 
News Centre, 2004).  Despite the severity of the situation in Darfur, and despite a long 
running campaign for aid over several months, U.K. donations to the Disasters 
Emergency Committee (DEC) for the Asian tsunami were approximately 10 times 
higher than to Darfur, and in just a little over two months (Eldridge, 2005).  Around 
the globe aid agencies attempted to redirect aid to Darfur, with aid workers in Australia 
referring to Darfur as a forgotten catastrophe (Gooch, 2005).   
In sum, it would appear that the perceived need of the disaster appeal is not 
sufficient to explain large scale helping behaviours.  Thinking back to chapter 1, and 
the donation behaviour of the G20 countries, there are greater populations in need in 
economically weaker countries abroad than at home. Yet, giving to overseas causes is 
miniscule in comparison to this need.  It would appear that perceived need is an 
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important factor to consider, but like the cost-reward models presented above, need 
cannot fully explain helping behaviour.     
This brings us to a second consideration.  Perhaps one of the reasons for lower 
overseas donations is that donors perceive helping overseas to be less effective?  
Strictly speaking, donation effectiveness can be defined in terms of whether donations 
are in principle effective, e.g. whether donations will reach their intended target and 
be used efficiently by charitable organisations.  One common sense intuition might be 
that the more effective a donation is perceived to be, the more likely it is that a donation 
will occur.  This idea is supported by survey research that has found perceptions of 
low efficacy to correlate with a lower likelihood of a donation being made (Diamond 
& Kashyap, 1997).  However, it is not clear from these studies if the effect was due to 
perceived efficacy, or due to a reverse justification whereby donors retrospectively 
justified their donation behaviour.  There is, however, at least one study that has 
manipulated perceived effectiveness, and has found it to have a significant causal 
effect on donation levels (Warren & Walker, 1991).   
Related to concerns over the effectiveness of a donation is the consideration of 
whether the donation is impactful.  Donation impact can be defined in terms of the 
influence that an individual donation will have on a person/persons in need.  When a 
layperson makes a donation because their donation is the last needed to meet a funding 
goal, or when they feel that their donation can save many lives, they are concerned 
with impact.  Qualitative interviews of donors suggest that donation effectiveness and 
donation impact are related concepts that go hand in hand, and that donors are 
concerned with both (Breeze, 2010). 
The above conceptualisation of donation impact has been proposed by 
(Duncan, 2004) who formulated an economic model of philanthropic impact, arguing 
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that donors want their donation to both be effective and impactful.  Duncan’s 
economic model of philanthropy may provide a useful way of understanding, for 
example, why donors may prefer to have their donation go fully to a single cause, 
rather than have their donation dispersed amongst several causes.   
Although not the main focus of the thesis, as will become clear in chapter 6, 
one aim of this work was to explore whether the effects of some of these variables 
would replicate in the donation contexts studied in the present body of work.  
Fallacious donation reasoning, Type 1 versus Type 2 decision-making, and the 
potential role of group memberships 
In this section, I conceptualise donation decisions as a type of problem-solving.   
There are many different causes to choose from, and thinking of whether to donate, 
and to whom, can create a problem.  Section 3.1 presented evidence for the role of 
reputation concerns and strategic thinking in relation to helping decisions.  However, 
in chapter 2 I suggested that helping can also be considered a more automatic process 
that is related to empathy or social learning.  This present section considers whether 
individuals have in fact two methods for decision-making, one that is more automatic 
and instinctive, and another that is more rational.  Evidence for this idea is presented 
below.  I begin by first presenting evidence of fallacious reasoning in a donation 
context, notably the ‘identifiable victim’ effect and the ‘psychophysical numbing’ 
effect.  I then introduce dual-process reasoning theories, briefly consider how dual-
process reasoning theories can explain the fallacious effects, and end by commenting 
on how reasoning styles may be especially important in an intergroup helping context.   
The ‘identifiable victim’ effect (Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997; Kogut & Ritov, 
2005, 2007) focuses on evidence that has found increased prosociality to a single 
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victim (e.g. a single sick child), as opposed to a group (e.g. eight sick children) (Kogut 
& Ritov, 2005).  The identifiable victim effect can be considered a cognitive fallacy, 
as in these paradigms participants can offer the same aid to several victims at no 
increased cost (greater efficiency), but instead opt to help an individual victim 
(reduced efficiency).  Researchers have found that focusing on an identifiable victim 
increases generosity compared to focusing on larger groups in need, but that being 
made aware of the effect has the perverse effect of diminishing prosociality (Small & 
Loewenstein, 2003).  The identifiable victim effect seems to be partly driven by the 
effectiveness of a single victim in invoking perspective taking, and thereby 
magnifying negative emotions such as distress that are aroused by the appeal (Kogut 
& Ritov, 2005; Kogut, 2011).  These findings would suggest that identifiable victims 
are more effective at generating empathic concern, or at the very minimum, at 
increasing the psychological vividness of the charitable appeal (cf. Jenni & 
Loewenstein, 1997).   
There is also evidence that the identifiable victim effect may be related to 
another fallacy referred to as ‘psychophysical numbing’ (Fetherstonhaugh et al., 1997; 
Friedrich et al., 1999; Slovic, 2007).  These researchers argue that participants are 
insensitive to the value of human life when that life is presented in statistical terms.  
For example, Fetherstonhaugh et al. (1997) found that participants prefer to fund 
disaster interventions that save a greater proportion of lives.  When considering the 
merit of two disaster interventions that claim the ability to save 5,500 lives, it was the 
proportion of lives that participants focused on, i.e. whether the charity in question 
could save 5,500 out of 11,000 lives, or 5,500 out of 25,000 lives.  This logic can be 
considered erroneous in that the value of 5,500 lives is seemingly dependent upon the 
proportion those lives make up out of the ‘total pot’.  Although one could argue that 
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donors are merely being efficient, this type of logic also suggests that donors are being 
callous.  Moreover, the value of 5,500 lives should remain constant, no matter what 
proportion of lives the 5,500 amount to.   
With regards to the link between the identifiable victim effect and 
psychophysical numbing, Slovic (2007) has argued that focusing on a single victim 
can counter the deleterious effects of presenting victims in statistical terms.  Moreover,  
Hsee et al. (2013) found that asking participants to think of a hypothetical donation 
amount for a single victim resulted in subsequently greater donations for a group of 
statistical victims.  They argued that donations towards groups of victims are lower 
due to scope insensitivity, and that focusing participants on a single victim before 
considering the larger group can help to correct this fallacy.   
Taken together, it would seem that the identifiable victim effect can be at least 
partly explained by a donor’s insensitivity to statistical victims, and warns us that a 
common sense factor related to donation decisions, specifically the scale of the 
problem, may not be predictive of prosociality in certain contexts.  The donation 
‘fallacies’ summarised above all suggest that donors do not necessarily make 
straightforward donation decisions.  Clearly, there is more than one type of decision 
making which seems to be at play.  Donors might ‘go with their gut’, or try to rationally 
weigh up the pros and cons between different donation options.   
Indeed, there is evidence that individuals have two distinct sets of cognitive 
modes that are related to this type of problem-solving.  One of these sets of systems is 
automatic, requires fewer mental resources, and tends to be faster; while the other set 
of systems is more analytical, requires effort, and tends to be slower – these sets of 
systems are referred to as Type 1 vs. Type 2 systems (Evans, 2010; Frankish & Evans, 
2009).  A dual-process position is based on experimental evidence that humans have 
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essentially two cognitive modes when it comes to decision making (e.g. Gawronski & 
Creighton, 2013; Kahneman, 2011).  There are essentially three types of evidence that 
supporters of dual-process theories call upon in order to support their demarcation.  
These three types can be broadly categorised under experimental research that aims to 
manipulate one type of reasoning while leaving the other unaffected, neuroscientific 
research that shows specific brain areas correspond to a specific reasoning style, and 
correlational studies that show Type 2 reasoning is related to cognitive reasoning 
where Type 1 is not.  These three areas are briefly discussed below. 
Evidence for an experimental distinction has been provided by studies that 
have shown a decrease in logical accuracy, and an increase in belief bias, when under 
time pressure (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005), or when under cognitive load (De 
Neys, 2006).  Since Type 2 processing is linked to greater cognitive effort and is 
associated with being slower, these types of studies suggest that Type 2 reasoning is a 
distinct set of systems from the faster Type 1 reasoning that remains unaffected by 
such manipulations.  Note that in these types of paradigms, inducing time-pressure 
and/or cognitive load does not merely result in increased errors or increased random 
error.  Introducing time pressure and/or cognitive load encourages polarisation of 
logical accuracy and belief bias, decreasing the former and increasing the latter, 
thereby suggesting that the two systems operate independently.  Importantly, Small 
and Loewenstein (2003) argue that helping towards an identifiable victim is somewhat 
instinctual (i.e. presumably a Type 1 process), while the deleterious effects of a 
deliberate reasoning style (presumably a Type 2 process) is due to a lack of empathic 
concern.  This would suggest that the two types of reasoning might interfere with each 
other, and there is evidence to support this view in the next paragraph. 
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In addition to experimental findings, there is evidence from neuroscientific 
research that suggests different brain regions correspond to the two types of reasoning.  
When presenting a participant with a belief or logic based problem, conscious 
reasoning is associated with activation in the right prefontal cortex (an area typically 
associated with executive control) (De Neys, Vartanian, & Goel, 2008; Goel, 2008; 
Goel & Dolan, 2003; Tsujii & Watanabee, 2009).  The logic here is that increased 
activity occurs in a specific brain region when requiring problem solving that requires 
Type 2 reasoning, but such activity does not occur on simpler tasks.  Moreover, the 
two types of reasoning are proposed to inhibit each other (Lieberman, 2009).  For 
example, when faced with a moral dilemma that involves making a rational (as 
opposed to an emotional) choice, there was increased activity in the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex and parietal lobes, areas that are linked with inhibiting emotional 
responses, with emotional responses presumed to be related to faster Type 1 processes 
(Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley & Cohen, 2004).  Finally, cognitive load has been 
shown to interfere with the ability to make more complex utilitarian moral judgments, 
while simpler non-utilitarian judgements remained unaffected (Greene, Morelli, 
Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008).  These results are in keeping with the 
aforementioned behavioural studies that found cognitive load and time pressure to 
inhibit logical reasoning and increase belief bias.   
If errors in reasoning are increased by cognitive load and time pressure, then 
one might predict that individuals with greater cognitive ability would perform better 
on such tasks and choose the correct answer on more occasions.  In general, this seems 
to be the case, e.g. individuals significantly higher on cognitive ability (measured by 
SAT scores) were more likely to choose the maximum utility (i.e. correct) answer on 
a probabilistic task (West & Stanovich, 2003).  Individuals who scored higher on 
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intelligence tests have also been shown to be more likely to solve abstract versions of 
the Wason selection task (Stanovich & West, 1999).  These studies support the view 
that individual differences play a role in reasoning, as well as the view that Type 2 
reasoning is linked to intelligence.   
Intelligence is not the only individual difference variable which might matter.   
Preference for critical thinking (need for cognition), or preference in trusting gut 
responses (faith in intuition), can predict the likelihood of fallacious reasoning.  A 
preference for critical thinking (need for cognition) has been shown to predict correct 
performance on a range of tasks such as syllogistic reasoning, argument evaluation, 
and hypothesis testing (Stanovich & West, 1998).  It has also been linked to the ability 
to avoid cognitive biases (West, Toplak, & Stanovich, 2008).  In line with Type 1 vs. 
Type 2 theory, there is evidence that critical thinking is able to interrupt intuitive 
thought processes, thereby leading to increased deliberation that in turn increases the 
odds of a correct response.  This idea has been tested using the Cognitive Reflection 
Test (Frederick, 2005), which is a measure of individual tendency to override an initial 
response and engage in further reasoning which subsequently leads to a correct 
response.  The Cognitive Reflection Test has been shown to predict the likelihood of 
biased answers (e.g. on a syllogistic reasoning task), and although the test is positively 
correlated with intelligence, it remains a predictor of correct responses even when 
intelligence is controlled for (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011).  Note that it is 
possible that Type 2 decision making can be done quickly, perhaps in situations where 
the individual is highly skilled and able to make fast calculations or utilise a heuristic 
(note that this implies that heuristics are not necessarily a Type 1 process).  
Nonetheless, in most cases Type 2 thinking is a much slower process than Type 1. 
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Dual-process reasoning theory is not without its critics.  Some researchers have 
voiced concerns over difficulties in classifying the two sets of systems, and even 
arguing for a unitary system (cf. Evans & Stanovich, 2013).  Nonetheless, I would 
argue that the evidence presented above provides a compelling argument for two broad 
cognitive reasoning systems that are related to problem-solving.  Type 1 is an 
automatic process that results in instinctive decision making that tends to be fast, while 
Type 2 requires conscious engagement, can override Type 1, is vulnerable to cognitive 
load and time-pressure, and tends to be slower (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). 
 So, how does a Type 1 and Type 2 theoretical approach to reasoning help us 
understand the fallacious donation reasoning associated with identifiable victims or 
psychophysical numbing?  If participants were to utilise a Type 1 decision-making 
process, then they might be more likely to consider the proportion rather than total 
number of lives saved when making donation decisions.  When presented with an 
identifiable victim, those operating under a Type 1 process may be moved to action 
because the case is more vivid and because it generates more empathic concern.  
Alternatively, Type 2 reasoning may result in participants considering objective 
economic value and utility or other strategic motives.   
 A few researchers have attempted to manipulate reasoning styles in an effort 
to increase charitable giving.  Dickert, Sagara and Slovic (2011) primed participants 
to either a deliberate more calculating reasoning style (i.e. a Type 2 process), or an 
affective reasoning style (i.e. a more Type 1 process), or a neutral prime.  Affective 
reasoning was found to increase donations.  It was associated with empathic concern, 
which in turn was a predictor of donation amount.  The authors suggest that mood 
management (i.e. regulating negative emotions aroused by the appeal) was predictive 
of donation decisions.  Interestingly, the authors also attempted, but failed, to replicate 
60 
the identifiable victim effect.  They argued that the reason for the failure was due to 
the victims in their charity appeal (Israeli children) not being part of their participants’ 
ingroup.   
The above speculation from Dickert and colleagues in explaining a null finding 
by way of group membership brings me to the final point I wish to make in this section.  
There has been a great deal of research into Type 1 and Type 2 processes, and a great 
deal of research into the effects of group membership, but little attempt to marry the 
two.  This is particularly the case when it comes to understanding prosocial effects.  
And yet, one could reason that the categorisation process that underlies the social 
identity approach is in many ways compatible with a Type 1/Type 2 conceptualisation.  
Classification of the social landscape into ingroups and outgroups has the effect of 
enabling fast automatic decisions as to how to treat other individuals.  Group 
membership categorisation can be conceptualised as a type of intuition, one that allows 
fast decision-making.   
To illustrate the above point, consider the example of the lack of donations to 
overseas outgroup members presented in chapter 1.  It may be easier to donate to 
ingroup causes at home (a Type 1 response based on group membership), rather than 
override this response and engage in the cognitive effort required to evaluate the 
efficacy and worthiness of an overseas cause.  Moreover, neuroscience findings 
presented in this section suggest Type 1 decisions to be related to emotional brain 
regions, and ingroup helping has been linked to empathic concern and negative 
affective arousal (see chapter 2).  In the same manner that Type 1/Type 2 responses 
can be distinguished by automaticity and effort (Evans & Stanovich, 2013), it seems 
reasonable to assume that ingroup helping can be a relatively automatic response that 
can occur quickly, while outgroup helping is a more conscious response that is slower 
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and more thoughtful.  The role of dual process reasoning and group memberships is a 
novel line of research and will be empirically investigated in chapter 6.  In other words, 
one aim of this thesis was to explore the applicability of a Type1/Type 2 framework 
to ingroup and outgroup helping, focussing specifically on donations.  
To increase donations to ‘naturally’ unpopular causes, researchers have 
encouraged people to become more aware of their donation behaviour and change their 
cognitive process from a more intuitive thinking style, to a more deliberate and 
analytical thinking style (Small et al., 2007).  Unfortunately, these attempts have been 
met with deleterious consequences.  As Small and colleagues demonstrated across four 
studies, simply informing participants about fallacious reasoning (in this case the 
identifiable victim effect), resulted in participants rejecting the automatic response to 
help, and thereby lowered overall contribution levels.  Small and colleagues have 
speculated that an analytical reasoning style may block the affective response that 
leads to helping.  Although they do not refer to Type 1/Type 2 processes in their work, 
we can see now that what they argue is perfectly in line with dual-process theories of 
reasoning.  Further, this line of reasoning is compatible with that of experimental 
economists who argue that a more analytical and ‘business’ cognitive style negates 
moral focus, as helping is rarely beneficial to the self from an economic viewpoint 
(Heyman & Ariely, 2004).      
Before we accept the conclusion that a Type 2 reasoning style leads to less 
prosociality, I would like to consider this position more carefully.  In fact, there might 
be boundary conditions to this pattern.  First, the findings that deliberate reasoning 
style deteriorates prosociality have largely been conducted in the context of 
identifiable victims. There is much less evidence about the effect of ‘deliberate’ 
priming when victims are presented statistically.  The only study that has compared 
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donations towards both statistical and identifiable victims (to my knowledge), has 
found a slight, albeit non-significant, increase in donations (study 1: Small et al., 
2007).  This would suggest that the context and framing of the charitable appeal may 
offer some nuance to the role of reasoning style in helping behaviour.  An interesting 
endeavour would therefore be to study the effects of reasoning styles more thoroughly 
in the context of statistical victims.  As will become clear, this was one aspect which 
the empirical part of this thesis explored.  
Moreover, there is reason to believe that a deliberate reasoning style may 
actually increase prosociality in certain situations.  Researchers have identified that 
outgroup members can be helped for strategic purposes (cf. Van Leeuwen & Täuber, 
2010), that reputation concerns can increase donation amounts (Alpizar, Carlsson, & 
Johansson-Stenman, 2008; Martinsson & Alpizar, 2013; Reyniers, 2013), and that 
reputation may be managed strategically for financial or political benefit (Fehrler & 
Przepiorka, 2013; Milinski et al., 2002).  Given that strategy is intuitively linked to a 
more analytical (i.e. Type 2) reasoning style, one could expect a deliberate reasoning 
style to lead to increased prosociality in certain contexts, e.g. when reputation is made 
salient, or when the donation in question is to outgroup recipients (given that such 
donations have been shown to be of more reputational concern than donations towards 
one’s own ingroup members).  Deliberate reasoning may harmonise well with other 
strategic motives which inform outgroup helping, and thereby particularly enhance 
helping for outgroup members.  
If deliberate reasoning is concerned with strategic evaluations of when to help, 
intuitive reasoning should be effective when strategic motives are less likely to be 
involved.  Ingroup helping has been linked to affective processes such as empathy 
(Stürmer et al., 2006), and it reasonable to assume that an affective response generated 
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by seeing another’s suffering will at least partly be intuitive and instinctive.  Another 
line of argument which would suggest that ingroup helping might benefit from an 
intuitive reasoning approach can be based on self-categorisation theory (SCT: Turner, 
1987), which has already been discussed in chapter 2.  As a person joins a group, a 
perceptual shift occurs where one begins to see ingroup members as similar to the self, 
and outgroup members belonging to a different group as dissimilar.  Ingroup victims 
in need may then be perceived as automatically worthy of help, since helping an 
ingroup member becomes much like helping the self (and this can be assumed to be a 
fairly intuitive response).  Thus, intuitive reasoning should be particularly well aligned 
with automatic helping of ingroup members, which is also frequently based on 
affective, intuitive responses.    
Finally, as has already been discussed, it is well documented by previous 
research that donations are increased in public compared to private settings (Alpizar 
et al., 2008; Andreoni & Petrie, 2004; Bateson, Callow, Holmes, Redmond Roche, & 
Nettle, 2013).  Moreover, an analytical thinking style may be more strategic in nature, 
and researchers have demonstrated that reputation concerns are often exploited for 
strategic benefits (Barclay, 2012; Milinski et al., 2002).  It is therefore possible that in 
addition to a positive main effect of public observability on donation contributions, 
that there will also be an interaction between the anonymity of a donation appeal and 
reasoning style.  Specifically, participants primed to a strategic thinking style may be 
more aware of reputational motives and therefore more likely to act upon them, 
whereas participants primed to trust their gut instinct may not act upon such nuances.   
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Conclusion 
In sum, chapter 3 establishes the importance of reasoning in prosociality.  It 
would seem that people have two distinct cognitive modes when it comes to problem-
solving, and donation decisions can be considered in this framework.  People may 
make quick, instinctive donation decisions, or they may engage in a more deliberate 
and analytical thought process.  This latter process may take into account reputational 
concerns as well as cost-reward factors.  An analytical approach may also encourage 
donors to consider strategic motives for outgroup helping, as well as consider factors 
related to the level of perceived need, efficacy, and the impact of their personal 
contribution.  When participants engage in deliberate reasoning, there are many more 
variables that may affect their giving behaviour.   
In the present chapter, I presented evidence of fallacious reasoning in donation 
decisions, and attempted to explain these findings using a dual-systems, Type 1/Type 
2 approach.  I argued that fallacious reasoning is associated with insensitivity towards 
statistical victims which in turn may be due to participants adopting a Type 1 response, 
rather than engaging in more critical Type 2 thinking.  The tendency to adopt a Type 
1 process, and thereby avoid lengthy deliberation of humanitarian issues, may go some 
way in understanding the donation patterns presented in chapter 1.  Finally, I noted 
that researchers have attempted to manipulate reasoning styles in an attempt to 
increase prosociality.  These attempts have resulted in mixed findings, but in general 
it appears that a more deliberate (Type 2) reasoning process results in decreased 
prosociality.  Interestingly, there is little theoretical work (to my knowledge) that has 
attempted to marry the robust findings in the cognitive literature with social 
psychological theories pertaining to group memberships.  I suggest that the two may 
be compatible, and that adopting a group view of helping behaviour can help to 
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understand why quick instinctive donation decisions may occur in an ingroup context, 
and why more strategic reasoning is likely engaged in an outgroup context.  I explore 
this further in chapter 7.     
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Chapter Four 
Facial attractiveness and helping behaviour 
 
Understanding the halo effect 
Thus far, much of the focus in this thesis has revolved around the potential 
donor, their relationship with the victims and (where applicable) perpetrators, and how 
they reason about helping.  However, a question central to all charitable organisations 
is how best to frame and solicit donation appeals.  The present chapter returns to a 
maxim held by many laypersons and studied in early social psychological research: 
‘what is beautiful is good’ (Dion, Berscheid, & Walster, 1972).  Dion and colleagues 
were referring to physical attractiveness, one of the most easily observable 
characteristics of others, and thereby one of the most accessible characteristics for a 
potential donor to base a helping decision on.  As we will see below, attractive others 
are seen as more positive on a range of dimensions that are not necessarily related to 
physical appearance.  These positive associations between physical attractiveness and 
other dimensions have been referred to as a form of stereotyping known as the ‘halo 
effect’ (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).  This section provides a brief overview of research 
that has demonstrated the halo effect, while the following section focuses on research 
that has linked beauty with prosociality.   
To begin, participants have been shown to rate attractive faces (compared to 
neutral or unattractive faces) as having better social skills, increased happiness, more 
likelihood of achieving higher status occupations, and increased competence (Dion et 
al., 1972).  These early findings are supported by a subsequent literature review that 
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found laypersons associate attractiveness moderately with increased intelligence and 
most strongly with increased social competence (Eagly, Ashmore, Makhijani, & 
Longo, 1991).  It may be especially worth highlighting that benefits associated with 
the halo effect may apply even to tasks that are seemingly irrelevant to one’s 
appearance, e.g. competence as an airline pilot (Webster & Driskell, 1983); although 
this view is in line with the general belief that attractive others are more intelligent.   
The relationship between traits such as intelligence and physical beauty may 
be unrelated; however, there is some evidence to suggest that attractive people may 
benefit from their good looks, perhaps by maintaining an evolutionary advantage. 
Kanazawa and Kovar (2004) argue that in evolutionary terms, physically attractive 
others are likely to be more intelligent (see also Grammer, Fink, Møller, & Thornhill, 
2003).  Their argument is derived from their literature review.  They suggest that 
intelligent men are likely to achieve higher status roles, that men in higher status roles 
will have more attractive female partners, and that both intelligence and beauty are 
heritable.  Moreover, Rhodes, et al. (2001) found a negative correlational between 
non-attractive (asymmetrical) faces and general health, although there were sex 
differences and the correlation was not maintained consistently from childhood into 
adulthood.  In an earlier longitudinal study, Kalick, Zebrowitz, Langlois and Johnson 
(1998) did not find a relationship between attractiveness and health, although both 
male and female raters erroneously judged attractive others as having improved health.  
Overall, regardless of whether one believes that there is a genuine link between 
attractiveness and other dimensions such as intelligence or health, it seems clear that 
laypersons tend to perceive attractive people as superior on these dimensions.   
The layperson perception that attractive others are superior on other 
dimensions has also been demonstrated in situations that may have real world 
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consequences.  In a mock jury experiment, jurors were less confident that attractive 
perpetrators were guilty, and they were more likely to recommend lenient sentences 
(Efran, 1974).  These results appear to be driven by increased physical attraction 
between jurors and more attractive targets, and consequently biases held by the jurors.  
Moreover, these effects occurred despite prior avowals from jurors that physical 
appearance should be irrelevant in the jury process.  In addition, findings in business 
and marketing research show that more attractive salespersons are more effective, and 
that evaluators place greater confidence in the abilities and social skills of attractive 
others (McElroy & Decarlo, 1999; Mobius & Rosenblat, 2006).  In sum, it seems that 
there is much evidence to support the halo effect.  The view that ‘what is beautiful is 
good’ does indeed seem to be widespread.    
There is also general agreement as to what is or isn’t physically attractive, with 
a seemingly common agreement across cultures as well as in young infants (Langlois 
et al., 2000).  Researchers have demonstrated gaze preference for attractive faces in 
infants a mere 6 months old (Langlois, Ritter, Roggman, & Vaughn, 1991; Rubenstein, 
Kalakanis, & Langlois, 1999).  These effects have been demonstrated in both female 
and male infants, and they do not appear to be influenced by race, age, or the facial 
attractiveness of the mother.   
A more cognitive explanation however is that infants prefer attractive faces 
because they are more average, and that average faces carry fewer distinguishing 
features that require effortful categorisation and are therefore easier to process 
(Rubenstein et al., 1999).  This explanation has the benefit of being convergent with 
findings in other domains related to cognitive fluency, e.g. researchers have 
demonstrated ease of processing can result in increased ratings of attractiveness for 
objects (Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2004).   
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In attempting to explain why attractive faces are considered attractive, a 
common position is that attractive faces are more average, and much research has 
demonstrated positive effects of averageness on facial attractiveness ratings (Rhodes 
et al., 2001; Valentine, Darling, & Donnelly, 2004).  In fact, even non-face objects 
that are averaged are considered more attractive (Halberstadt & Rhodes, 2000; 
Halberstadt & Rhodes, 2003), lending support to averageness as the underlying 
mechanism.  Perhaps as faces become more representative of a population (and 
therefore more average), they are likely to be viewed as more attractive (Langlois & 
Roggman, 1990).  This means that one may expect to find increased prosociality 
towards attractive others, and that attractiveness can be manipulating by modifying 
the averageness of a person’s facial features. 
Finally, one might expect cultural differences with regards to attractiveness, 
but facial attractiveness ratings (of photographs) have been demonstrated to be similar 
across cultures in both infant and adult populations, and even after controlling for 
media influences (Rhodes et al., 2001).  These findings suggest that there might be, to 
some extent, cross-cultural agreement of what is beautiful.  Overall, there appear to be 
commonly shared ideas of what is beautiful, and perceived beauty exerts a halo effect 
such that it leads to more favourable perceptions on other, probably unrelated, 
dimensions.   
The persuasive effects of beauty on helping behaviours 
Of particular interest to the present thesis is the role that physical attractiveness 
may play in soliciting prosocial behaviour.  Behavioural studies have found increased 
rates of helping physically attractive confederates who solicited help on a student 
campus (Benson, Karabenick, & Lerner, 1976; West & Brown, 1975).  Other 
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researchers have found that solicitations from a more attractive person resulted in 
increased donations (Reingen & Kernan, 1993), and that a picture of an attractive 
person on a poster (that included a disfigured victim) also increased donation amounts 
(Bennett, 1997).   
In the context of time spent volunteering to help AIDS victims, researchers 
have found a positive link between the level of attraction between the victim and 
volunteer (Stürmer, Snyder, & Omoto, 2005); although attraction in this case was 
operationalised as interpersonal attraction, rather than the physical beauty associated 
with the halo effect.  Research that has focused on physical attraction has found beauty 
to affect interpersonal helping between opposite sexes (Nadler, Shapira, & Ben-Itzhak, 
1982).  These findings are not consistent with Dion (1972) who did not find interaction 
effects between participant gender and the target being evaluated.  By contrast, Nadler 
and colleagues found a prosocial effect from females towards attractive males, but not 
from males towards attractive females.  However, the paradigm in these studies 
involved requesting additional help from an attractive or unattractive other, leading to 
speculation that heterosexual males were perhaps unwilling to appear less competent 
in the presence of an attractive female.  Moreover, Nadler and colleagues investigated 
the likelihood of asking an attractive other for help, rather than that of helping an 
attractive other.  Hence, while these results suggest that attractiveness plays a role in 
interpersonal helping, it does not provide evidence for the facilitating role of physical 
attractiveness in being successful at eliciting donations.   
One study which did manipulate the attractiveness of the victim in a donation 
paradigm found increased donations towards an attractive person in need, but only 
when the need was very urgent, i.e. in an emergency situation (West & Brown, 1975).  
Another study found that student volunteers were more likely to deliver an important 
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document across campus for an attractive person (Benson et al., 1976).  In this latter 
study, the results may be due to a physically attractive other being more persuasive.  
For example, in a consumer study, buyers were more likely to treat an attractive seller 
cordially and be persuaded by their offer and, when ostensibly working for a charity, 
attractive sellers solicited significantly more donations (Reingen & Kernan, 1993).  
Finally, as mentioned above, in a study measuring empathy towards facial 
disfigurement victims, the presence of an attractive other alongside the disfigured 
victim elicited the most support (Bennett, 1997).  These results are interesting, given 
that the attractive person was not the victim in need.  Overall, it would seem that 
physical beauty can increase donation contributions.   
More recently, researchers have used data mining techniques to investigate 
donor behaviour on charitable micro lending sites such as KIVA (www.kiva.org).  
Although these sites procure loans from donors, they can be considered charitable in 
the sense that donors are motivated for prosocial reasons.  The loans are geared 
towards helping individuals in developing countries, and the donor forgoes any 
interest payments and typically reinvests the funds to another person in need, leading 
to the term ‘prosocial lending’ (Liu, Chen, Chen, Mei, & Salib, 2012).  One study, 
which analysed borrowing patterns of 6,977 loans in June 2009, found that darker skin 
tone and/or obesity of the borrower reduced lending rates, while borrowers who were 
above normal in physical attractiveness were more likely to be funded by a value of 
around 11% (Jenq, Pan, & Theseira, 2015).  The researchers found that more 
experienced lenders were less influenced by the physical attractiveness of the 
borrower.  They suggest that new lenders, faced with a huge amount of first time 
information, are more likely to be swayed implicitly by the physical appearance of the 
borrower.  Given my discussion of reasoning in chapter 3, we can now interpret their 
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conclusion under a dual-process lens.  New lenders may fall back on a Type 1 process 
that is influenced by the physical appearance of the borrower, while more experienced 
lenders may use a Type 2 process to weigh-up the numerous pros and cons of the 
appeal.  Finally, a recent analysis of giving behaviour for a charity run on the U.K. 
Just Giving website (www.justgiving.com) has found that physical attractiveness 
played a role between male donors and female runners (Raihani & Smith, 2015).  The 
authors found that male donors gave more to attractive female fundraisers, particularly 
when other males had made a prior donation, suggesting that the increased donations 
were due to evolutionary competitiveness.  
Taken together, it seems clear that physical attraction may play an important 
role in subsequent helping behaviour, and the last study mentioned alludes to one of 
the reasons for this effect.  Consistent with an evolutionary approach, helping due to 
physical attractiveness may be the result of a biological desire to be physically (and 
presumably psychologically) closer to the more attractive and therefore more desirable 
individual (Fink & Penton-Voak, 2002; Grammer et al., 2003).  In addition to the study 
by Raihani and Smith (2015), other researchers have argued that interpersonal helping 
can be driven by physical attraction.  For example, in a largely heterosexual culture, 
same-sex pairings (between helper and helpee) do not benefit from attraction effects, 
and may even be associated with lower prosociality perhaps due to jealousy or other 
social concerns (Maria Agthe, Spörrle, & Maner, 2011; Nadler, 1980).  Thus, while 
the halo effect may lead to increased ratings of competence, intelligence, and success 
from both sexes, interpersonal helping due to attraction may be more effective in 
opposite-sex dyads (although, as the findings previously discussed show, the pattern 
is far from unequivocal).   
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Regardless, few if any studies (to my knowledge) have investigated physical 
attraction in an intergroup helping context, and it is unclear as to whether group 
memberships would interact with the physical appearance of the person in need.  There 
is, however, one study that has suggested that political ingroup leaders are viewed as 
more physically attractive than corresponding outgroup leaders (Kniffin, Wansink, 
Griskevicius, & Wilson, 2014).  However, this effect appeared to be driven by 
familiarity, i.e. an exposure effect.  The ‘mere exposure’ effect (Zajonc, 1968), 
demonstrates a cognitive preference or liking of an object that is more familiar.  
Therefore, Kniffin and colleagues argue that a shared ingroup membership would 
significantly moderate the familiarity of the political candidate, thereby increasing 
physical attractiveness ratings.  One aim of this research was to probe the relationship 
between attractiveness and group memberships, and their joint effects on donation 
decisions, further.  Above, I outlined that the research on Type 1/Type 2 reasoning 
styles has hitherto not been considered systematically within an intergroup framework, 
and the same can be said about the research on physical attractiveness. One aim of this 
research was to remedy this, as outlined in detail in chapter 8. 
Conclusion 
This chapter considered evidence of the role physical attractiveness may play 
in prosociality.  I outlined that the ‘halo effect’ is a robust phenomenon that applies 
equally to both genders.  This effect can result in increased ratings of desirable 
attributes such as intelligence, social skills and competence.  There is also evidence of 
physical attractiveness shaping patterns of interpersonal helping behaviour.  While 
aforementioned work by Maria Agthe, Spörrle and Maner (2011), and Nadler (1980), 
provide evidence to suggest that helping due to physical beauty is more pronounced 
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between opposite-sexes.  Given that we live in a heterosexually dominant culture, it 
has been proposed that interpersonal helping driven by attractiveness is partly due to 
mating preferences which serve evolutionary functions.  However, some of the 
findings which could be interpreted as evidence for an innate/evolved preference for 
attractiveness could, however, easily be reinterpreted.  For example, preferences in 
infants for attractive faces have been suggested to be driven by a need for cognitive 
fluency.  Importantly, I noted that there is little research that has investigated group 
memberships alongside physical attractiveness.  One aforementioned study has found 
that the physical attractiveness of political leaders was linked to group membership.  
Still, it is unknown whether ingroup members will receive more aid if they are 
physically attractive, or whether the physical appearance of outgroup members can 
result in increased prosociality.   
Having outlined the theoretical background which informed my research (with 
omissions dictated by brevity requirements), I will now turn to the empirical part of 
my work.  In the following three chapters, I will outline a series of studies which, taken 
together, address my main questions.  Chapter 6 will zoom in on the effects on 
donations by group membership perceptions.  These studies will consider both the in- 
or outgroup membership (vis-à-vis the donor) of the potential recipient of help, but 
also that of a potential perpetrator who has put the victims in their undesirable position 
of need.  Chapter 7 will explore the effects of reasoning styles, and particularly 
investigate how the use of Type 1/Type 2 processes might alter responses to help 
needed by ingroup or outgroup victims.  Chapter 8 will put at its centre the question 
of how perceived attractiveness of a victim might affect donation responses, again in 
an intergroup context where those in need are either ingroup or outgroup members.  
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Chapter Five 
The effects of group memberships on charitable donations 
 
Introduction 
The present chapter is comprised of four studies which investigate intergroup 
processes in the context of donations to large groups in need.  As outlined above, there 
is a large literature on charitable helping, but there are some notable gaps in that 
literature.  Firstly, much of the past literature on charitable helping has focused on 
features of the people in need, and features of potential perpetrators have been largely 
ignored (see chapter 2).  Thus, the present studies offer a novel contribution by 
focusing not only on victims in need, but also on the perpetrators involved, and on the 
important role that some thinkers have reasoned that perpetrators play in humanly 
caused problems (Gray & Wegner, 2012).  To recap what was reviewed in chapter 2, 
some studies have demonstrated that mere human involvement can influence 
prosociality, while studies in non-charitable contexts have demonstrated that 
perpetrators can play an important role in how respondents perceive tragic events.  
Given this pattern, one may expect a salient perpetrator group to affect donation 
decisions, and this research will investigate this possibility.   
 Secondly, much of the past research has been situated at an interpersonal level, 
i.e. it has focussed on how/why a respondent helps a specific person in need.  With the 
exceptions already noted in the review above (c.f. chapter 2), the role group 
memberships may play in charitable helping has been relatively neglected.  Thus, the 
studies in this thesis adopt a social identity approach that considers the importance of 
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salient group memberships.  As already discussed, there is robust evidence of the 
importance of group memberships in helping behaviours in other domains.  It is 
therefore surprising that there is relatively little research that has investigated the 
specific effect of group memberships on donation decisions.   
Overview of hypotheses 
 The hypotheses below are largely derived from the literature reviewed in the 
previous chapters.  Hence, the theoretical rationale for each hypothesis will be 
summarised, but not in too much detail.  For a more thorough discussion, the reader is 
referred back to the theoretical chapters above.  
Hypothesis 5.1.  A salient shared group membership between donor and 
perpetrator will increase donations towards the victims.  The prediction for this main 
effect rests on the literature reviewed in chapter 2.  In line with a social identity 
approach, it is presumed that participants feel existentially intertwined with other 
group members (Zagefka, Nigbur, Gonzalez, & Tip, 2012); therefore, a salient shared 
group membership with the perpetrator should result in the participant feeling 
increased social responsibility to help.  To put more simply, participants will feel that 
the helping situation they are faced with is their ‘problem’, and not a problem for 
someone else to solve.  Participants will therefore be more open towards making 
financial reparations when they share group membership with the perpetrator.   
 Hypothesis 5.2.  The present studies predict increased prosociality when the 
victim and donor share a salient group membership. This prediction follows from 
much of the research detailed in chapter 2 which has found an ingroup bias/preference 
that some have referred to as 'ingroup love' (Brewer, 1999).  This prediction is 
consistent with the social identity approach.  As the self becomes intertwined with the 
group, a process of de-individuation can occur, where one sees the self and others as 
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group members.  In this manner, helping an ingroup victim is analogous to helping the 
self.  
 Hypothesis 5.3. Prosociality will be highest when both the victim and 
perpetrator are ingroup members.  One can expect that any feelings of empathic 
concern for the victim will be amplified when the donor also feels that they are 
somewhat responsible for the negative event.  The rationale for this will become 
clearer with the discussion of the mechanisms of responsibility and empathy in the 
predictions below.  Essentially, when the donor accepts that they have a responsibility 
to help, they should be more open to feelings of empathic concern and distress, and 
therefore any negative feelings that are generated will be far more effective.     
 Hypothesis 5.4.  A shared perpetrator group membership will positively 
increase attributions of perceived donor responsibility.  Perceived donor responsibility 
is defined as the extent to which the donor feels that they have a duty to help others in 
need.  As discussed in chapter 2, outgroup helping has been linked to various strategic 
motives which in turn are often related to how the ingroup (and thereby the self) will 
be perceived by others (van Leeuwen & Täuber, 2010).  Thus, whether a donor accepts 
responsibility to help an outgroup member may be influenced partly by strategic image 
concerns that are related to perceptions of egalitarianism and fairness (Braun & 
Gollwitzer, 2012; van Leeuwen, Dijk, & Kaynak, 2013).  One situation where an 
individual will feel responsible to help an outgroup member is when the ingroup is 
designated as the perpetrator, evinced by studies which have investigated helping due 
to feelings of guilt (Brown et al., 2008).  Therefore, one may expect a shared 
perpetrator group membership to impact upon responsibility ratings.   
 Hypothesis 5.5.  Whereas the perpetrator effect described above is predicted to 
operate via a mechanism related to perceived responsibility, the ingroup victim 
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helping preference will be driven by greater empathy for ingroup victims compared to 
outgroup victims.  As seen above, there is a large body of work that has identified 
empathic concern as a proximate mechanism which triggers helping, and many of the 
paradigms in this research area have inadvertently focused on ingroup helping (see 
chapter 2).  Most of all, the prediction is based on previously mentioned work that has 
demonstrated that ingroup (but not outgroup) victims are helped due to empathy 
responses (Stürmer et al., 2006).  As elaborated upon previously, a shared victim group 
membership is linked with empathic responses, which in turn are linked to ingroup 
(but not outgroup) helping (Stürmer et al., 2006).  This implies an intrinsic desire to 
help ingroup victims that may not be present for outgroup victims.  Thus, there is 
reason to expect that a shared victim group membership will increase helping due to 
feelings of empathic concern. 
 Hypothesis 5.6.  The relationship between empathy and prosociality will be 
mediated by a sense of donor responsibility to help the victim.  It is proposed that a 
heightened feeling of concern and distress for the victims should lead to a heightened 
desire and felt obligation to intervene and help, i.e. empathic concern should result in 
feeling responsible to help.  This position is based on work that has demonstrated that 
responsibility mediates negative affective emotions such as guilt (Basil, Ridgway, & 
Basil, 2006), and that empathy directed towards others who are suffering is an 
effective method of generating negative affective  responses which prompt helping 
(Basil, Ridgway, & Basil, 2008).  Basil and colleagues do not develop the link between 
empathy and responsibility, but this link is made explicitly in the current thesis.  Given 
that Basil and colleagues have demonstrated responsibility to mediate negative 
affective emotions in a charity appeal, and given that empathy is highly effective in 
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generating helping responses, it is reasonable to test the assumption that empathy will 
be mediated by responsibility.  
 Finally, effects on the perceived scale of the disaster (operationalised in the 
current studies as the extent of the suffering and financial damage incurred) were 
explored.  The perceived scale of the disaster has been shown to positively predict 
donation aid; however, this has been attributed to the impact that the scale of a disaster 
has on subsequent media coverage (Simon, 1997).  Of greater interest, the subjective 
scale of the disaster has been shown to be inflated when human involvement is due to 
an intentional act (Ames & Fiske, 2013).  Given that human intentionality has been 
shown to affect the perceived scale of a tragic event, it would be interesting to test 
whether shared group memberships (particularly with a perpetrator group) can also 
affect subjective perceptions of harm and damage, i.e. the perceived scale of the 
disaster.     
Study 1 
 Study 1 uses an experimental design, and varies the group membership of the 
perpetrators in an airline disaster, to test the prediction that a shared group membership 
between donors (participants) and perpetrators will increase donation levels 
(Hypothesis 5.1).  Further, study 1 is particularly focused on the minimal conditions 
needed to achieve such an effect.  
 Study 1 also includes some exploratory aspects.  To begin, rather than focus 
on a simple comparison between ingroup and outgroup perpetrator, study 1 
distinguishes between two types of outgroup perpetrators.  In one case, the perpetrators 
belong to the same group as the victims.  In the other case, the perpetrators do not 
share a membership with either the victims or the donors – instead, they are of a third 
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party. The purpose of this demarcation was to nuance the ingroup/outgroup 
relationship.  While it may be tempting to think of the perpetrator relationship as a 
simple ingroup/outgroup dichotomy, it is reasonable to expect that it will matter to 
potential donors which other groups the perpetrator is associated with.  More 
specifically, study 1 explores whether there will be deleterious consequences when the 
perpetrator is related to the victim in need.  Therefore, the inclusion of a third party 
perpetrator group, where the perpetrator is not related to either the victim or the donor, 
allows for a more nuanced comparison.   
 In line with what is outlined in section 5.1., the present study also included a 
measure of the perceived scale of the disaster.  As noted above, the present study 
included this measure for exploratory purposes.   
Method 
Participants 
 Eighty-four participants completed the study (61 female, 23 male).  
Participants consisted of an opportunity sample of undergraduate students who took 
part in the study online for course credit (N = 65) and participants recruited on campus 
who participated voluntarily (N = 19).  Ages ranged from 18 to 54 (Mage = 23.16, SD 
= 8.75).  Participants were randomly assigned to one of three group membership 
conditions: i) the perpetrator belonged to the participants’ own country; ii) the 
perpetrator belonged to the victims’ country; or iii) the perpetrator belonged to a third, 
non-specified country not shared with the participant or the victims.   
Procedure and measures 
 Participants answered standard demographic questions and then, via the use of 
an online random number generator, were assigned to one of three experimental 
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versions of a fictitious news report.  The news report covered an accidental disaster 
that involved a plane crash in a foreign location.  The crash resulted in an explosion 
that caused the deaths of hundreds, as well as substantial environmental damage.  The 
content of the news reports was kept deliberately abstract and provided no salient or 
relevant information other than the group membership of the perpetrator.  To illustrate, 
the manipulation stated that the plane causing the accident was either from: ‘your 
country’, ‘the victim’s country’, or ‘a different country’.  Thus, the perpetrator shared 
group membership with either the donor, the victim, or a non-specified third party.  
Aside from this small change, all other features of the three conditions were identical 
(see Appendix A).   
 Participants in each condition subsequently answered a short questionnaire 
beginning with an item asking them to make a hypothetical donation by writing down 
how much they would donate to aid the victims using an open response format to avoid 
potential anchor effects (Hysenbelli, Rubaltelli, & Rumiati, 2013).  Previous research 
has demonstrated that hypothetical donations are correlated with actual donations 
(Alpizar, Carlsson, & Johansson-Stenman, 2008; Macmillan, Smart, & Andrew, 1999; 
Macmillan, 2004; Zagefka et al., 2011).  Moreover, several studies in the domain of 
experimental economics have demonstrated that hypothetical financial estimates are 
reliable proxies for real monetary behaviours (Champ, Bishop, Brown, & McCollum, 
1997; Johannesson et al., 1999; Loomis, Brown, Lucero, & Peterson, 1996).  
Importantly, the purpose of the study was not to assess accurate mean levels of giving 
(which might be inflated in hypothetical rather than real donations), but to assess the 
effects of the perpetrator group membership manipulation (which can be assumed to 
affect hypothetical and real donations in a similar way).  
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 In the present study, and all subsequent studies, participants answered a series 
of measures on seven point scales (1 = not at all/disagree strongly to 7 = very 
much/agree strongly).   
 Willingness to donate included four items to measure giving prosociality: ‘I 
would be willing to give donations to the victims of the disaster’, ‘I think it is important 
to give donations to the victims of the disaster’, ‘I think it is the right thing to do to 
give donations to the victims of the disaster’ and, ‘I would give the maximum amount 
I could afford according to my means to the victims of the disaster’; α = .89.  
 Disaster scale was measured using three items asking the participant to rate 
the disaster for the surviving victims in terms of: ‘human suffering’, ‘irreparable 
mental scarring’, and ‘loss of housing and livelihoods’; α = .81.   
Upon completion of the study all participants were debriefed. The present 
study, and all following studies, conformed to APA ethical guidelines, as well as to 
standard BPS and APA procedure for online psychological research, where relevant.   
Results 
The effect of ingroup and outgroup perpetrators on hypothetical donations and 
willingness to donate 
In order to address the issue of outliers and inflated giving estimates associated 
with hypothetical spending (Kirby & Herrnstein, 1995), following previous research 
which used open format donation estimates (Dickert, Sagara, & Slovic, 2011) 
hypothetical donation amounts were log10 transformed.   
 Hypothesis 5.1 predicted a difference in prosociality depending on whether the 
perpetrator was ingroup or not. Therefore, the victim perpetrator and third party 
perpetrator conditions were collapsed into a single outgroup condition (these 
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conditions will be analysed separately in an exploratory manner).  A multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted with perpetrator group membership 
(ingroup vs. outgroup) as the independent factor, and hypothetical donations and 
willingness to donate as the dependent variables.  There was a significant effect of 
perpetrator group membership on the dependent factors, Pillai's Trace = .089, F(2,71) 
= 3.45, p = .037, partial η2 = .089.  Univariate analyses indicated a significant effect 
of perpetrator group membership on hypothetical donations, F(1,72) = 6.91, p = .010, 
partial η2 = .088; participants donated an average of £1.59 when the perpetrator 
belonged to the ingroup, but only £1.14 was donated on average when the perpetrator 
was from an outgorup.  There was also a marginal effect on willingness to donate, 
F(1,72) = 3.21, p = .077, partial η2 = .043, with participants more willing to help when 
the perpetrator was from the ingroup (5.34), than when the perpetrator was from the 
outgroup (4.69).  These results support Hypothesis 5.1, in that donors responded more 
prosocially when the perpetrator was a member of their ingroup. 
Analyses investigating the effect of victim and third party perpetrator group 
membership on hypothetical donations and willingness to donate 
 Next, to explore whether it mattered whether perpetrators shared the same 
group membership as the victims, the above analyses were repeated, but with three 
levels of the independent variable (IV): (donor group perpetrator vs. victim group 
perpetrator vs. third-party perpetrator).  Hypothetical donations and willingness to 
donate remained as the dependent variables.  The multivariate effect of the perpetrator 
group membership factor was not significant, Pillai's Trace = .111, F(2,70) = 3.32, p 
= .086, partial η2 = .055.  Univariate analyses yielded a significant effect of perpetrator 
group membership on hypothetical donations, F(2,71) = 3.64, p = .031, partial η2 = 
.093; and a non-significant effect on willingness to donate, F(2,71) = 2.44, p = .094, 
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partial η2 = .064.  Post hoc pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni adjustment applied) 
revealed that donations in the donor perpetrator condition were significantly higher 
than in the third-party outgroup perpetrator condition (p = .033) but not the victim 
perpetrator condition (p = 1.91) (see Table 1 below).  
Exploratory analyses on the effect of perpetrator group and victim group on the 
perceived scale of the disaster 
The effect of donor perpetrator versus outgroup perpetrator (victim and third 
party outgroups combined) was investigated.  An independent t-test was conducted 
with ingroup and outgroup perpetrator as the between subjects factor and disaster 
scale as the dependent variable.  There was a significant effect of perpetrator group on 
disaster scale, t(82) = 2.02, p = .046, such that the disaster was seen as more damaging 
for the victims when the perpetrator belonged to the ingroup (5.42), than when the 
perpetrator belonged to an outgroup (5.00). 
 Next, a univariate analysis of variance was run with three levels of perpetrator 
group membership (donor group perpetrator vs. victim group perpetrator vs. third-
party perpetrator) as the independent factor, and with disaster scale as the dependent 
variable.  Results indicated an effect of perpetrator group membership on the perceived 
scale of the disaster, F(2,81) = 3.74, p = .028, partial η2 = .085.  Pairwise comparisons 
(Bonferroni adjusted) indicated a significant difference between the donor perpetrator 
condition and the other country perpetrator condition (see Table 1).   
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Table 1 
The effect of perpetrator group membership on giving prosociality (Study 1) 
 Donor Group 
Perpetrator 
95 % 
CI 
Victim 
Group 
Perpetrator 
95% CI Third party 
perpetrator 
95% CI 
Hypothetical 
donations 
£1.59a (.79) 1.3:1.8 £1.21a,b (.75) .91:1.5 £1.07b (.58) .79:1.3 
Willingness to 
donate 
5.34a (1.23) 4.7:5.9 4.97a (1.52) 4.3:5.5 4.44a (1.59) 3.8:5.0 
Disaster scale 5.42a (.79) 5.0:5.7 5.22a,b (.85) 4.8:5.5 4.78b (1.02) 4.4:5.1 
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses.  
Across rows: Items that do not share a subscript are significantly different at p < .05. 
  
Discussion 
Study 1 demonstrates that perpetrator group membership can play an important 
role in intergroup giving.  Both hypothetical donation amount and general willingness 
to donate were highest when the perpetrator shared the respondent’s group, confirming 
Hypothesis 5.1.  Exploratory analyses were also conducted to investigate whether the 
outgroup perpetrator relationship could be further demarcated, and more specifically, 
whether donations would be affected by the perpetrator sharing (or not sharing) a 
group membership with the victims.  After all, one might expect prosociality to be 
reduced when the victim and perpetrator are related (possibly due to increased victim 
blame).  Surprisingly, the donor perpetrator condition differed significantly from the 
third party perpetrator condition but not the victim perpetrator condition (although the 
pattern was evident).  Overall, it is fair to conclude that prosociality towards a 
humanitarian disaster was higher when ingroup status was shared with the perpetrator 
than when the perpetrator was an outgroup member (and particularly when the 
perpetrator belonged to a third party).   
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 Exploratory analyses were also conducted on the perceived scale of the 
disaster.  One might expect donors to protect their reputation, by downplaying the 
scale of the disaster, if the perpetrator was from their ingroup – but this was not the 
case.  The disaster was seen as more damaging when the respondent shared an ingroup 
membership with the perpetrator, and much less damaging when the perpetrator was 
from a third party.  Potentially, this finding could be due to participants caring more 
about events which are caused by ingroup members, and hence by participants 
psychologically magnifying the scale of such events.  This is a tentative explanation 
however, as it is worth noting that the scale of the disaster was seen as similarly 
damaging when the perpetrator shared a group membership with the victim.  Although 
disaster scale was not significantly different across the victim and third-party 
conditions, the pattern of data would suggest that the difference in disaster scale was 
driven by the low scores in the third-party condition, i.e. when the perpetrator was 
associated with a third-party that the disaster was seen as less damaging.   
 Taken together, the results of study 1 suggest increased prosociality when the 
perpetrator belongs to the ingroup, and decreased prosociality when the perpetrator 
belongs to a third-party.  Moreover, results suggested that a third-party perpetrator was 
associated with less helping than a perpetrator from the victims’ group (although this 
was only a trend, as these two conditions did not significantly differ from each other).  
The results are in line with research that has demonstrated bystander apathy when one 
country commits an offence against another, most notably during acts of collective 
violence and genocide (Staub, 1999).  Staub has commented on the failure of 
international bystanders to intervene when a third-party is involved, and the present 
results illustrate his argument in minimal conditions.  Merely associating the 
perpetrator with a third-party led to deleterious effects, possibly more so than 
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associating the perpetrator with the victims.  One can speculate that participants felt a 
lack of responsibility to help when the perpetrator was associated with a third-party.  
Of course, one may also feel less responsibility to help when the perpetrators are 
related to the victims.  In real world scenarios, international aid may be offered to 
countries that require aid for a variety of reasons – Staub argues that the same aid is 
offered less quickly when a third-party is involved.   
 Finally, unlike studies that have investigated helping behaviour towards 
minority groups (Saucier, Miller, & Doucet, 2005), or to specific causes (Cuddy et al., 
2007), the context used in the present study was kept deliberately abstract.  Therefore, 
the differences in giving behaviour reported in the present study cannot be explained 
by stereotype activations.  The findings demonstrate that in order to elicit a difference 
in giving behaviour, it is enough to merely categorize and make salient a distinctive 
perpetrator group.   
Study 2 
 Study 2, also testing Hypothesis 5.1, is a replication of study 1 in a different 
context. The aim was to test the generalisability and potential boundary conditions of 
the findings of study 1. Whereas study 1 used the context of an accidental disaster, 
study 2 utilises the context of a military incursion.  Study 2 also investigates the 
underlying processes related to prosociality by including a measure of donor 
responsibility (testing Hypothesis 5.4).  To recap, increased perceived donor 
responsibility was expected to be the mechanism explaining why donor perpetrators 
would be associated with higher donations.  As such, donor responsibility was 
expected to be an explanatory factor for increased prosociality due to the donor being 
88 
associated with the perpetrator.  To test Hypothesis 5.6, a measure of empathic 
concern, henceforth referred to as empathy, is also included.   
The present study also includes a number of exploratory aspects.  Firstly, 
disaster scale is again included in order to attempt to replicate the findings from study 
1.  Secondly, although Hypothesis 5.4 predicts an effect of victim group on empathy, 
the current thesis does not make a similar prediction that perpetrator group will affect 
empathy.  Nonetheless, it would be interesting for exploratory reasons to investigate 
whether perpetrator group membership can also affect empathy levels.  
 Finally, study 2 also investigates perceived responsibility attributions (for the 
donor, victim, or government).  This is an exploratory aspect designed to nuance the 
donor responsibility measure and better understand the third-party effects identified in 
study 1.   
Method 
Participants 
 One hundred and ten participants completed an online survey with the 
opportunity to win a £50 raffle voucher.  The survey was advertised on an online 
campus notice board, opportunistically via social networking websites, and advertised 
on websites that list social psychology experiments, e.g. 
http://www.socialpsychology.org.  Ages ranged from 18 to 80 (M = 27.94, SD = 
10.87) and there were 74 females and 36 males.  Study 2 utilised the same design as 
in the previous study, with participants randomly assigned to one of three perpetrator 
membership groups. 
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Procedure and Measures 
 Participants were randomly allocated by the survey software to one of the three 
group membership conditions.  The order and presentation of the stimuli was kept 
similar to study 1, except that the vignette now described military action taken in 
another country.  Participants read that there was a threat of chemical weapons from 
militant groups and that military action was taken as a response to this threat 
(Appendix B).  As in Study 1, there were three distinct perpetrator groups in the 
manipulation (donor perpetrator, victim perpetrator, third-party perpetrator), thus the 
perpetrator either shared group membership with the participant, the victim, or with 
neither.    
 All measures described in study 1 were also included in this study.  
Hypothetical donations (as with all other measures henceforth) was now measured on 
a seven point scale.  This change was due to the highly inflated (and variable) donation 
amounts in the open-ended response format used in study 1. The use of a seven point 
scale also avoids the need for a log transformation.  The new scale for hypothetical 
donation amount ranged from £0 to £12, measured in £2 increments.   
The new alpha reliability for willingness to donate was .86, and for disaster 
scale the new reliability was .81.   
Empathy was measured using a modified version of the Impression Check 
Questionnaire (Davis, 1980), which consists of five items designed to measure 
situational empathy as used by Stürmer et al. (2006): ‘I felt great sympathy for the 
victims and their suffering’, ‘I felt very compassionate for the victims of the disaster’, 
‘I had a lot of empathy with the victims for the horrors they suffered’, ‘I felt very 
concerned for the victims of the disaster’ and ‘I felt very sorry for the victims of the 
disaster’; α = .92.   
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Additionally, a 3 item measure of donor responsibility (Basil et al., 2006) was 
included: ‘I believe that I have a responsibility to help because I am so much better 
off than the victims’3, ‘I believe that I have a responsibility to do what I can to help’, 
and ‘I believe that helping is the right thing to do’; α = .82. 
 The present study also included explanatory variables that may aid in 
understanding the mechanisms of charitable helping.  Firstly, two further single item 
measures of responsibility were included.  Victim responsibility, ‘I think the victims 
of the disaster might have been responsible for their situation at least to some extent’; 
and, government responsibility, ‘I think my country/the victims' country/the 
neighbouring country should accept responsibility for what happened’.  This latter 
measure is in fact a measure of perpetrator responsibility, as in the current context the 
government, be it the donor’s government, the victims’ government, or the 
neighbouring country’s government, was described as instigating the military 
incursion.   
 
  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
3 The responsibility items were selected by drawing upon past research, although on reflection, one 
could argue that at face value there is a danger of the first responsibility item prejudging donation 
decisions.  Due to this potential concern, all of the main analyses, i.e. non-exploratory analyses that 
test a hypothesis, were re-analysed in the current study with this first item omitted.  The alpha 
reliability for the two item measure of responsibility was .754 and the results were near identical for 
both the MANOVA tests and for the mediation and bootstrapping tests.  Therefore, I concluded that 
although the responsibility scale could be refined, removing item 1 of the scale was not necessary in 
this study or in subsequent analyses.  
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Results 
The effect of perpetrator group membership on donation amount, willingness to 
donate, empathy, and donor responsibility 
 A MANOVA was conducted with perpetrator group membership as the 
independent factor (donor perpetrator vs. outgroup perpetrator, again collapsing across 
the two outgroup conditions) and hypothetical donations and willingness to donate as 
the dependent measures.  Contrary to study 1, and contrary to Hypothesis 5.1, the 
multivariate test was not significant, Pillai's Trace = .003, F(2,106) = .166, p = .848, 
partial η2 = .003.  Univariate tests confirmed that the donor perpetrator condition (5.69) 
did not significantly differ from the outgroup perpetrator condition (5.54) on 
hypothetical donations, F(1,107) = .032, p = .858, partial η2 < .001.  Neither did the 
donor perpetrator condition (5.33) differ significantly from the outgroup perpetrator 
condition (5.17) on willingness to donate, F(1,107) = .279, p = .598, partial η2 = .003.   
 In order to test Hypothesis 5.4, the above analyses were repeated with donor 
responsibility and empathy as the dependent measures.  Hypothesis 5.4 predicted an 
effect of perpetrator group on responsibility to help; empathy was included in these 
analyses for completeness.  The multivariate test indicated that perpetrator group 
membership did not have a significant effect, Pillai's Trace = .002, F(2,106) = .084, 
partial η2 = .002.  Contrary to Hypothesis 5.4, univariate tests showed that the donor 
perpetrator condition (4.84) did not significantly differ from the outgroup perpetrator 
condition (4.72) on donor responsibility, F(1,107) = .165, p = .685, partial η2 = .002; 
nor did the donor perpetrator condition (5.28) differ from the outgroup perpetrator 
condition (5.21) on empathy, F(1,107) = .063, p = .803, partial η2 = .001.   
Analyses investigating the effect of victim and third party perpetrator group 
membership on hypothetical donations and willingness to donate 
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The above analyses were repeated but with the perpetrator outgroup nuanced 
to victim and third party outgroup conditions.  A MANOVA was conducted with 
perpetrator group membership as the independent factor (donor perpetrator, victim 
perpetrator, third-party perpetrator) and hypothetical donations and willingness to 
donate as the dependent measures.  The multivariate test was not significant, Pillai's 
Trace = .003, F(4,212) = .087, p = .986, partial η2 = .002; indicating a null effect of 
perpetrator group on the dependent measures.  The univariate test confirmed a null 
effect of perpetrator group on hypothetical donations, F(2,106) = .017, p = .983, partial 
η2 < .001; and also confirmed a null effect of perpetrator group on willingness to 
donate, F(2,106) = .140, p = .870, partial η2 = .003 (see Table 2). 
 The above analyses were repeated with donor responsibility and empathy as 
the dependent measures.  The multivariate test indicated that perpetrator group 
membership was not significant, Pillai's Trace = .007, F(4,212) = .193, p = .942, 
partial η2 = .004.  Univariate tests indicated that perpetrator group did not affect donor 
responsibility, F(2,106) = .769, p = .714, partial η2 = .006.  There was also no effect 
of perpetrator group on empathy, F(2,106) = .214, p = .808, partial η2 = .004 (see Table 
2).   
Exploratory analyses on the effect of perpetrator and victim group on the perceived 
scale of the disaster 
 An independent t-test was conducted with perpetrator group (donor perpetrator 
vs. outgroup perpetrator) as the independent variable and disaster scale as the 
dependent measure. There was no significant difference between the donor perpetrator 
(6.18) and outgroup perpetrator (6.31) conditions on the perceived scale of the disaster, 
t(108) = -.747, p = .457. 
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Exploratory analyses were then conducted with three levels of the perpetrator 
condition.  An ANOVA was run with perpetrator group (donor perpetrator, victim 
perpetrator, third-party perpetrator) as the independent factor and disaster scale as the 
dependent variable.  Contrary to study 1, there was no significant effect of perpetrator 
group on the perceived scale of the disaster, F(2,107) = .355, p = .702, partial η2 = .007 
(see Table 2). 
 
Table 2 
The effect of perpetrator group membership on giving prosociality (Study 2) 
 Donor 
Perpetrator 
95 % 
CI 
Victim  
Perpetrator 
95% CI Third party 
perpetrator 
95% CI 
Hypothetical 
donations 
£5.69a (4.4) 4.3:7.0 £5.56a (3.9) 4.1:6.9 £5.51a (4.1) 4.0:6.9 
Willingness to 
donate 
5.33a (1.3) 4.8:5.8 5.16a (1.6) 4.6:5.6 5.18a (1.6) 4.6:5.7 
Empathy 5.28a (1.3) 4.8:5.7 5.30a (1.2) 4.8:5.7 5.10a (1.5) 4.6:5.5 
Donor 
responsibility 
4.84a (1.6) 4.3:5.3 4.84a (1.4) 4.3:5.3 4.58a (1.5) 4.0:5.1 
Disaster scale 6.18a (.93) 5.9:6.4 6.28a (.84) 5.9:6.5 6.36a (.87) 6.0:6.6 
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses.  
Across rows: items that do not share a subscript are significantly different at p < .05. 
       
 
The mediating relationship of donor responsibility and empathy on prosociality 
towards disaster victims 
 In order to further test Hypotheses 5.4, the SPSS PROCESS macro (Hayes, 
2012) was used (set to 5,000 bootstrap re-samples) to investigate whether donor 
responsibility mediated the relationship between perpetrator group (with two levels: 
ingroup vs. outgroup) and hypothetical donations.  The indirect path was not 
significant, point estimate = -.269, CI 95% [-1.42, .736].  This result was confirmed 
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with a Sobel test, Z = -.490, p = .624.  The analysis was then repeated with willingness 
to donate as the outcome variable; again the result was not significant, point estimate 
= -.091, CI 95% [-.544, .374], Z = -.386, p = .700.  These results do not support 
Hypothesis 5.4.  
The relationship between donor responsibility, empathy, and donation decisions 
 Next, a series of analyses were conducted to test if empathy, responsibility, 
and helping were sequentially related, in line with the process proposed by Hypothesis 
5.6.  To begin with, donor responsibility was significantly bivariately correlated with 
hypothetical donations, r = .622, p < .001, and with willingness to donate, r = .729, p 
< .001.  Empathy was also significantly correlated with hypothetical donations, r = 
.237, p = .013 and willingness to donate, r = .453, p < .001.  Moreover, empathy was 
significantly correlated with donor responsibility, r =.467, p < .001.   
To test Hypothesis 5.6 (that donor responsibility mediates empathic concern), 
mediation analyses were conducted, again using the SPSS PROCESS macro.  Bias 
corrected bootstrapping analysis, with 5,000 re-samples, indicated that the indirect 
path between empathy and hypothetical donations, via donor responsibility, was 
significant, point estimate = .840, CI 95% [.45, 1.34].  A Sobel test confirmed this 
result, Z = 3.92, p < .001.  The mediation analysis was then repeated with willingness 
to donate as the outcome variable.  Again, the indirect path between empathy and 
willingness to donate via donor responsibility was significant, point estimate = .346, 
CI 95% [.20, .52].  A Sobel test confirmed the bootstrapping analyses, Z = 4.15, p < 
.001.  Together, these results support Hypothesis 5.6, by suggesting that feelings of 
empathy increase prosociality towards victims via the mechanism of accepted 
responsibility. 
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Exploratory analyses investigating the effect of perpetrator group membership on 
responsibility attributions (donor, victim, and government)  
 Exploratory post hoc analyses were conducted in order to further investigate 
the effect of perpetrator group membership on different types of attributions of 
responsibility.   
A three-way mixed measures ANOVA was conducted with perpetrator group 
membership (donor perpetrator, victim perpetrator, and third-party perpetrator) as 
the independent variable, and with responsibility attribution (donor responsibility, 
victim responsibility, and government responsibility) as the repeated measures 
variable.  Results revealed a significant main effect of responsibility attribution, 
F(2,218) = 13.25, p < .001, partial η² = .11. Bonferroni adjusted comparisons 
revealed that donor responsibility (4.71) was significantly lower than both victim 
responsibility (5.55) and state responsibility (5.58), p < .001.  Across conditions, 
individuals felt they were less responsible than either the victims or the government 
when it came to helping those in need (see  
Figure 1 below). 
 There was also a significant interaction between perpetrator group membership 
and responsibility attributions, F(4,218) = 3.19, p = .014, partial η² = .05.  Post hoc 
comparisons (Bonferroni adjusted) revealed that when the donor shared group 
membership with the perpetrator, donor responsibility was attributed as significantly 
lower (4.82) than state responsibility (5.98), p < .001.  The difference between donor 
responsibility and victim responsibility was not significant, p = .223; although the 
pattern was interesting in that victim responsibility (5.19) was attributed as marginally 
higher than donor responsibility (4.82).   
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 A similar pattern was observed for responsibility attributions when the victim 
shared group membership with the perpetrator; however, in this condition the victims 
were seen as most responsible (5.68), while donor responsibility was again lowest 
(4.92), p = .060.  Government responsibility (5.16) was also higher than donor 
responsibility (4.92), but this result was not significant, p = .460.   
 Finally, when the perpetrator belonged to a third country, donor 
responsibility (4.41) was significantly lower than both victim responsibility (5.79) 
and state responsibility (5.58), p = .001 and p = .003, respectively (see  
Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Responsibility to help attributions by perpetrator group membership 
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Discussion 
 Study 2 did not replicate the results from the previous study regarding 
Hypothesis 5.1.  Crucially, the ingroup bias effect on donations was negated.  There 
were no differences in donations across experimental conditions, with donors giving 
similar amounts irrespective of the perpetrator’s group membership; nor was there an 
exploratory effect of perpetrator group on the perceived scale of the disaster.  This is 
in direct contrast with study 1, which found perpetrator group membership to affect 
both giving decisions and perceptions over the magnitude and harm caused by the 
disaster.  There was also no difference in individual responsibility attributions due to 
shared perpetrator group membership (Hypothesis 5.4), with similar levels of donor 
responsibility displayed irrespective of perpetrator group.  Finally, although the 
pattern was not consistent across all three conditions, it is fair to conclude that donor’s 
perceived their responsibility to help as substantially lower than responsibility 
attributed to the government, or responsibility attributed to the victims.   
One explanation for these null results could be the increased human 
involvement and the intentionality inherent in contexts that involve military action.  
Zagefka et al. (2011) demonstrated that natural disasters were viewed more favourably 
than disasters perceived to be caused by human involvement.  Although the disaster 
in study 1 involved an accidental explosion, participants may have viewed this as less 
foreseeable and more similar to an ‘act of God’.  Certainly, they would not have 
viewed the accidental scenario as intentional.  Researchers have demonstrated that 
intentional acts are viewed more harshly, particularly as they are foreseeable with the 
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benefit of hindsight (Ames & Fiske, 2013; Lagnado & Channon, 2008).  Put simply, 
when human action is involved, something that is inherent in a situation that involves 
the military, participants may become less forgiving and thereby less prosocial.  It is 
therefore possible that participants may see any form of military action as an 
intentional human act that deserves less sympathy.   
The above reasoning, that participants would feel less prosocial due to human 
involvement, has a strong theoretical basis, but it is presented tentatively given that 
the mean levels in the current study for willingness to help were similar to the midpoint 
levels obtained in study 1.  However, the context in the present study was quite 
different from the accidental disaster in study 1, so it is debatable as to how strong a 
conclusion can be drawn from comparing these means across studies.  Moreover, 
participants would not wish to appear callous, so it is likely that any deleterious effects 
pertaining to prosocial behaviour would affect one condition more than the others, i.e. 
it would likely diminish helping in the prosocial condition as opposed to resulting in 
no helping across all conditions.  Nonetheless, there is some evidence of decreased 
prosociality due to the context if one considers the exploratory analyses into 
responsibility attributions.  The present study found that perpetrator group 
membership affected attributions of responsibility, such that donor responsibility 
remained low irrespective of the perpetrator group involved.  This suggests (at least in 
a military context) that when government action is involved, e.g. in a military 
incursion such as the Gulf War or the war in Afghanistan, that individuals may feel 
less responsible for providing subsequent aid.   
 It is also interesting that there were significant differences between 
responsibility attributions between the ingroup condition and the third-party outgroup 
condition.  When the perpetrator belonged to the ingroup, the government was 
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perceived to be most responsible.  However, when the perpetrator was not part of the 
ingroup, the victims were held as most responsible.  Victim responsibility remained 
high even when a third-party (presumably neighbouring country) was the perpetrator, 
and victim responsibility was in fact attributed as marginally higher than the 
responsibility of the invading state.  Although this latter result did not represent a 
significant difference, the pattern does suggest that victims are often held responsible 
for their own plight, particularly in political situations that may occur overseas.  It is 
also notable that donor responsibility to help was lowest when the perpetrator was 
from another country.   
These results effectively demonstrate the bystander effect at an international 
level.  This returns the discussion to a point already mentioned in study 1.  Staub 
(1999) has long argued that atrocities such as attempted genocide are foreseeable, with 
many political and economic markers occurring before violent action takes place.  
Despite this, there is often little in the form of intervention from international 
onlookers, who in practice become bystanders.  Further, when genocide happens 
(Rwanda, Darfur), there is often a delay in political aid and public support.  One can 
speculate that this delay is tied to a feeling of low responsibility towards the plight of 
victims in another country, particularly when a third country is involved.  
 Finally, exploratory analyses revealed no effect of perpetrator group on 
empathy. However, in support of Hypothesis 5.6, donor responsibility was found to 
mediate empathy towards victims in need.  This supports the notion that empathy 
subsequently lead to a sense of donor responsibility to help victims in need.  The 
present study utilised a traditional scale of empathy (based on work by Batson and 
colleagues) that measures distress, concern and sympathy towards the victims, and 
found evidence in support of the proposed mediation process.      
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Study 3 
Study 3 replicates the paradigm used in the previous studies (testing 
Hypotheses 5.1, 5.4 & 5.6), but does so in the context of an environmental oil spill 
disaster.  Also, the previous two studies used abstract category representations for the 
groups involved.  Although abstract representations can be considered a strength in 
experimental designs because they minimise the potential for introducing confounds, 
the use of abstract representations can also be criticised for being artificial and more 
difficult for participants to envisage.  To illustrate, in study 1 (Appendix A), there may 
have been ambiguity as to which country the spokesperson was claiming responsibility 
from, and this ambiguity may have attenuated potential differences between the victim 
and third party conditions. Therefore, study 3 uses genuine country names.  In study 
3, the perpetrator is a U.S. oil company that has caused an environmental disaster in 
Estonia.  Since study 3 investigates helping towards European victims from U.S. 
citizens, a measure of nationality identification is included.  Nationality can be an 
effective tool for manipulating group memberships and prompting prosociality, but 
the effectiveness of appeals to collective pride or guilt may depend on the level of 
identification.  In particular, high identifiers may reject appeals driven by guilt (e.g. 
being associated with the perpetrator), as this has negative consequences towards the 
ingroup that they value so highly (van Leeuwen, van Dijk, & Kaynak, 2013b; Zebel, 
Doosje, & Spears, 2009).  A measure of the perceived scale of the disaster was 
included for exploratory reasons, as in the previous two studies.  However, the 
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exploratory aspect that included additional measures of responsibility was not 
included due to space constraints.  
 
 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were recruited via Mturk, which has been demonstrated to provide 
a reliable participant pool (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Chandler, Mueller, 
& Paolacci, 2014; Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2013).  Participants were paid 
around 50 cents to take part in a 5 minute survey.  This amount is considered moderate 
compared to other tasks on MTurk, and workers appear incentivised to complete 
surveys at this price point (Buhrmester et al., 2011).  Ages ranged from 21 to 73 (Mage 
= 39.07, SD = 13.07).  Twenty-eight participants were excluded for not being of U.S. 
nationality (this was a necessary requirement for the design of the current study).  A 
further twelve participants were excluded for not answering over 95% of the questions, 
and five participants were excluded for providing duplicate responses.  Interquartile 
ranges were examined and no participants were excluded for being extremely fast, or 
slow, on survey completion time. This left a total of sixty-four participants4 who 
completed the study (28 female, 36 male).   
                                                 
 
 
4 In general, power analyses using G-power 3.1, along with consideration of previous sample sizes in 
published work, suggested that approximately 66 participants (22 per condition) was the minimum 
requirement needed to detect a medium to large effect size using a one-way ANOVA.  This minimum 
number was achieved in the current study, although I note in the study discussion that this number is 
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Procedure and measures 
 The procedure was identical to that in previous studies, except that participants 
read about an environmental oil spill.  The disaster occurred off the coast of Estonia 
and the perpetrator (the oil company at fault) was manipulated to be either from the 
U.S. (ingroup), Estonia (victim outgroup), or Latvia (third-party outgroup).  
Participants were also shown an image of animal wildlife covered in crude oil.   
 Measures were identical to those used in study 2, except that items now 
referred to the oil disaster.  As in the previous study, hypothetical donations were 
measured with a single item on a 7 point scale.  The new reliabilities for the composite 
measures were: willingness to donate, α = .88; empathy, α = .82; donor responsibility, 
α = .87; and disaster scale, α = .76.  An additional two item measure was included to 
measure U.S. identification, ‘I strongly identify with being a U.S. citizen’, and, ‘Being 
a U.S. citizen is important to me’; α = .93.   
 Finally, Oppenheimer, Meyvis and Davidenko (2009) recommend using a 
check to ensure that MTurk participants remain diligent and attend to the stimulus and 
experimental instructions.  Using a procedure termed the Instructional Manipulation 
Check (IMC) (Oppenheimer et al., 2009), it is possible to prevent participants from 
continuing the experimental survey until they have demonstrated sufficient diligence.  
The procedure involves presenting a large section of onscreen text, with a standard 
‘next’ button displayed on the bottom of the screen.  However, participants must not 
click on the next button (as they have done previously), but instead they must read all 
                                                 
 
 
questionably low for an online study.  The minimum participant number is substantially higher in 
other studies, particularly when the design attempts to detect a possible interaction.   
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of the displayed text which gives them an alternative instruction.  In the present study, 
the IMC text told the participants about the importance of attention in scientific 
research, praised them for fully reading the text and demonstrating such attention, and 
then instructed them to click elsewhere on the screen.  Failure to do this resulted in 
participants being returned to the IMC screen until they either quit the study, or 
successfully passed the check.  Previous research has demonstrated that participants 
are not antagonised by the check since they had already agreed to answer the question 
items in good faith as a condition of the survey (Oppenheimer et al., 2009).  Moreover, 
participants who repeat the check several times are not significantly different in their 
responses from participants who pass the check on the first attempt (Oppenheimer et 
al., 2009).  No participants failed to complete the check in the present study.  On 
average, participants clicked on the IMC screen 3.5 times (i.e. attempted to click on 
the next button once or twice before following the correct instructions) and spent a 
mean time of 43.4 seconds on the IMC page.    
Results 
The effect of ingroup and outgroup perpetrator group membership on donation 
amount and willingness to donate 
 In order to test Hypothesis 5.1, a MANOVA was conducted on two levels of 
perpetrator group (ingroup donor perpetrator vs. outgroup perpetrator) and with 
hypothetical donations and willingness to donate as dependent measures.  The 
multivariate test was not significant, Pillai’s Trace = .054, F(2,61) = 1.732, p = .186, 
partial η² = .054.  Univariate tests indicated that the donor perpetrator group (4.82) did 
not significantly differ from the outgroup perpetrator group (5.28) on hypothetical 
donations, F(1,62) = .373, p = .544, partial η² = .006.  Further, there was not a 
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significant difference between the donor perpetrator group (4.82) and the outgroup 
perpetrator group (5.49) on willingness to donate, although this effect was somewhat 
closer to significance, F(1,62) = 2.85, p = .096, partial η² = .044.   
 The analyses above were repeated with U.S. identification as a covariate.  The 
multivariate test indicated that the covariate was significant overall, Pillai’s Trace = 
.159, F(2,60) = 5.69, p = .005, partial η² = .159.  Further, univariate tests indicated that 
the covariate was significant for both hypothetical donations, F(1,61) = 10.39, p = 
.002, partial η² = .146 and willingness to donate, F(1,61) = 8.66, p = .005, partial η² = 
.124.  However, the inclusion of the covariate did not meaningfully alter the 
multivariate test results for perpetrator group, which remained non-significant, p = 
.202.  Univariate tests for perpetrator group on hypothetical donations indicated little 
change in mean levels between the donor perpetrator group (4.99) and the outgroup 
perpetrator group (5.26), F(1,61) = .261, p = .611, partial η² = .004.  The same was 
true for the univariate effect on willingness to donate, donor perpetrator group (4.86) 
compared to outgroup perpetrator group (5.48), F(1,61) = 2.74, p = .103, partial η² = 
.043.  Overall, these results are in contrast to the results in study 1, and do not support 
Hypothesis 5.15. 
Analyses investigating the effect of ingroup, victim, and third party perpetrator group 
membership on hypothetical donations and willingness to donate  
                                                 
 
 
5 U.S. identification was also examined as a potential moderator in order to investigate whether high 
and low identifiers responded differently to being associated with the perpetrator group.  Using 
PROCESS (model 1), U.S. identification was entered as a mean centred variable along with 
perpetrator group (ingroup vs. outgroup) with hypothetical donations as the outcome variable.  U.S. 
identification was a significant predictor, p = .049, but the interaction term was not significant, p = 
.956.  The analysis was repeated with willingness to donate as the outcome variable.  However, 
neither U.S. identification, p = .108, nor the interaction term, p = .799, were significant.   
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The above analyses were repeated but with three levels of perpetrator group 
membership for exploratory reasons.  A MANOVA was conducted with perpetrator 
group membership as the independent variable (donor perpetrator, victim perpetrator, 
third-party perpetrator) and hypothetical donations and willingness to donate as the 
dependent variables.  The multivariate test indicated that the effect of perpetrator 
group on the dependent variables was not significant, Pillai's Trace = .061, F(4,122) 
= .956, p = .434, partial η² = .030.  Univariate tests indicated that perpetrator group 
membership did not have a significant effect on hypothetical donations, F(2,61) = 
.194,  p = .824, partial η² = .006; or a significant effect on willingness to donate, 
F(2,61) = 1.47, p = .238, partial η² = .046 (see Table 3).   
 The above analysis was repeated with U.S. identification as a covariate.  
Multivariate tests revealed that U.S. identification was a significant covariate, Pillai's 
Trace = .173, F(2,59) = .6.18, p = .004, partial η² = .173.  Perpetrator group did not, 
however, have a significant effect on the dependent variables, Pillai's Trace = .076, 
F(4,120) = 1.17, p = .324, partial η² = .038.  Univariate results indicated that U.S. 
identification was a significant covariate for hypothetical donations, F(2,60) = 11.75, 
p = .001, partial η² = .164; and a significant covariate for willingness to donate, F(2,60) 
= 1.47, p = .236, partial η² = .047. 
Nonetheless, perpetrator group membership did not have a significant effect on 
hypothetical donations with the inclusion of the covariate, F(2,60) = .795,  p = .456, 
partial η² = .026; nor was there a significant effect on willingness to donate, F(2,60) = 
1.47, p = .238, partial η² = .046 (see Table 3).   
The effect of ingroup and outgroup perpetrator group membership on donor 
responsibility and empathy  
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In order to test Hypothesis 5.4, a MANOVA was conducted with perpetrator 
group (donor perpetrator vs. outgroup perpetrator) and with donor responsibility and 
empathy as the dependent measures. As in the previous study, empathy was included 
for exploratory reasons. The multivariate test was not significant, Pillai’s Trace = 
.049, F(2,61) = 1.55, p = .219, partial η² = .049.  Univariate tests indicated that there 
was no significant difference between donor perpetrator (4.94) and outgroup 
perpetrator (5.40) for donor responsibility, F(1,62) = 1.29, p = .260, partial η² = .020.  
Nor was the difference between donor perpetrator (5.73) and outgroup perpetrator 
(5.69) significant for empathy, F(1,62) = .025, p = .875, partial η² < .001.   
Analyses were repeated but with U.S. identification as a covariate.  The 
covariate had a significant effect across both donor responsibility and empathy, 
Pillai’s Trace = .139, F(2,60) = 4.83, p = .011, partial η² = .139.  Univariate tests 
indicated that U.S. identification was a significant covariate for donor responsibility, 
F(1,61) = 4.25, p = .043, partial η² = .065; and for empathy, F(1,61) = 9.81, p = .003, 
partial η² = .139.  However, as before, the covariate did not meaningfully alter the 
results.  The donor perpetrator condition (4.97) did not significantly differ from the 
outgroup perpetrator condition (5.40) on donor responsibility, F(1,61) = 1.15, p = 
.287, partial η² = .019.  Nor did the donor perpetrator condition (5.75) differ from the 
outgroup perpetrator condition (5.68) for empathy, F(1,61) = .095, p = .759, partial η² 
= .002.   
The effect of donor perpetrator, victim perpetrator, and outgroup perpetrator group 
membership on donor responsibility and empathy  
 The above analyses were repeated but with perpetrator group demarcated to 
three levels as in previous analyses.  Donor responsibility and empathy remained as 
dependent measures.  Multivariate tests revealed no significant effect of perpetrator 
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group on the dependent variables, Pillai's Trace = .070, F(4,122) = 1.10, p = .356, 
partial η² = .035.  Univariate tests confirmed that perpetrator group did not have a 
significant effect on responsibility, F(2,61) = .746, p = .479, partial η² = .024.  
Similarly, perpetrator group did not have a significant effect on empathy, F(2,61) = 
.596, p = .554, partial η² = .019 (see Table 3 below).  These results are contrary to 
Hypothesis 5.4 which predicted an effect of donor perpetrator group membership on 
perceived responsibility to help victims in need.  Note that the analysis was repeated 
with U.S. identification as a covariate.  Similar to the previous analysis, U.S. 
identification was a significant covariate (p < .05), but did not meaningfully alter the 
results.  
Exploratory analyses on the effect of perpetrator and victim group on the perceived 
scale of the disaster 
 Finally, as per the previous studies, exploratory analyses were conducted on 
the perceived scale of the disaster.  An independent measures t-test with perpetrator 
group (donor perpetrator vs. outgroup perpetrator) as the independent variable found 
no significant difference on the perceived scale of the disaster, t(62) = .061, p = .952.  
The analysis was repeated by running a univariate ANCOVA that included U.S. 
identification as the covariate.  The covariate was not significant, F(1,61) = 3.31, p = 
.074, partial η² = .051, and did not meaningfully alter the results.     
A one way ANOVA was then run with three levels of perpetrator group 
membership (donor perpetrator, victim perpetrator, third party perpetrator) and with 
disaster scale as the dependent variable.  Perpetrator group membership was not 
significant, F(2,61) = 1.06, p = .350, partial η² = .034.  The analysis was repeated with 
U.S. identification as a covariate, but again the covariate was not significant, F(1,60) 
= 2.11, p = .152, partial η² = .034, and again did not meaningfully alter results.  
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Table 3 
The effect of perpetrator group membership on giving prosociality (Study 3) 
 Donor  
Perpetrator 
95 % 
CI 
Victim  
Perpetrator 
95% CI Third-party 
perpetrator 
95% CI 
Hypothetical 
donations 
£4.93a (2.3) 3.9:5.9 £5.33a (1.9) 4.4:6.1 £5.25a (1.9) 4.5:5.9 
Willingness to 
donate 
4.82a (1.7) 4.1:5.5 5.41a (1.1) 4.4:6.1 5.55a (1.2) 4.5:5.9 
Empathy 5.73a (1.3) 5.2:6.1 5.54a (1.2) 5.1:5.9 5.80a (1.5) 5.4:6.1 
Donor 
responsibility 
4.94a (1.6) 4.2:5.6 5.30a (1.4) 4.6:5.9 5.48a (1.5) 4.9:6.0 
Disaster scale 5.96a (.95) 5.4:6.4 5.71a (1.0) 5.2:6.1 6.12a (.91) 5.7:6.4 
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses.  
Across rows: items that do not share a subscript are significantly different at p < .05. 
 
 
The mediating relationship of donor responsibility on prosociality towards disaster 
victims 
 As a further test of Hypothesis 5.4, mediation analyses were conducted using 
the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2012).  Bootstrapping with 5,000 re-samples 
indicated that the indirect path from perpetrator group to hypothetical donations, via 
donor responsibility, was not significant, point estimate = .452, CI 95% [-.46, 1.57].  
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A Sobel test corroborated this result, Z = .844, p = .399.  Similarly, the indirect path 
from perpetrator group to willingness to donate, via donor responsibility, was not 
significant, point estimate = .377, CI 95% [-.42, 1.28].  These results do not support 
Hypothesis 5.4.   
The relationship between donor responsibility, empathy, and hypothetical donations 
and willingness to donate 
 To test Hypothesis 5.6, a mediation analysis was conducted using the SPSS 
PROCESS macro.  Empathy, donor responsibility, hypothetical donations, and 
willingness to donate were all significantly correlated with each other (p < .001).  
Bootstrapping with 5,000 resamples indicated that the indirect path from empathy to 
hypothetical donations, via donor responsibility, was significant, point estimate = 
1.00, CI 95% [.50, 1.55]; Sobel test, Z = 4.08, p < .001.  The above analyses were then 
repeated, but with willingness to donate as the outcome variable.  Bootstrapping 
analysis indicated that the indirect path from empathy to willingness to donate, via 
donor responsibility was again significant, point estimate = .665, CI 95% [.36, .98].  
A Sobel test confirmed this result, Z = 3.67, p < .001.  These results support Hypothesis 
5.6, in that empathy towards victims in need was again mediated by a sense of 
responsibility to help. 
Discussion 
 The results of the present study are in contrast to study 1; however, the results 
are somewhat similar to that in study 2.  Contrary to Hypothesis 5.1, these studies both 
displayed a pattern (though non-significant) of lower donations when the perpetrator 
and participant shared a common group membership.  Hypothesis 5.4 was also 
rejected, as there was no effect of perpetrator group membership on donor’s perceived 
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responsibility to help victims in need.  However, Hypothesis 5.6 was again supported, 
with donor responsibility mediating the path between empathy and prosociality. This 
latter result is in keeping with the proposed hypothesis that empathy increases 
perceived individual responsibility to help others in need, which in turn may affect 
donations.  Finally, exploratory analyses did not confirm a significant effect of 
perpetrator group membership on the perceived scale of the disaster.   
 There is a practical explanation that could explain the null findings.  The 
present study used MTurk for participant recruitment, a platform where participants 
are paid small sums of money to complete tasks.  MTurk has been demonstrated to be 
a suitable platform to conduct scientific research (Buhrmester et al., 2011; Goodman 
et al., 2013; Paolacci, Chandler, Stern, & Ipeirotis, 2010), however it may not be 
suitable for conducting work in the domain of prosociality.  There is evidence that 
merely activating the concept of money can decrease prosociality (Vohs, Mead, & 
Goode, 2006, 2008).  In MTurk samples, participants are motivated by the small sums 
they are paid.  The salience of money is present throughout, e.g. participants are 
reminded of the pay amount several times in the process of accepting and completing 
a task.  Moreover, although it is possible that the negative effect of money activation 
on subsequent prosocial behaviour would affect mean levels across conditions, there 
is a possibility that it would more greatly affect whatever condition would normally 
elicit the most prosociality.   
It should also be noted that a more mundane explanation may account for the 
issues related to data collection using MTurk.  The current sample size may be 
acceptable for a one-way ANOVA using a traditional sample where data is analysed 
in a controlled setting; however, online data is considerably ‘noisier’ than data 
collected in the lab, and researchers have suggested that sample sizes using MTurk 
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need to be much larger, with potentially 47 participants per cell (see Simmons (2014) 
for a brief discussion).   
 It may also be the case that the context of the charitable appeal is paramount 
in an intergroup context where group memberships are made salient. Study 1 was set 
in the context of an accidental disaster where the perpetrator (the pilot) was a person 
responsible for the disaster.  By contrast, study 2 used a context of intentional political 
and military action where the perpetrator was represented by an organisation (the 
government).  Similarly, study 3 alluded to incompetence of a perpetrator that was 
again an organisation (an oil company).  In situations where culpability for the disaster 
(and thereby responsibility for reparations) is allocated to a group, shared perpetrator 
group membership may be less effective as a method of eliciting prosociality from 
individuals.  Making inferences across studies in this manner is speculative, but 
nonetheless, the issues associated with participant payment, alongside questions over 
the context of the scenario, suggest that the present results should be treated with 
caution.    
Study 4 
 In light of the previous argument over the context of the disaster, study 4 tests 
Hypothesis 5.1 by returning to a scenario where the disaster can be at least partly 
attributed to a person, rather than to a group level organisation.  Study 4 also advances 
the previous paradigms by manipulating both victim and perpetrator group 
memberships simultaneously.  By doing this, it is possible to comment for the first 
time on how victim group and perpetrator group interact to affect donations.  As with 
the previous studies, it was predicted that the shared group membership with the 
perpetrator would positively affect donor responsibility to help the victims 
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(Hypothesis 5.4).  However, study 4 also tests the prediction that shared group 
membership with the victims will increase donations (Hypothesis 5.2), and that 
prosociality would be highest when the respondent shares group membership with 
both the perpetrator and the victims (Hypothesis 5.3).  It was also predicted that shared 
victim group membership would positively affect empathy levels (Hypothesis 5.5).  
Moreover, when considering the underlying processes of the predicted effects, it was 
predicted that the process would be such that the effect of empathy on donation 
decisions would be mediated by donor responsibility (Hypothesis 5.6).  Finally, 
exploratory analyses were again conducted to investigate whether shared group 
membership of the perpetrator or victim affected the perceived scale of the disaster.   
Method 
Participants  
 One hundred and eighty-two participants (111 female, 71 male) were invited 
to take part in a study and be entered in a prize draw for a £50 voucher.  Participants 
were recruited through online campus notice boards and websites that host psychology 
experiments (Mage = 28, SD = 11.8).  Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 
(perpetrator ingroup/outgroup) x 2 (victim ingroup/outgroup) independent factorial 
design.  As in the preceding study, prosocial behaviour was measured through 
hypothetical donations and willingness to donate.   
Procedure and measures 
 Participants first answered standard demographic items before being randomly 
allocated by survey software (Qualtrics) to one of four experimental conditions.  In 
each condition, participants read a short vignette that described a coach crash that 
killed or left injured 100 tourists.  Group membership of the victims was manipulated 
113 
so that the tourists were either from the participant’s own country, or from another 
country, ‘Esturia’ (this was in fact a fictional country, although it was presented as a 
real country to participants).  None of the participants reported being suspicious about 
the veracity of the vignette; indeed, large-scale flooding has been a regular occurrence 
in recent years both in the UK and abroad (e.g., along the Thames, along the Danube).  
Moreover, all participants were asked, via an open ended response format, to guess 
the purpose of the study and comment on anything they perceived to be unusual.  None 
of the participants were able to guess the nature of the study, nor did they express any 
suspicion over the use of ‘Esturia’ as a fictitious country.  
In order to manipulate victim group membership, a technique referred to as 
‘piping’ was used.  This involved recording the nationality entered by the respondent 
(ostensibly before the start of the study) and subsequently inserting this data into the 
vignette.  Piping was also used to manipulate the nationality of the perpetrator (coach 
driver), who was described as being at fault for the crash due to speeding.  Participants 
were also told that either the participant’s own country, or Esturia, had poor driving 
license regulations.  Thus, both victim membership and perpetrator membership were 
manipulated.  The location of the crash was not specified, and each vignette included 
an identical non-descript image of a coach wreckage and rubble.   
 Hypothetical donations were again measured on a seven point scale, from £0 
to £12, measured in £2 increments.   
 The same seven point composite measures were included as in previous 
studies, with the exception of U.S. identification which was no longer relevant.  The 
new alpha reliabilities were: willingness to donate; α = .90; empathy, α = .92; donor 
responsibility, α = .81; and disaster scale, α = .79.  Note that the latter measure no 
longer referred to ‘housing’ in one of the items, and instead consisted of two items 
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similar to those previously used, ‘The suffering of the coach crash victims was huge’, 
and ‘The mental scarring of the coach crash victims was huge’.       
Results 
The effect of perpetrator and victim group membership on donation amount and 
willingness to donate 
 In order to test Hypotheses 5.1, 5.2 & 5.3, a two-way MANOVA was 
conducted with perpetrator group membership (donor perpetrator vs. outgroup 
perpetrator) and victim group membership (ingroup victims vs. outgroup victims) as 
between subject factors.  Hypothetical donations and willingness to donate were 
entered as the dependent variables.  There was no significant multivariate effect of 
perpetrator group on the dependent measures, Pillai's Trace = .007, F(2,117) = .612, 
p = .543, partial η2 = .007.  There was, however, a significant effect of victim group 
membership, Pillai's Trace = .041, F(2,117) = 3.74, p = .026, partial η2 = .041.  There 
was also a significant interaction effect, Pillai's Trace = .043, F(2,117) = 3.98, p = 
.020, partial η2 = .043.   
Univariate tests confirmed that, contrary to Hypothesis 5.1, perpetrator group 
membership did not significantly affect hypothetical donations, F(1,178) = 1.17, p = 
.281, partial η2 = .007; nor did it significantly affect willingness to donate, F(1,178) = 
.760,  p = .385, partial η2 = .004.   
However, in support of Hypothesis 5.2, victim group membership did 
significantly affect hypothetical donations, F(1,178) = 7.40, p = .007, partial η2 = .040; 
as well as willingness to donate, F(1,178) = 3.90, p = .050, partial η2 = .021.  As 
expected, donations were higher for ingroup compared to outgroup victims.  For 
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hypothetical donations, means were £5.59 for ingroup vs. £3.86 for outgroup.  For 
willingness to donate, means were 4.79 for ingroup and 4.32 for outgroup.  
Further, the interaction between perpetrator and victim group had a significant 
effect on hypothetical donations, F(1,178) = 7.79, p = .006, partial η2 = .042; and a 
significant effect on willingness to donate, F(1,178) = 4.47, p = .036, partial η2 = .025.  
As predicted by Hypothesis 5.3, donations were magnified when both perpetrators 
and victims were ingroup members (see Table 4).    
The effect of perpetrator group and victim group on donor responsibility and empathy 
 In order to test Hypothesis 5.4 & 5.5, the MANOVA above was repeated with 
donor responsibility and empathy as the dependent measures.  The multivariate test 
indicated a marginal effect of perpetrator group on the dependent measures, Pillai’s 
Trace = .027, F(2,177) = 2.46, p = .088, partial η2 = .027; a significant effect of victim 
group on the dependent measures, Pillai’s Trace = .044, F(2,177) = 4.08, p = .018, 
partial η2 = .044; and a marginal effect of the interaction on the dependent measures, 
Pillai’s Trace = .030, F(2,177) = 2.69, p = .071, partial η2 = .030.   
 Univariate tests were then inspected.  Perpetrator group had a significant effect 
on donor responsibility, F(1,178) = 3.99, p = .047, partial η2 = .022; but a marginal 
effect on empathy, F(1,178) = 3.30, p = .071, partial η2 = .018.  In support of 
Hypothesis 5.4, responsibility was higher when the perpetrator was ingroup to the 
donor (m = 4.88, sd = 1.3) compared to when the perpetrator was outgroup to the donor 
(m = 4.48, sd = 1.3).  
Victim group did not have a significant effect on donor responsibility, 
F(1,178) = 2.51, p = .114, partial η2 = .014; but had a significant effect on empathy, 
F(1,178) = 8.15, p = .005, partial η2 = .044.  In support of Hypothesis 5.5, empathy 
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was higher when victims were ingroup members (5.22) compared to when they were 
outgroup members (4.88) (see Table 4).   
Exploratory analyses on the effect of perpetrator and victim group on disaster scale 
 An exploratory ANOVA was conducted on the perceived scale of the disaster.  
Results indicated that perpetrator group did not affect disaster scale, F(1,178) =  .074, 
p = .786, partial η2 < .001.  Victim group did however affect disaster scale, F(1,178) 
= 4.60, p = .033, partial η2 = .025; with the scale of the disaster perceived as more 
damaging for ingroup victims than for outgroup victims (see Table 4).  There was no 
effect of the interaction, F(1,178) = .009, p = .925, partial η2 < .001. 
 
Table 4 
The effect of perpetrator group membership on giving prosociality (Study 4) 
 
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses.  
Across rows. Items that do not share a subscript are significantly different, p < .05.  
    
 
 
 
 Donor  
Perpetrator 
95 % CI Outgroup  
Perpetrator 
95% CI 
Ingroup Victim     
Hypothetical donations £6.83a (4.5) 5.5:8.1 £4.36b (4.5) 3.1:5.5 
Willingness to donate 5.15a (1.7) 4.6:5.6 4.44b (1.5) 3.9:4.8 
Donor responsibility 5.24a (1.1) 4.8:5.6 4.44b (1.3) 4.0:4.8 
Empathy 5.67a (1.0) 5.3:6.0 4.97b (1.2) 4.6:5.3 
Disaster scale 6.06a (1.0) 5.7:6.3 6.01a (1.0) 5.7:6.3 
Outgroup Victim     
Hypothetical donations £3.32a (3.8) 2.2:4.4 £4.41a (4.0) 2.9:5.8 
Willingness to donate 4.17a (1.5) 3.7:4.8 4.47a (1.4) 3.9:5.0 
Donor responsibility 4.52a (1.4) 4.1:4.8 4.53a (1.2) 4.0:4.9 
Empathy 4.78a (1.1) 4.4:5.1 4.80a (1.3) 4.3:5.2 
Disaster scale 5.7a (1.0) 5.4:5.9 5.69a (1.0) 5.3:6.0 
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The mediating relationship of donor responsibility and empathy on prosociality 
towards disaster victims 
 As in previous studies, the SPSS PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2008) was used, 
set to 5,000 bootstrap resamples, in order to test Hypotheses 5.4 & 5.5.  Victim group 
membership was significantly correlated with hypothetical donations, r = -.204, p = 
.006; and with willingness to donate, r = -.151, p = .042.  Perpetrator group was not 
significantly correlated with hypothetical donations, r = -.053, p = .480; nor was it 
significantly associated with willingness to donate, r = -.046, p = .542.   
Donor responsibility was investigated as a mediator of perpetrator group 
membership (testing Hypothesis 5.4).  The indirect effect from perpetrator group 
membership to hypothetical donations was not in evidence, point estimate = -.604, CI 
95% [-1.31, .047]; a Sobel test indicated that the effect was marginal, Z = -1.74, p = 
.081.  In a similar pattern, the indirect effect of donor responsibility on willingness to 
donate did not emerge, point estimate = -.279, CI 95% [-.583, .021]; with a Sobel test 
indicating that the effect was marginal, Z = -1.77, p = .076.  However, donor 
responsibility significantly mediated the interaction between victim group and 
perpetrator group membership on hypothetical donations, point estimate = 1.16, CI 
95% [.529, 2.00]; Sobel test, Z = 2.98, p = .002.  Moreover, a similar pattern was 
obtained for the mediation of the interaction term on willingness to donate, point 
estimate = .569, CI 95% [.239, .936]; Sobel test, Z = 3.13, p = .001.   
Donor responsibility was also investigated as a possible mediator of victim 
group membership on prosociality.  The indirect path between victim group 
membership and hypothetical donations, via donor responsibility, was not significant, 
point estimate = -.473, CI 95% [-1.18, .117]; Sobel test, Z = -1.42, p = .154.  Neither 
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was the indirect path via donor responsibility significant between victim group 
membership and willingness to donate, point estimate = -.222 CI 95% [-.548, .059]; 
Sobel test, Z = -1.44, p = .148.  Taken together, these results offer little support for 
Hypothesis 5.4, in that donor responsibility was not a significant mediator of the effect 
of perpetrator group membership on donations. 
Analyses were then repeated to investigate whether empathy was a significant 
mediator of the effect of victim group membership on prosociality.  In support of 
Hypothesis 5.5, empathy was found to be a significant mediator of the effect of victim 
group membership on hypothetical donations, point estimate = -.617, CI 95% [-1.22, 
-.191].  A Sobel test confirmed this significant indirect effect, Z = -2.37, p = .017.  
Empathy also significantly mediated the effect of victim group membership on 
willingness to donate, point estimate = -.296, CI 95% [-.548, -.096]; Sobel test, Z = -
.2.53, p = .011.  Empathy also mediated the interaction between victim group 
membership and perpetrator group membership on hypothetical donations, point 
estimate = .914, CI 95% [.454, 1.56]; Sobel test, Z = 2.89, p = .003.  Similarly, empathy 
mediated the effect of the interaction on willingness to donate, point estimate = .459, 
CI 95% [.249, .737]; Sobel test, Z = 3.25, p = .001.   
As expected, empathy was not a significant mediator of perpetrator group 
membership on hypothetical donations, i.e. the indirect path from perpetrator group 
membership to hypothetical donations via empathy was not significant, point estimate 
= -.342, CI 95% [-.897, .115]; Sobel test, Z = -.1.33, p = .183.  Neither was empathy a 
significant mediator of the effect of perpetrator group membership on willingness to 
donate, point estimate = -.157, CI 95% [-.388, .064]; Sobel test, Z = -.1.35, p = .174.   
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Overall these results support Hypothesis 5.5, and suggest that empathy is a 
central mechanism that can account for prosocial behaviour when victim ingroup 
membership is made salient.   
The relationship between donor responsibility, empathic concern, and donation 
decisions 
 Donor responsibility was a significant correlate of hypothetical donations, r = 
.515, p < .001, and of willingness to donate, r = .647, p < .001.  Similarly, empathy 
was a significant bivariate predictor of hypothetical donations, r = .377, p < .001, as 
well as willingness to donate, r = .471, p < .0016.  Moreover, empathy was significantly 
related to donor responsibility, r = .512, p < .001.   
To test Hypothesis 5.6 (that donor responsibility mediates effects of empathic 
concern), mediation analyses were conducted using the SPSS PROCESS macro 
(Hayes, 2012).  Bias corrected bootstrapping analysis, with 5,000 resamples, indicated 
that the indirect path between empathy and hypothetical donations, via donor 
responsibility, was significant, point estimate = .840, CI 95% [.45, 1.34].  A Sobel test 
was also conducted and confirmed this result, z = 3.92, p < .001.  The mediation 
                                                 
 
 
6 As discussed in chapter 2, findings by Stürmer et al. (2005; 2006) found empathy to be a stronger 
predictor for helping ingroup victims compared to outgroup victims.  So far, in the current thesis, 
studies 2, 3, and 4 have all found empathy to be a significant predictor of prosociality towards 
outgroup victims.  However, it is possible that empathy is a stronger predictor for ingroup victims, 
and this notion was tested in the current study.  Using PROCESS for SPSS (model 1), an interaction 
term was created with empathy and victim group (ingroup vs. outgroup) and with hypothetical 
donations as the outcome.  The three predictor variables were entered simultaneously into the model.  
The interaction term was not significant, p = .430.  The analysis was repeated with willingness to 
donate as the outcome variable and again the interaction term was not significant, p = .873.  These 
findings, along with the significant correlations between empathy and prosociality in studies 2 and 3, 
suggest that empathy is an equally effective predictor of helping for both ingroup and outgroup 
victims.  Although these findings are not in line with research that has indicated differences in 
physical or neurological empathic responses as a function of group membership (c.f. Cikara, Bruneau 
& Sax, 2011), it should be noted that much of this past research has focused on racially defined 
groups, whereas the present line of research manipulates national group membership.      
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analysis was then repeated with willingness to donate as the outcome variable.  Again, 
the indirect path between empathy and willingness to donate via donor responsibility 
was significant, point estimate = .346, CI 95% [.20, .52].  A Sobel test confirmed the 
bootstrapping analyses, z = 4.15, p < .001.  Together, these results support Hypothesis 
5.6, by suggesting that feelings of empathy increase prosociality towards victims via 
the mechanism of responsibility. 
Structural model of perpetrator group, victim group, donor responsibility, and 
empathy on prosociality 
 To further investigate the underlying processes, a structural equation model 
was built in order to examine the relationship of all variables simultaneously (see 
Figure 2).  As theorised in the introduction to this chapter, perpetrator group 
membership predicted donor responsibility, which in turn predicted prosociality.  
Victim group membership predicted empathy, which in turn predicted donor 
responsibility, which in turn predicted prosociality. The prosociality latent outcome 
variable consisted of hypothetical donations and willingness to donate, with the path 
from prosociality to willingness to donate fixed to 1.  The interaction between victim 
and perpetrator group membership was also included in the model.  
 The model fitted the data well given the sample size, χ2(61) = 130.23, p < .001, 
χ2 / df = 2.13; CFI = .954; RMSEA = .079; SRMR = .055; and accounted for 63.7% of 
the variance in prosociality.  Although the χ2 test was significant, it has been argued 
that this test of model fit is overly strict, unrealistic, sensitive to both sample size and 
data normality, and dichotomous in nature (Bentler, 2007; Curran, Bollen, Chen, 
Paxton & Kirby, 2003; Jöreskog, 1987; Steiger, 2007).  χ2 / df is considered a fairer 
test of model fit as it is somewhat less susceptible to these issues, with an acceptable 
value being < 3 and ideally < 2; thus the current model demonstrated good fit (Hu & 
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Bentler, 1999).  RMSEA is generally considered to have good fit at ≤ .06, CFI at ≥ 
.95, and SRMR ≤ .05-08 (Byrne, 2001; Hu & Bentler, 1999).  Although the RMSEA 
fit could be improved in the current model, overall the four fit statistics demonstrate a 
good level of fit. 
Both bootstrapping (using 5,000 resamples), and Sobel tests, indicated that 
victim group membership had a significant indirect effect on prosociality through 
empathy, which in turn led to donor responsibility, point estimate = .648, 95% CI 
[.241, 1.20]; Z = 2.88, p = .001.  Similarly, bootstrapping results indicated that the 
interaction between victim group and perpetrator group had a significant positive 
effect on prosociality through empathy and donor responsibility, point estimate = .403, 
95% CI [.007, .908]; with a marginally significant Sobel test result, Z = 1.91, p = .055.  
In the final model, the direct path between perpetrator group and donor responsibility 
was not significant, p = .236 (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2 
Structural equational model of group memberships on prosociality (Study 4). Significance levels in parentheses. 
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Alternative structural models 
Alternative structural models were tested, with a view to demonstrating that 
the preferred model would fit better than other plausible models.  To begin, alternative 
models related to the mediators (donor responsibility and empathy) were investigated.  
The first model was identical to the previous model above, but with direct paths from 
perpetrator group membership, victim group membership, and the interaction term, to 
the latent prosociality variable.  A χ2 comparison of model fit was conducted to 
establish whether this model, with additional direct paths, would be superior to the 
present model.  The χ2 of this new model was subtracted from the χ2 of the current 
model.  The chi square difference was not significant, χ2(3) = 5.01, p = .200, suggesting 
that the mediators of empathy and donor responsibility are fully capable of accounting 
for the variance in prosociality.   
A second alternative model was again identical to the proposed model above, 
but included a direct path from empathy to prosociality.  This model was included in 
order to confirm that the direct effect of empathy on prosociality was not a more 
substantial effect than the novel process presented in the current model where empathy 
leads to donor responsibility (Hypothesis 5.6), which in turn leads to prosociality.  The 
fit statistics of this alternative model were similar to the current model and the chi 
square difference between the models was not significant, χ2(3) = 5.01, p = .150; 
indicating that an additional direct path from empathy to prosociality does not improve 
the overall model fit and is not required.   
 Two further theoretical models were next tested, to ascertain that the preferred 
model does indeed fit better than other plausible alternatives.  The first competing 
hypothesis was that rather than predicting a linear relationship between empathy and 
donor responsibility that leads to prosociality, it could be that empathy directly affects 
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prosociality, and that donor responsibility also directly affects prosociality, in a 
parallel process.  This would refute Hypothesis 5.6, in that the link between empathy 
and donor responsibility would be redundant. In order to test this possibility, a direct 
path between empathy and the latent prosociality variable was added, and the path 
between donor responsibility and prosociality was kept, while the path between 
empathy and donor responsibility was removed.  This alternative model had poor fit, 
χ2(61) = 179.06, p < .001, χ2 / df = 2.93; CFI = .921; RMSEA = .103; SRMR = .183; 
particularly on the latter three indicators, supporting Hypothesis 5.6.   
 Another competing hypothesis is that the linear relationship that predicts a path 
from empathy to donor responsibility (Hypothesis 5.6) could be reversed, and that 
donors first feel responsible for helping, which in turn leads to greater empathy and 
thereby greater helping.  In order to test this, the paths between empathy and donor 
responsibility were reversed in an alternative model, such that donor responsibility 
now predicted empathy, which in turn predicted the latent prosocial variable.  This 
alternative model was inferior to the proposed model, demonstrating poorer fit on three 
out of four model fit indicators, χ2(61) = 188.12, p < .001, χ2 / df = 3.08; CFI = .915; 
RMSEA = .107; SRMR = .099.  
Discussion 
 Study 4 extended the findings of the previous studies by including victim group 
membership and perpetrator group membership in the same design.  As predicted, 
shared victim group membership resulted in increased prosociality (Hypothesis 5.2).  
Furthermore, a novel contribution was made with the confirmation that a salient 
perpetrator group can also affect donation decisions that are placed in an intergroup 
context.  Interestingly, rather than a direct effect of perpetrator group on prosociality 
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(Hypothesis 5.1), the effect was present only through the interaction with victim group 
(Hypothesis 5.3).  This interaction demonstrated that donation decisions were more 
favourable when both victims and perpetrators shared the donor’s group membership.   
Study 4 also provided some evidence that salient victim and perpetrator group 
memberships may affect donations through different mechanisms.  Experimental 
results demonstrated an effect of victim group on empathy (Hypothesis 5.5) but not on 
donor responsibility.  By contrast, perpetrator group affected donor responsibility 
(Hypothesis 5.4), but not empathy.  Moreover, whereas donations to the victim ingroup 
were mediated by empathy (supporting Hypothesis 5.5), there was no evidence that 
the effect of perpetrator group membership on donations was mediated by a sense of 
donor responsibility (contrary to Hypothesis 5.4).  The structural equation model 
yielded evidence that empathy was mediated by donor responsibility (in support of 
Hypothesis 5.6).   
Finally, exploratory analyses yielded a significant effect of salient victim 
group on the perceived scale of the disaster, such that ingroup victims were seen to 
have suffered more, and that the cost of the disaster was greater for ingroup victims.  
It is unclear as to why perpetrator group did not have a similar effect (as in study 1), 
but it is interesting that shared group membership again affected a variable that is, on 
first inspection, irrelevant.  One might anticipate different estimates of financial harm, 
but it is unclear as to why sharing victim group membership (the present study), or 
perpetrator group membership (study 1), would affect the perceived level of suffering.  
It could be that participants are more willing to acknowledge the harm of a disaster 
when they are somehow related via a shared group membership, perhaps as a form of 
social support.  Or, it could be that they genuinely feel that the disaster was more 
harmful, perhaps due to transference of the increased negative feelings they 
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themselves experience, which colours their judgement when asked to rate the scale of 
the disaster.  No doubt other explanations could be offered, suggesting this to be a 
promising line for future research.     
General Discussion 
 Understanding the mechanisms through which individuals help other groups is 
vitally important given the vast sums involved, and given the number of lives that 
depend on such aid.  Although individuals can show amazing generosity towards local 
and national causes, generosity directed towards other groups and other countries 
tends to be lower.  The present studies investigated the role of shared group 
memberships in attitudes towards charitable giving.  
 As a package, the studies demonstrate that donors are more generous when 
they share a group membership with the perpetrator (Hypothesis 5.1, shown in study 
1 – although not confirmed in studies 2, 3, and 4).  Further, donors prefer to give to 
ingroup rather than outgroup victims (Hypothesis 5.2, shown in study 4).  Results also 
suggest that, as predicted, the effects of victim ingroup (rather than outgroup) 
membership with the donor on donations were mediated by empathy (Hypothesis 5.5, 
shown in study 4).   Contrary to predictions, the effects of perpetrator ingroup (rather 
than outgroup) membership with the donor on donations were not mediated by 
perceived responsibility (Hypothesis 5.4, no support found in studies 2, 3, or 4).  
Instead though, responsibility mediated the effect of empathy on donations 
(Hypothesis 5.6., supported in studies 2, 3, and 4).  Last but not least, victim and 
perpetrator group memberships interacted in their effect of donations, so that 
donations were highest if both were ingroup members (Hypothesis 5.3, supported in 
study 4).  
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 Having said this, results were not ‘perfect’ in all respects.  Notably, the 
perpetrator group effect was particularly pronounced in study 1 when the outgroup 
perpetrator was from a third party, and less so when the perpetrator was from the 
victim group itself.  Moreover, perpetrator group membership was not impactful in 
itself in study 4, but the effect emerged in the form of the interaction when considered 
in conjunction with the victim group membership manipulation.  This raises some 
interesting questions.  The findings point to the possibility that studying whether 
perpetrators belong to the donor’s ingroup or outgroup is possibly too simplistic.  It 
may not be the case that a salient outgroup perpetrator merely provides motives for 
not helping, i.e. that presenting a charitable appeal with an intergroup dimension 
merely engenders a lack of prosociality.  Rather, it appears that under conditions where 
perpetrators do not share a group membership with donors, it might matter which other 
group they belong to.  For example, outgroup members are sometimes helped in order 
to distinguish the ingroup from one or more outgroups (van Leeuwen & Mashuri, 
2011).  If perpetrators belong to a third party, it might matter what the precise relations 
are between the third party, the donors’ group, and the victims’ group.  Therefore, it 
is hoped that although the present contribution cannot possibly answer all questions 
raised by group membership effects in the context of donations to humanly caused 
events, an important contribution might be to raise awareness for these issues, and put 
them firmly on the research agenda going forward. 
 Based on the aforementioned discussion, an interesting question for future 
exploration is to study in more depth the effect of group membership of the perpetrator 
in different groups.  For example, it has been mentioned previously that intentional 
harms are viewed as more damaging than non-intentional harms (Ames & Fiske, 
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2013), and it would be interesting to investigate whether intentional harms are further 
magnified when the negative deed is committed by an outgroup perpetrator.   
Moreover, although the current thesis focused on empathy and responsibility 
as explanatory mechanisms, it is unlikely that the array of possible mediators has been 
exhausted.  Other previously studied mediators of prosociality such as interpersonal 
attraction (Stürmer et al., 2006), similarity (Bal & van den Bos, 2010; Chandler, 
Griffin, & Sorensen, 2008), or oneness (Cialdini et al., 1997) could be investigated, to 
see if they have explanatory power for the effects of victim and perpetrator group 
memberships on donation behaviour.  
 Across studies, only a subtle abstract manipulation that involved changing 
three or four keywords was needed to achieve a salient group membership effect.  The 
fact that such a minimal manipulation triggers experimental effects speaks to the 
importance of group membership cues for informing donation decisions.  These 
findings are consistent with Levine and Thompson (2004), who found location of the 
disaster (which one might consider a ‘common sense’ variable), to be irrelevant in 
charitable helping, but that a salient group categorization was enough to affect giving 
behaviour.  However, the present results extend these findings by demonstrating that 
the technique can also apply to manipulation of perpetrator groups.   
 Thus far, the discussion has been theoretical in nature, but the present findings 
may also have applied importance.  While some charity appeals highlight shared group 
memberships between donors and recipients, suggesting that practitioners are to at 
least some extent aware of the importance of victim group memberships, few appeals 
seem to utilize the importance of perpetrator group memberships.  Yet, when 
confronted with humanly caused events, laypersons may well ask themselves who they 
believe is responsible for the problem and, depending on perpetrator group 
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membership, they may well become indifferent.  As such, pursuing these issues further 
will not only be of theoretical importance, but will also have potential applied benefits.  
Given that charitable giving is a billion dollar industry, even a small increase in 
donations at an individual level might save thousands of lives, as well as reduce 
poverty and suffering worldwide.  This work addresses an important gap in the 
literature not only because group memberships in donations contexts have not 
sufficiently been theorized, but also because of the frequency and multitude of 
humanitarian crises that mar our recent history – and because of the number of lives 
that depend on donations for survival. 
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Chapter Six 
Deliberate and intuitive reasoning styles and outgroup helping 
 
Introduction 
As discussed in some length in chapter 3, there is evidence that people have 
two distinct modes of thinking when it comes to problem-solving and, by extension, 
when it comes to donation decisions (Evans & Stanovich, 2013).  To recap, Type 1 
decision making is considered to be relatively fast, automatic, and based on instinctual 
processes; while Type 2 is considered to be much slower, effortful and more 
evolutionarily advanced (Kahneman, 2011).   
As outlined in detail in chapter 3, there are reasons to assume that reasoning 
styles might affect donations as well as empathic concern for those in need.  Moreover, 
as outlined in that chapter, there are reasons to assume that reasoning styles interact 
with reputation concerns in their effect on donations, and that reputation concerns in 
themselves will also affect donations. The present chapter will investigate these ideas.  
 The chosen approach comprises several important innovations beyond 
previous research.  Firstly, the manipulation of victim group membership alongside a 
manipulation of reasoning style is novel.  Previous research has manipulated reasoning 
style in the context of identifiable victims (Dickert et al., 2011; Small et al., 2007); 
however, the present thesis is concerned with group level processes, and it could be 
argued that when participants focus on an identifiable victim they are helping in a 
more interpersonal context.  As such, study 5 utilises the context of general statistical 
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victims in need.  To date, there is much less evidence about the effect of ‘deliberate’ 
priming when victims are presented statistically.   
Secondly, the present approach is novel in investigating reputation effects and 
reasoning style in the same design.  It is a rather obvious question whether reasoning 
styles are sensitive, and exert different effects, depending on contextual demands and 
characteristics.  For example, as outlined in chapter 3, there are reasons to assume that 
the effects of an analytically focused reasoning style will be amplified if congruent 
situational characteristics also invite an analytical focus.  The present thesis presents 
an inaugural test of these ideas.  
Overview of hypotheses  
As before, hypotheses are largely derived from the literature reviewed in the 
previous chapters.  Hence, the theoretical rationale for each hypothesis will be 
summarised, but not in too much detail.  For a more thorough discussion, the reader is 
referred back to the theoretical chapters above. 
Hypothesis 6.1.  In line with the predictions of the previous chapter, consistent 
with a social identity approach, and consistent with previous research that has found a 
preference for ingroup helping (e.g. Levine & Thompson, 2004; Stürmer et al., 2005), 
it is predicted that there will be a main effect of victim group membership, such that 
ingroup members will receive greater donations.  
Hypothesis 6.2.  Moreover, consistent with the results in study 4 and the 
rationale previously outlined, it is predicted that victim group membership will affect 
empathic concern, with ingroup victims receiving greater empathy compared to 
outgroup members.   
Hypothesis 6.3.  With regards to reasoning style, since empathy is considered 
an affective response (Batson et al., 1989), participants primed to trust their own 
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affective responses, i.e. go with their ‘gut’, should feel more empathic concern than 
those primed to think analytically. This prediction is based on arguments by Small and 
colleagues who argue that the deleterious effects of a deliberate reasoning style (albeit 
in the context of helping identifiable victims) is due to a lack of empathic concern 
(Small et al., 2007).   
Hypothesis 6.4.  It is also predicted that an intuitive reasoning style will 
increase donations towards fellow ingroup members.  This prediction is derived by 
assuming that the social identity process by which the self can become intertwined 
with other ingroup members is an automatic, intuitive process.  When it occurs, 
ingroup helping necessarily involves helping others who are similar to the self.  Or, 
put another way, helping the ingroup is much like helping the self, which would be 
considered an intuitive ‘gut reaction’ for most people.  By contrast, a deliberate 
reasoning style may be able to inhibit this tendency, and engage in more effortful 
reasoning that considers other motives/factors for helping.       
 Hypothesis 6.5.  With regards to reputation effects on giving behaviour, it is 
predicted that when donation decisions are made public, participants will donate more.  
As discussed in chapter 3, this is consistent with research that has demonstrated 
increased donations in various public settings (Alpizar et al., 2008; Andreoni & Petrie, 
2004; Bateson, Callow, Holmes, Redmond Roche, & Nettle, 2013).  It should be noted 
that in this past research, soliciting donations in public were reasoned to make salient 
individual reputation concerns, which in turn were hypothesised as increasing 
prosociality.  Although researchers have demonstrated that ingroup members are 
concerned with how the outgroup sees them (Hopkins et al. (2007; van Leeuwen & 
Tauber (2012)), the aforementioned studies that manipulate anonymity also 
demonstrate that individuals are concerned with impression management when it 
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comes to other ingroup members.  In particular, an ingroup member will not desire to 
appear callous in the eyes of a fellow ingroup member, particularly if generosity and 
kindness are considered positive group qualities.    
 Hypothesis 6.6.  It is also predicted that reputation concerns will interact with 
reasoning style, such that participants primed to think more analytically will be more 
affected by reputation concerns than those who are primed with intuition.  It is 
reasonable to assume that an analytical thinking style is more strategic in nature, and 
researchers have demonstrated that reputation concerns are often exploited for 
strategic benefits (Barclay, 2012; Milinski et al., 2002).  The interaction between the 
two factors is predicted to impact on donation decisions.  
Finally, note that no main effects of reasoning style are predicted.  This is 
because the deleterious effects of a deliberate reasoning style on donations has 
previously been studied using identifiable victims, whereas the present studies use a 
context of statistical victims in order to investigate group level processes.  The study 
by Small et al. (2007) is the only study that has investigated reasoning prime effects 
in the context of statistical victims (to my knowledge), and found an increase (albeit a 
non-significant increase) of a deliberate reasoning prime on donation decisions.  One 
goal of the present studies is to explore whether an analytical reasoning style can lead 
to increased helping in certain contexts.   
Study 5 
Study 5 primes participants to either a deliberate analytical reasoning style, or 
a more intuitive heuristic reasoning style, and measures subsequent prosocial 
intentions towards either ingroup or outgroup victims.  The design allows testing of 
whether donations to ingroup (rather than outgroup) victims are indeed more 
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forthcoming (Hypothesis 6.1, c.f. also Hypothesis 5.2).  The design also allows 
investigation of an interaction effect between reasoning style and ingroup/outgroup 
status of the victims (Hypothesis 6.4).     
Study 5 improves upon previous studies by including several predictor 
variables that may be associated with charitable donations.  Two of these predictor 
variables are directly related to reasoning style, need for cognition (a measure of the 
extent that participants desire more effortful cognitive modes of thinking), and faith in 
intuition (a measure of how instinctive participants are and how likely they are to ‘go 
with their gut’).  These two measures were also included as an alternative way of 
tapping into the constructs of interest, in case the manipulations would prove not 
effective.  In particular, a tendency for critical thinking has been linked to the ability 
to provide normative answers on a range of common problem-solving tasks 
(Frederick, 2005; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011; West, Toplak, & Stanovich, 
2008).    
Additionally, as discussed in chapter 3, there are several variables that may be 
related to how donors reason about charitable appeals, e.g. the perceived need for a 
donation, and the perceived effectiveness of donating.  These two variables are 
included as potential predictors in the present study, alongside variables that have 
already been shown to be relevant in chapter 5, i.e. the perceived scale of the disaster, 
and empathy towards the victims.  Thus, although these inclusions are somewhat 
exploratory, study 5 offers an additional contribution by assessing several relevant 
predictors of charitable helping simultaneously in the same design.  The inclusion of 
an empathy measure also allowed for testing of Hypothesis 6.2 (c.f. Hypothesis 5.5), 
which suggested that empathy would be affected by victim group membership, and of 
Hypothesis 6.3, which predicted an effect of reasoning style on empathy.  
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Method 
Participants 
 Ninety-two undergraduate students completed the study for course credit (Mage 
= 19.16, SD = 3.38; 83 female, 9 male).  66.1% of the sample identified as British, the 
remaining 33.9% of participants represented various nationalities.   
Procedure 
 Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (reasoning prime: 
deliberate/intuitive) x 2 (victim group membership: ingroup/outgroup) independent 
factorial design.  Participants were first asked to provide demographic data and answer 
trait items relating to need for cognition and faith in intuition (see measures section 
below).  They were then instructed to read a short vignette modelled on the 
manipulations used by Levine and Thompson (2004).  The vignette described a 
fictitious natural disaster of floods that had killed or left homeless several thousand 
victims (see appendix H).  Using piping, the vignettes were manipulated to state that 
the disaster took place either in the participant’s own country, or in an unbeknownst 
fictional country (Esturia).  Thus, participants either read of a flood in their own 
country, affecting ingroup victims (ingroup victim condition), or of a flood in Esturia 
affecting Esturians (outgroup victim condition).  Piping ensured that a relevant group 
membership was salient for all participants in the ingroup condition, irrespective of 
their country of origin, while the use of a fictional country avoided pre-existing biases.  
As in study 4, participants were asked to guess the nature of the study and comment 
on any aspects of the study via an open-ended response format.  Participants did not 
indicate any suspicion of ‘Esturia’ as a fictitious country.  
Before reading the vignette, participants were randomly assigned to either a 
deliberate reasoning prime condition, or an intuitive reasoning prime condition.  Both 
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primes were modelled on manipulations shown to affect reasoning style and 
subsequent monetary behaviour (Dickert et al., 2011).  The deliberate prime condition 
involved answering six mathematical questions, e.g. ‘If an object travels 5 metres in 
60 seconds, how many metres will it travel in 360 minutes?’  Participants were 
instructed to think carefully and to deliberate on each question.  The intuitive prime 
condition also consisted of six items; however, participants were instructed to answer 
the questions quickly, using their instinct and intuition.  Three of the six intuitive items 
had a negative focus, while three of the items had a positive focus, e.g. ‘When you 
hear the word ‘failure’, what do you feel?’ or, ‘When you hear the word ‘love’, what 
do you feel?’ The use of both positive and negative items reduces the likelihood of the 
item content confounding the manipulation.  Items for both conditions, deliberate and 
intuitive, were presented in random order to the relevant participant group (see 
appendix E).   
Aside from the manipulations described above, all other information was kept 
identical between conditions.  Before being debriefed, participants were asked to guess 
the purpose of the study.  None of the participants guessed the nature of the 
manipulations, nor did they report being suspicious of the veracity of the vignette; 
indeed, large-scale flooding has been a regular occurrence in recent years both in the 
UK and abroad (e.g., along the Thames, along the Danube).   
Measures 
 Several of the measures previously described in studies 1 to 4 were included 
in the present study.  Hypothetical donations were measured from £0 to £12 in £2 
increments (resulting in a 7-point scale); again, this was used as a monetary index of 
prosocial behaviour.  The new alpha reliabilities for the composite measures were as 
follows: willingness to donate, α = .86; empathy, α = .92; and disaster scale, α = .85.  
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Donation effectiveness was measured with a single item, ‘I think donating to the flood 
victims will be effective’.  Donation need was also measured with a single item, ‘I 
think that the flood victims will need help’. 
The present study also included items designed to measure and tap into 
individual differences related to reasoning style.  Since these were dispositional 
measures, they were taken before the experimental manipulation.  The ten item short 
form of the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI) (Norris, Pacini, & Epstein, 1998) 
was included which consists of two subscales, need for cognition (based initially on 
work by Cacioppo, Petty & Kao, 1984), and faith in intuition (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-
Raj, & Heier, 1996).   
Need for cognition was measured with five items, ‘Thinking hard and for a 
long time about something gives me little satisfaction’ (reverse coded), ‘I prefer 
complex to simple problems’, ‘I prefer to do something that challenges my thinking 
ability rather than do something that requires little thought’, ‘I try to avoid situations 
that require thinking in depth about something’ (reverse coded), and, ‘I don’t like to 
have to do a lot of thinking’ (reverse coded); α = .79.   
The items for faith in intuition were, ‘In general, I trust my initial feelings 
about people’, ‘I believe in trusting my hunches’, ‘My initial impressions of people 
are almost always right’, ‘When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my 
gut feelings’, and, ‘I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong even if I can’t 
explain how I know’, α = .84.  
Finally, the length of time that participants spent on the reasoning prime, the 
charity appeal, the overall survey, and the time spent answering the hypothetical 
donations items, was measured in seconds.  Participants in the intuitive reasoning 
condition should complete the manipulation more quickly than participants in the 
138 
deliberate condition that involved mathematical answers.  Moreover, if the effects of 
the intuitive prime are lasting, then one would expect participants to continue to ‘go 
with their gut’ after the manipulation and complete subsequent survey items more 
quickly. 
Results 
Bivariate correlations are displayed in Table 5.  Empathy, donation need, 
effectiveness, and responsibility were all significantly associated with hypothetical 
donations and willingness to donate, although empathy was a much stronger predictor 
for the latter.  The perceived scale of the disaster did not co-vary with helping 
intentions, nor did need for cognition or faith in intuition.  There was also a strong 
correlation between empathy, and willingness to donate.   
 
Table 5 
Zero order correlations (Study 5) 
  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. Hypothetical donation        
2. Willingness to donate .534**       
3. Empathy .261* .665**      
4. Donation effectiveness .367** .367** .481**     
5. Disaster scale .141 .505** .515** .258*    
6. Donation need .337** .692** .654** .449** .585**   
7. Need for cognition .023 .090 .145 -.086 .278** .198  
8. Faith in intuition -.178 -.099 -.078 -.357** .177 -.027 .207* 
Note. ** p < .001. * p < .05. 
 
Manipulation check 
 As discussed in the introduction to chapter 6, deliberate reasoning involves an 
analytical reasoning style, and is therefore likely to be slow and effortful.  By contrast, 
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intuitive reasoning is more closely associated with a heuristic reasoning style that 
draws upon ‘gut instincts’ and is thus quicker and less effortful.  Therefore, 
participants in the deliberate reasoning condition should take longer to complete the 
priming task, and moreover, spend a longer amount of time processing the vignette, 
completing the survey, and deciding on answers for the dependent measures.   
 Independent measures t tests were conducted with reasoning style as the 
independent variable, and time in seconds as the dependent variable, for reasoning 
prime, vignette exposure, survey completion, and hypothetical donations decision 
time.  Results indicated that participants in the deliberate priming condition were 
significantly slower on all of the aforementioned measures: reasoning prime, t = -
12.62, p < .001 (281.28s vs. 81.53s); vignette exposure time, t = -4.40, p < .001 (54.04s 
vs. 36.48s); survey time, t = -5.51, p < .001 (1017.37s vs. 748.17s); and hypothetical 
donations decision time, t = -2.30, p = .023 (10.02s vs. 14.21s).  
The results indicate that the reasoning prime manipulation was successful.  
Note that an alternative method of assessing the manipulation would be to observe the 
written answers in the intuitive prime condition, and count the number of correct 
answers in the deliberate prime condition.  However, although all participants wrote 
an answer in the intuitive prime condition, this does not prove that their answers were 
generated intuitively; suggesting that a time based manipulation check is a superior 
method for assessing this condition.  Similarly, scoring the number of correct maths 
answers in the deliberate prime condition does not prove or disprove the type of 
reasoning style engaged in problem solving; and besides, Type 2 problem solving does 
not necessarily result in correct answers (Kahneman, 2011).   
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Effect of reasoning style and victim group membership on hypothetical donations and 
willingness to donate 
A two-way MANOVA was conducted with reasoning style (intuitive vs. 
deliberate) and victim group membership (ingroup vs. outgroup) as between subject 
factors (testing Hypotheses 6.1 & 6.4).  Hypothetical donations and willingness to 
donate were entered as the dependent variables.  Multivariate tests indicated that 
victim group membership was significant, Pillai’s Trace = .093, F(2,88) = 4.53, p = 
.013, partial η2 = .093.  Reasoning style was close to significance, Pillai’s Trace = 
.065, F(2,88) = 3.05, p = .052, partial η2 = .065.  The interaction between victim group 
membership and reasoning style did not significantly affect the dependent measures, 
Pillai’s Trace = .009, F(2,88) = .388, p = .679, partial η2 = .009.   
Univariate analyses indicated that victim group membership had a significant 
effect on hypothetical donations, F(1,89) = 5.15, p = .026, partial η2 = .055, with 
ingroup victims receiving increased donations (£7.94) compared to outgroup victims 
(£6.00) (supporting Hypothesis 6.1). There was no effect of victim group membership 
on willingness to donate, F(1,89) = .157, p = .693, partial η2 = .002.  Reasoning style 
also had a significant effect on hypothetical donations, F(1,89) = 5.74, p = .061, partial 
η2 = .061, with those primed to a deliberate reasoning style donating greater amounts 
(£8.00) compared to those primed to an intuitive style (£5.95).  Reasoning style did 
not have a significant effect on willingness to donate, F(1,89) = .629, p = .430, partial 
η2 = .007.  The interaction term was not significant for either hypothetical donations, 
F(1,89) = .191, p = .663, partial η2 = .002, nor for willingness to donate, F(1,89) = 
.157, p = .693, partial η2 = .002 (not supporting Hypothesis 6.4).   
The above analyses were repeated but need for cognition and faith in intuition 
were included as covariates.  This was to test whether the manipulation would be 
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effective once dispositional individual differences related to the manipulation were 
controlled for.  Neither need for cognition nor faith in intuition were significant 
covariates in the multivariate test (p = .491 and p = .290, respectively).  With regards 
to univariate tests, need for cognition did not have a significant effect on either 
hypothetical donations, p = .383, nor on willingness to donate, p = .245.  Similarly, 
faith in intuition did not have a significant effect on hypothetical donations, p = .131, 
nor on willingness to donate, p = .227.  Furthermore, as indicated above, the two 
measures had been included to have an alternative to the manipulation to tap into the 
constructs of interest.  However, as seen in the bivariate correlation table, the 
constructs did not correlate significantly with donation preferences, meaning that there 
was little to be gleaned from this approach.     
The effects of reasoning style and victim group membership on empathy  
 Further analyses were conducted in order to ascertain whether empathy was 
affected by victim group membership (Hypothesis 6.2) or reasoning style (Hypothesis 
6.3).  An ANOVA was conducted with the two IVs as experimental factors, with 
empathy as the dependent variable.   
This revealed that, contrary to Hypothesis 6.2, victim group membership did 
not significantly affect empathy, F(1,89) = 1.34, p = .248, partial η2 = .015.  Reasoning 
did not significantly affect empathy, F(1,89) = .201, p = .655, partial η2 = .002, in 
contrast to Hypothesis 6.3.  The interaction did not significantly affect empathy, 
F(1,89) = .020, p = .887, partial η2 < .001.  
The effects of reasoning style and victim group membership on disaster scale, 
donation effectiveness, and donation need 
 Finally, for exploratory reasons, the above analyses were repeated in order to 
ascertain whether reasoning style and victim group affected variables that pertain to 
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how donors may reason about charitable appeals, these variables were the perceived 
scale of the disaster, the perceived need for a donation, and the perceived effectiveness 
of donating.  These three variables were entered as dependent variables in a 
MANOVA, with victim group membership and reasoning style as the independent 
variables. 
 Multivariate tests indicated a significant effect of victim group membership, 
Pillai’s Trace = .112, F(3,83) = 3.48, p = .020, partial η2 = .112.  The multivariate 
effect of reasoning was not significant, Pillai’s Trace = .060, F(3,83) = .060, p = .158, 
partial η2 = .060.  The interaction was not significant, Pillai’s Trace = .014, F(3,83) = 
.388, p = .762, partial η2 = .014.   
Univariate analyses revealed that victim group membership had a significant 
effect on the perceived scale of the disaster, F(1,85) = 5.38, p = .023, partial η2 = .060, 
with the scale of the disaster seen as worse for outgroup victims (for the means, see 
Table 6).  This was contrary to the pattern obtained in previous studies.  There was no 
effect of victim group membership on the perceived effectiveness of making a 
donation, F(1,85) = .251, p = .618, partial η2 = .003; however, there was an effect on 
the perceived need for donations, F(1,85) = 5.45, p = .022, partial η2 = .060.  Again, 
this was in the direction of the outgroup, with outgroup victims perceived as having 
greater need (see Table 6).   
With regards to the reasoning manipulation, there was no significant effect on 
the perceived scale of the disaster, F(1,85) = .219, p = .641, partial η2 = .003; nor was 
there a significant effect on the perceived need for a donation, F(1,85) = .242, p = 
.624, partial η2 = .060.  There was, however, a marginal effect on donation 
effectiveness, F(1,85) = 2.97, p = .088, partial η2 = .034; again, this was in the direction 
of the outgroup (see Table 6).  Finally, the interaction term was not significant for 
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scale, F(1,85) = .540, p = .465, partial η2 = .006; need, F(1,85) = .030, p = .863, partial 
η2 < .001; or donation effectiveness, F(1,85) = .162, p = .688, partial η2 = .002.   
 
Table 6 
The effect of victim group membership and reasoning style on giving prosociality  
(Study 5) 
 Intuitive 
Reasoning 
95 % CI Deliberate 
Reasoning 
95% CI 
Ingroup Victim     
Hypothetical donations £7.11a (5.0) 5.5:8.6 £8.76a (3.4) 7.0:10.4 
Willingness to donate 5.33a (1.0) 4.9:5.7 5.60a (1.3) 5.1:6.0 
Empathy 5.22a (.98) 4.7:5.6 5.07b (1.3) 4.5:5.5 
Disaster scale 5.61a (1.0) 5.2:5.9 5.66a (1.0) 5.2:6.0 
Effectiveness 4.04a (1.3) 3.5:4.5 4.39a (1.0) 3.8:4.9 
Donation need 5.01a (1.1) 4.5:5.4 4.84a (1.4) 4.3:5.3 
Outgroup Victim     
Hypothetical donations £4.80a (3.9) 2.9:6.6 £7.21b (3.5) 5.5:8.9 
Willingness to donate 5.51a (1.0) 5.0:6.0 5.60a (.94) 5.1:6.0 
Empathy 5.47a (1.0) 4.9:5.9 5.39a (1.2) 4.9:5.8 
Disaster scale 6.22a (.69) 5.8:6.6 5.98a (.90) 5.5:6.3 
Effectiveness 3.80a (1.2) 3.2:4.3 4.36a (1.1) 3.8:4.9 
Donation need 5.57a (1.0) 5.0:6.1 5.49a (1.2) 4.9:6.0 
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses.  
Across rows. Cells that do not share a subscript are significantly different, p < .05.  
 
Multiple regression of predictor variables on hypothetical donations and on 
willingness to donate 
 Exploratory analyses were conducted to investigate simultaneously the 
relationship between victim group membership, reasoning style, empathy, donation 
effectiveness, donation scale, donation need, need for cognition, and faith in intuition 
on hypothetical donations.  A hierarchical multiple regression was conducted with the 
experimental manipulations (victim group membership and reasoning style) entered 
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in model 1, and with empathy, disaster scale, donation effectiveness, donation need, 
need for cognition, and faith in intuition, entered in model 2.  Model 1 was significant, 
F(2,86) = 5.06, p = .008, adjusted R2 = .085.  As expected, and in line with the 
MANOVAS reported above, there was a negative relationship between outgroup 
victim membership and donation amount, β = -2.06, t = -2.38, p = .019, and a positive 
relationship between a deliberate reasoning style and donation amount, β = 1.89, t = 
2.18, p = .031.  Model 2 was also significant, F(8,80) = 4.31, p < .001, adjusted R2 = 
.232.  Moreover, model 2 was a significant improvement over model 1, Fchange(6,80) 
= 3.74, p = .002.  In the final model, in addition to the variables from step 1, the level 
of perceived need was a significant predictor (see Table 8 for beta and significance 
values).   
The above analyses were repeated but with willingness to donate as the 
outcome variable.  Model 1 was not significant, F(2,86) = .324, p = .724, adjusted R2 
= -.016.  Neither victim group membership nor reasoning style were significantly 
correlated with helping intentions, β = .074, t = .321, p = .749, and β = .167, t = .727, 
p = .469; respectively.  Model 2 (the overall model) was significant, F(8,80) = 18.74, 
p < .001, adjusted R2 = .652.  Contrary to previous results, victim group membership 
and reasoning style were not significant predictors.  Empathy, donation effectiveness 
and donation need positively predicted willingness to help (see Table 7).   
 I also carried out further exploratory analyses testing moderation effects; 
however, these did not yield interesting results and will not be reported for reasons of 
brevity.  
 
 
 
145 
Table 7  
Predictors of donation decisions for overall model (Study 5) 
 β t p 
Hypothetical donations    
Victim group membership -2.71 -3.20 .002 
Reasoning style 1.92 2.33 .022 
Empathy .072 .150 .882 
Donation effectiveness .399 .950 .345 
Disaster scale -.348 -.595 .553 
Donation need 1.33 2.77 .007 
Need for cognition .358 .836 .406 
Faith in intuition -.121 -.293 .771 
Willingness to donate    
Victim group membership -.209 -.138 .171 
Reasoning style .118 .802 .425 
Empathy .244 2.83 .006 
Donation effectiveness .285 3.81 .006 
Disaster scale -.012 -.116 .908 
Donation need .346 4.02 <.001 
Need for cognition .036 .469 .640 
Faith in intuition .087 1.18 .241 
 
  
Discussion 
 Study 5 investigated whether an intuitive or deliberate reasoning style can 
affect donation decisions, and whether these distinct styles can interact with victim 
group membership.  There was a main effect of reasoning prime on donations, such 
that participants given an analytical prime were more prosocial to both ingroup and 
outgroup victims.  With regards to victim group membership, the present study found, 
in line with Hypothesis 6.1 (Hypothesis 5.2 in the previous chapter), that ingroup 
members resulted in increased donation amounts.  Although it should be noted that 
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these results were not replicated for self-reported willingness to help, increased 
donations towards ingroup victims are in line with the results from study 4, not to 
mention a robust literature that has demonstrated increased ingroup prosociality 
(Levine et al., 2005; Levine & Thompson, 2004; Stürmer et al., 2006).  The interaction 
between victim group and reasoning style was not significant however, yielding no 
support for Hypothesis 6.4, which had predicted an intuitive reasoning style would 
amplify benefits yielded by an ingroup membership of the victims.   
Contrary to Hypothesis 6.3, there was no effect of reasoning style on empathy. 
Contrary to Hypothesis 6.2 (which tested the same idea as hypothesis 5.5 in the 
previous chapter), there was also no effect of the manipulations on empathy.  The null 
result for empathy contradicts those results of study 4 which found an effect of victim 
group membership on empathic concern.  One potential explanation is that the context 
used in the present study did not elicit levels of distress and concern high enough to 
be compared to that elicited for the victims in study 4.  In this thesis (and in line with 
Batson et al. 1981; Batson & Toi, 1982), empathy has been operationalised as an 
affective variable that measures concern and distress for the victim.  The context in 
study 4 described a horrific coach crash that could be easily imagined by participants, 
and that concerned a scenario that could affect anyone who travels.  By contrast, the 
flood scenario in the present study had a greater number of statistical victims and may 
well have suffered from statistical insensitivity (Fetherstonhaugh et al., 1997; 
Friedrich et al., 1999; Slovic, 2007), with participants less able to imagine being 
themselves in a similar situation.  Although logically speaking flooding is arguably a 
common potential natural disaster in many different climates, nonetheless it is perhaps 
less vivid than the description of a coach crash.  Admittedly, though, reasonably high 
mean levels for empathy in the present study make this explanation tentative.    
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 A number of other exploratory analyses were conducted.  There was an effect 
of victim group membership on scale, such that the scale of the disaster was perceived 
to be higher for outgroup members.  Again, this result is in direct opposition to the 
pattern found in study 4, and again the context may be relevant.  As the majority of 
participants were from the U.K. or major European economies, it could be that 
participants in the present study assumed that outgroup members from a ‘smaller 
nation’ would be more greatly affected by the floods.   
Finally, regression analyses were conducted on donation amount with a 
number of predictor variables that pertain to charitable helping.  Interestingly, other 
than the experimental manipulations, only the perceived need for a donation positively 
predicted donation amount in a simultaneous model that included empathy, disaster 
scale, and effectiveness.  Empathy is generally considered to be one of the most 
important variables related to helping behaviour (see chapter 2), yet it accounted for 
little variance in a model predicting donation amount that contained multiple 
predictors.  With regards to willingness to help, donation need was again positively 
correlated, although in this model empathy and donation effectiveness were also 
significant predictors.  Finally, for both outcome variables, the perceived scale of the 
disaster, as well as trait measures of need for cognition and faith in intuition, were not 
statistically significant predictors.   
Study 6 
Study 6 continues to manipulate reasoning style, but replaces victim group 
membership with a reputation concern manipulation where participants make a public 
or private donation (Hypotheses 6.5 & 6.6). As discussed in chapter 3, reputational 
image concerns have been shown to be a robust method of affecting charitable helping, 
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and the present study is novel in investigating reputation effects and reasoning style in 
the same design.  As noted in chapter 3, reputation concerns are often manipulated 
through varying anonymity, which is considered a close proxy.  Following this 
approach, study 6 manipulates whether participant donation decisions are known to 
other participants.   
Study 6 also continues to investigate the relationship between empathy, 
allowing a further test of Hypothesis 6.3.  Moreover, measures of donation 
effectiveness, and donation need are included, as before.  Additionally, a measure of 
donation impact is included (c.f. chapter 3) as this variable has been shown to be an 
important predictor of donation behaviour (Cryder, Loewenstein, & Scheines, 2013).    
Method 
Participants 
 One hundred and eighteen undergraduate students completed the study for 
course credit (Mage = 19.15, SD = 3.6; 106 female, 12 male).  68% of the sample 
identified as British, the remaining 32% of participants represented various 
nationalities.   
Procedure 
 Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (reasoning prime: 
deliberate/intuitive) x 2 (anonymity: public/private) independent factorial design, with 
the procedure to manipulate reasoning style identical to that in the previous study.   
The current experiment was conducted in a computer lab with eight terminals.  
Each terminal was shielded and each participant was instructed to not sit directly 
adjacent to another student.  Participants first answered standard demographic items 
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and trait items relating to need for cognition and faith in intuition (see measures section 
below).   
Anonymity was manipulated via participant instructions that indicated that 
they would need/not need to explain their donation decision to another student.  
Participants were reminded of their anonymity (or lack of anonymity) via an 
instruction presented ostensibly at the end of the study.  This instruction informed 
participants in the ‘no anonymity’ condition to indicate to the researcher that they had 
finished and to wait before being paired with another student.  While waiting to be 
paired, each participant had the opportunity to change their donation amount, although 
unbeknownst to them, their original donation amount was still recorded.  
Participants in the ’anonymity’ condition underwent an identical procedure, 
except that they were not told that they would be paired to discuss their donation 
decision with another student.  However, they were also given the opportunity to 
‘change’ their donation amount at the end.     
Measures 
 The following items were included in the present study and have been 
previously described in study 5.  Hypothetical donations was again measured on a 
seven point scale as in the previous study.  However, the present study also included 
a measure of donation change, which was the difference between participant’s original 
donation amount and their second donation amount after being reminded of the 
anonymity manipulation.   
The new alpha reliabilities for the composite measures were as follows: 
willingness to donate, α = .86; empathy, α = .87; need for cognition, α = .73; and, faith 
in intuition, α = .78.  Donation effectiveness and donation need were measured with 
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the same single items as before.  Additionally, a single item measure of donation 
impact was also included, ‘I think that my donation can make a big difference’.    
 Finally, as in the previous study, the length of time that participants spent on 
the reasoning prime, the charity appeal, the overall survey, and the time spent 
answering the hypothetical donations items, was measured in seconds.   
Results 
Bivariate correlations are presented below in Table 8.  All of the predictor 
variables were significantly correlated with both hypothetical donations and 
willingness to donate, with the exception of faith in intuition.  Surprisingly, but in line 
with results obtained in study 5, this latter variable did not significantly correlate with 
any predictor other than need for cognition.   
 
Table 8 
Zero order correlations (Study 6) 
  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. Hypothetical donation1        
2. Willingness to donate .594**       
3. Empathy .408** .588**      
4. Donation effectiveness .271** .362** .274**     
5. Donation impact .279** .380** .302** .587**    
6. Donation need .306** .385** .520** .197* .198*   
7. Need for cognition .253** .296** .131 -.089 .012 .212*  
8. Faith in intuition .105 .034 .062 -.072 -.134 .180 .254** 
Note. ** p < .001. * p < .05. 
1Hypothetical donations were the original donation amount before participants were given the option 
of changing their decision. 
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Manipulation check 
 Consistent with the previous study, independent measures t-tests were 
conducted with reasoning style as the independent variable and time in seconds as the 
dependent variable for reasoning prime, vignette exposure time, survey time, and 
hypothetical donations decision time.  As explained in the manipulation check for the 
previous study, participants were primed to be slower and more thoughtful in the 
deliberate priming condition.  Thus, a successful manipulation should result in slower 
decision making on the aforementioned variables.   
 An independent t-test indicated that participants in the deliberate priming 
condition participants were slower on reasoning prime, t(116) = -8.80, p < .001 
(236.39s vs. 86.25s); vignette exposure time, t(116) = -2.20, p = .030 (42.08s vs. 
36.16s); hypothetical donations decision time, t(116) = -2.75, p = .007 (10.17s vs. 
7.72s); and survey time, t(116) = -7.92, p < .001 (459.18s vs. 280.43s).  Unlike in the 
previous study, this latter item represented the time spent on the main survey items 
only and did not include time spent on the information sheet or debrief.  It was not 
necessary to measure the time spent on these sections as they were not relevant to the 
experiment, and removing these sections improved timing accuracy.  Overall, these 
results indicate that the reasoning style manipulation was successful.  
The effects of reasoning style and public vs. private anonymity on donation decisions 
A first test of the potential effects of the anonymity manipulation on donations 
was carried out, using t-tests.  A t-test was conducted on participants’ hypothetical 
donations, with anonymity as the IV.  Results indicated that initial donation decisions 
did not differ between the two conditions, t(116) = -.157, p = .875 (mean for the public 
condition = £3.75; mean for the private condition = £3.69).  The same test was 
repeated, but this time with donation change scores as the dependent variable.  Results 
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indicated that donation change was £0.05 in the public condition, and £0.20 in the 
private condition; however, this difference was not significant, t(112) = 1.06, p = .290.  
Given that participants donated very similar amounts on both occasions, donation 
change was not analysed further.   
I also wanted to test the effect of the manipulations on the DVs in a more 
complete design.  A 2 (reasoning style: deliberate vs. intuitive) x 2 (anonymity: public 
vs. private) MANOVA was conducted, with hypothetical donations and willingness 
to donate as the dependent measures.  Multivariate tests indicated no significant effect 
of reasoning prime, Pillai’s Trace = .012, F(2,113) = .681, p = .508, partial η2 = .012.  
There was also no significant effect of anonymity, Pillai’s Trace = .003, F(2,113) = 
.186, p = .830, partial η2 = .003.  The interaction effect was also not significant, Pillai’s 
Trace = .012, F(2,113) = .663, p = .517, partial η2 = .012.   
 As with the previous study, univariate analyses revealed that participants 
donated slightly more to statistical victims when primed to a deliberate reasoning style 
compared to an intuitive reasoning style (see Table 9); however, the difference was 
not significant, F(1,114) = .684, p = .410, partial η2 = .006.  There was also no effect 
of reasoning on willingness to donate, F(1,114) = .028, p = .868, partial η2 < .001.   
The anonymity manipulation was also not significant, with the public 
condition (£3.75) receiving similar amounts to the private condition (£3.69), F(1,114) 
= .02, p = .868, partial η2 < .001 (contrary to Hypothesis 6.5).  A similar result was 
obtained for the effects of anonymity on willingness to donate, F(1,114) = .138, p = 
.711, partial η2 = .001.   
The interaction between reasoning style and anonymity was also not 
significant for hypothetical donations, F(1,114) = .509, p = .477, partial η2 = .004, and 
not significant for willingness to donate, F(1,114) = .089, p = .766, partial η2 = .001 
153 
(contrary to Hypothesis 6.6).  Analyses were repeated with need for cognition and faith 
in intuition as covariates; however inclusion of these variables did not meaningfully 
alter any of the above results.    
 
Table 9 
The effects of reasoning style and anonymity on donation decisions (study 6) 
 Mean   SD 95% CI 
Hypothetical 
donations 
Intuitive Anonymous 3.67a    (1.8) 3.0:4.3 
Public 3.50a    (1.6) 2.8:4.1 
Marginals 3.59a    (1.7)   
Deliberate Anonymous 3.71a    (1.7)  3.0:4.3 
Public 4.00a    (1.7)  3.3:4.6 
Marginals 3.85a    (1.7)   
Total Anonymous 3.69a    (1.8)   
Public 3.74a    (1.7)   
Marginals 3.72a    (1.7)   
Willingness to 
donate 
Intuitive Anonymous 5.64a    (.88) 5.3:5.9 
Public 5.63a    (.84) 5.3:5.9 
Marginals 5.63a    (.85)  
Deliberate Anonymous 5.66a    (.85) 5.3:5.9 
Public 5.55a    (.95) 5.2:5.8 
Marginals 5.61a    (.90)  
Total Anonymous 5.65a    (.85)  
Public 5.59a    (.89)  
Marginals 5.62a    (.87)  
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses.  
Along columns. Items that do not share a subscript are significantly different, p < .05.  
 
The effect of reasoning style and anonymity on empathy  
 As in the previous study, the analyses above were repeated, in order to test 
whether empathy was affected by reasoning style (Hypothesis 6.3).  Anonymity was 
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also included in the design for exploratory purposes.  If empathy is affected by 
anonymity, then this would suggest that these variables are at least in part measuring 
social norms of helping.   
Analyses indicated that there was no effect of reasoning style on empathy, 
F(1,114) = .084, p = .773, partial η2 = .001.  There was no significant effect of 
anonymity on empathy, F(1,114) = .73, p = .394, partial η2 = .006; with participants 
reporting similar levels of empathy in the public condition (5.49) and in the private 
condition (5.39).  The interaction between reasoning style and anonymity on empathy 
was also not significant, F(1,114) = .38, p = .534, partial η2 = .003 (see Table 10).       
 
Table 10 
The effects of reasoning style and anonymity on empathy (Study 6) 
 Mean  SD 95% CI 
Empathy Intuitive Anonymous 5.42a (.93) 5.0:5.7 
Public 5.46a (.85) 5.1:5.8 
Marginals 5.44a (.88)  
Deliberate Anonymous 5.26a (1.2) 4.9:5.6 
Public 5.52a (.75) 5.1:5.8 
Marginals 5.39a (1.0)   
Total Anonymous 5.34a (1.0)  
Public 5.49a (.80)  
Marginals 5.42a (.95)  
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses.  
Along columns. Items that do not share a subscript are significantly different, p < .05.  
 
The effect of reasoning style and anonymity on perceived donation effectiveness, 
donation impact, and donation need 
Further analyses were conducted to explore the effects of reasoning style and 
anonymity on variables that may affect donation decisions, specifically the 
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effectiveness of donating, the need for donations, and the impact of making an 
individual donation.  These three variables were assigned as dependent variables in a 
MANOVA, with reasoning style and anonymity as independent variables. 
Multivariate tests indicated that reasoning style did not have a significant 
effect, Pillai’s Trace = .009, F(3,112) = .356, p = .785, partial η2 = .009.  Anonymity 
also did not have a significant effect, Pillai’s Trace = .010, F(3,112) = .386, p = .778, 
partial η2 = .010; nor did the interaction, Pillai’s Trace = .011, F(3,112) = .430, p = 
.732, partial η2 = .011.   
Univariate analyses indicated no significant effect of reasoning style on 
donation effectiveness, F(1,114) = .071, p = .790, partial η2 = .001; donation impact, 
F(1,114) = .050, p = .855, partial η2 < .001; or, donation need, F(1,114) = .439, p = 
.302, partial η2 = .009.   Similarly, there was not a significant effect of anonymity on 
donation effectiveness, F(1,114) = .915, p = .341, partial η2 = .008; donation impact, 
F(1,114) = .871, p = .353, partial η2 = .008; or, donation need, F(1,114) = .001, p = 
.972, partial η2 < .001.  Finally, the interaction was not significant for donation 
effectiveness, F(1,114) = .708, p = .402, partial η2 = .006; donation impact, F(1,114) 
= .015, p = .901, partial η2 < .001; or, donation need, F(1,114) = .269, p = .605, partial 
η2 = .002 (see Table 11).   
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Table 11 
The effects of reasoning style and anonymity on donation effectiveness, donation impact,  
and donation need (Study 6) 
 Mean SD 95% CI 
Donation 
effectiveness 
Intuitive Anonymous 4.95a (1.2) 4.5:5.3 
Public 4.56a (1.2) 4.1:4.9 
Marginals 4.76a (1.2)  
Deliberate Anonymous 4.71a (1.1) 4.2:5.1 
Public 4.68a (1.0) 4.2:5.1 
Marginals 4.70a (1.1)  
Total Anonymous 4.83a (1.1)  
Public 4.62a (1.1)  
Marginals 4.73a (1.1)  
Donation 
impact 
Intuitive Anonymous 4.35a (1.2) 3.9:4.7 
Public 4.11a (.97) 3.6:4.5 
Marginals 4.23a (1.1)  
Deliberate Anonymous 4.28a (1.4) 3.8:4.7 
Public 4.10a (1.1) 3.6:4.5 
Marginals 4.19a (1.3)  
Total Anonymous 4.32a (1.3)  
Public 4.11a (1.0)  
Marginals 4.21a (1.2)  
Donation need Intuitive Anonymous 6.29a (.69) 6.0:6.5 
Public 6.23a (.67) 6.0:6.4 
Marginals 6.26a (.68)  
Deliberate Anonymous 6.10a (.68) 5.8:6.3 
Public 6.17a (.46) 5.9:6.4 
Marginals 6.14a (.58)  
Total Anonymous 6.20a (.68)  
Public 6.20a (.58)  
Marginals 6.20a (.63)  
Note.  Standard deviations in parentheses.  
Along columns.  Items that do not share a subscript are significantly different, p < .05.  
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Multiple regression of predictor variables on hypothetical donations and on 
willingness to donate 
 Exploratory analyses were conducted to investigate the relationship between 
several predictor variables and hypothetical donations.  As in study 5, a hierarchical 
multiple regression was conducted with the experimental manipulations (victim group 
membership and reasoning style) entered in model 1.  Empathy, donation 
effectiveness, donation impact, donation need, need for cognition and faith in intuition 
were entered in model 2.  As already suggested by the MANOVA analyses reported 
above, Model 1 was not significant, F(2,115) = .356, p = .701, adjusted R2 = -.011.  
Neither reasoning style, β = .269, t = .829, p = .409, nor anonymity, β = .046, t = .143, 
p = .887, were significant predictors of donation amount.  Model 2 (the overall model) 
was significant, F(8,109) = 5.13, p < .001, adjusted R2 = .274.  Moreover, model 2 was 
a significant improvement over model 1, Fchange(6,109) = 6.68, p < .001.  Empathy and 
need for cognition were significantly correlated with hypothetical donations (see 
Table 12 for beta and significance values).   
 The above analyses were repeated with willingness to donate as the outcome 
variable.  Model 1 was not significant, F(2,115) = .081, p = .922, adjusted R2 = .001.  
Reasoning style was not a significant predictor, β = -.027, t = -.168, p = .867, nor was 
anonymity, β = -.059, t = -.363, p = .718.  Model 2 was significant, F(8,109) = 12.09, 
p < .001, adjusted R2 = .431, and a significant improvement over model 1, 
Fchange(6,109) = 16.07, p < .001.  Empathy, and need for cognition were positively 
associated with willingness to help (see Table 12).   
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Table 12  
Predictors of donation decisions for overall regression model (Study 6) 
 β t p 
Hypothetical donations    
Reasoning style .418 1.45 .149 
Anonymity .117 .400 .690 
Empathy .465 2.50 .014 
Donation effectiveness .173 .977 .331 
Donation impact .208 1.19 .233 
Donation need .220 .810 .420 
Need for cognition .390 2.38 .019 
Faith in intuition .117 .650 .517 
Willingness to donate    
Reasoning style .043 .353 .725 
Anonymity -.018 -.141 .888 
Empathy .398 5.01 < .001 
Donation effectiveness .098 1.29 .199 
Donation impact .126 1.70 .091 
Donation need .076 .656 .513 
Need for cognition .228 3.25 .002 
Faith in intuition -.030 -.388 .699 
 
  
 
Discussion 
 The present study investigated whether reasoning style and anonymity would 
affect donations towards statistical outgroup victims after flooding.  Contrary to the 
results of the previous study there was no significant effect of reasoning style on 
prosociality, with participants reporting similar helping levels regardless of an 
intuitive or deliberate focus on the appeal.  Contrary to Hypothesis 6.5, there was also 
no effect of anonymity on donation amount, nor an interaction between reasoning style 
and whether the donation decision was public or private (Hypothesis 6.6).  These 
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findings are contrary to previous studies which have found public settings to increase 
donations (Alpizar et al., 2008; Ernest-Jones, Nettle, & Bateson, 2011; Martinsson & 
Alpizar, 2013).  Finally, and contrary to Hypothesis 6.3, no effect was found of 
reasoning style on empathy.    
 As outlined above, Reyniers (2013) found an effect of ‘reluctant altruism’, 
with participants more likely to donate when their donation decision was made public.  
The result was an increase in donation frequency in the public condition, but a decrease 
in mean donation levels.  The discrepancy between the results of the present study and 
Reynier’s could be partly due to the use of hypothetical donations.  Although 
hypothetical donations are a good proxy for monetary donations in most situations, 
they are perhaps less susceptible to the reluctant altruism identified by Reyniers.  This 
may be because hypothetical donations can be made without any financial cost to one’s 
self, and there are perhaps less sensitive to a public/private manipulation. In other 
words, since hypothetical donations tend to be somewhat inflated compared to 
monetary donations, the anonymity effect may have been masked by a ceiling effect.  
However, one previous study did find reputation concerns to affect hypothetical giving 
(Francisco Alpizar, Carlsson, & Johansson-Stenman, 2008), therefore this explanation 
is tentative.   
Another, more practical explanation, might be that the anonymity 
manipulation in the present study was simply not strong enough to elicit the 
reputational concerns needed to affect giving amounts.  It may be worth noting that 
the manipulation in the current study differed from the manipulation by Reyniers in 
that it asked participants to explain their donation decision.  This focus on 
accountability is presumably inherent in the design by Reyniers, i.e. participants would 
be concerned over how their donation decision was perceived by a peer, and although 
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they were not asked to explain their decision, it is presumably this focus on 
accountability that accounted for the ‘reluctant altruism’ observed by Reyniers.  Since 
the current study obtained null findings, the question of whether accountability was 
manipulated alongside anonymity, and the degree to which accountability can be 
considered a proxy for anonymity, is a moot point.  It is possible that participants 
reacted negatively to having to justify their donation decision and that this negatively 
affected their donation decisions.  However, observation of mean donation levels 
suggests that the null findings in the present study were not due to a lack of donations 
in the public condition, but rather due to unexpected generosity in the anonymous 
condition.  This point is elaborated upon in more detail in chapter 8.   
General Discussion 
All in all, little support for the predicted effects was found across studies 5 and 
6. There was again evidence that ingroup victims receive more donations than 
outgroup victims (Hypothesis 6.1, supported in study 5 but only for one of the outcome 
measures).  There was no evidence that ingroup victims elicit more empathy 
(Hypothesis 6.2., no support in study 5. There was no evidence that Type 1 reasoning 
is associated with stronger empathic responses (Hypothesis 6.3, no support in studies 
5 and 6). Further, there was no evidence that Type 1 reasoning would be particularly 
effective in eliciting donations to ingroup victims (Hypothesis 6.4, no support in study 
5).  There was no evidence that lack of anonymity increases donations (Hypothesis 
6.5, no support in study 6).  Finally, there was no evidence that reasoning type and 
anonymity interact in their effect on donations (Hypothesis 6.6., no support in study 
6).  However, despite these findings, several interesting effects were found for which 
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no strong a priori hypotheses had been held, which point towards interesting avenues 
for further exploration.  
Study 5 found that a deliberate reasoning style led to increased prosociality, 
while Study 6 found a null effect.  At first glance, the results of study 5, where a 
deliberate style ameliorated giving, appears contrary to previous findings that found a 
deliberate reasoning style to lower generosity (Dickert, 2008; Small et al., 2007).  
However, it should be noted that the present study described statistical victims, while 
previous studies found negative deliberate reasoning effects when an identifiable 
victim (in both studies a sick Israeli child) was the target in need.  When the target was 
a statistical victim (e.g. study 1: Small et al., 2007), deliberate reasoning resulted in 
increased donations.  Although the study by Small and colleagues found greater 
donations towards statistical victims following a deliberate reasoning prime, they did 
not find a significant difference.  However, the present study 5 did find a significant 
difference.   
The results in study 5 (but not study 6) appear to be in line with the argument, 
made by Small and colleagues, that helping identified victims is linked to emotional 
affect, and that an analytical prime somehow blocks this affective process.  When the 
victims are referred to as statistics, and when they are outgroup members, helping 
might be affected by processes other than emotions, and so analytical reasoning styles 
may not reduce helping.  If anything, a more rational thought process should lead to 
more helping when the targets are not identified.    
The results of study 5 suggest that the current position in the literature can be 
nuanced.  Recently, researchers appear to have settled on the position that intuitive 
thinking leads to more helping (Dickert et al., 2011; Small et al., 2007), while 
statistical framing of victims leads to less helping (Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, Johnson, 
162 
& Friedrich, 1997).  However, the results from study 5 suggest that analytical thinking 
can be beneficial if the charitable appeal focuses on statistical rather than identified 
victims, i.e. on logic, rather than emotion.  These are tentative suggestions however, 
especially given that the effect was not replicated in study 6.  It may be that the appeals 
used in the current studies were not emotionally strong enough to generate the levels 
of distress and concern needed, and no firm conclusions can be drawn.  Although 
alleviating negative mood has been linked to reasoning styles and donations (Dickert 
et al., 2011), it remains unclear as to how reasoning style affects donation behaviour 
outside the context of identifiable victims, and it also remains unclear as to whether 
the process is related to the effects of rational thinking on empathic concern.   
Finally, if reasoning style is directly linked to problem-solving, then a clearer 
effect may be obtained by placing participants in moral dilemma situations where they 
need to choose between various charitable causes.  So far, the aforementioned studies 
that have attempted to manipulate reasoning style have done so in a single context (as 
have the present studies), but a more complicated design with several charitable causes 
may be better able to distinguish the effects of intuitive verses deliberate reasoning.   
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Chapter Seven 
 
Group membership and facial attraction effects on giving behaviour 
 
Introduction 
As discussed in chapter 4, there is much evidence of a ‘halo effect’ (Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977) where physically attractive others benefit from positive ratings on a 
host of dimensions that relate to social competence, intelligence, and success.  
Moreover, chapter 4 presented evidence that the positive characteristics associated 
with attractive others may result in increased prosociality.  However, as seen in chapter 
4, most of this research has been focused on interpersonal helping other than 
donations.  Hence, a novel contribution of this present thesis was to test if 
advantageous effects of attractiveness would also be visible for the specific type of 
intergroup prosociality that charitable appeals represent.  
As study 4 and 5 investigated, there is an ingroup bias (Brewer, 1999) that may 
result in increased prosociality towards fellow ingroup members.  However, the 
literatures on attractiveness effects and on group membership effects have hitherto 
developed separately.  Hence, another important innovation of this thesis was to 
consider both types of effects in one comprehensive framework.  
It is also possible that attractive ingroup members will benefit even further 
from this effect. As discussed previously at length, one of the key mechanisms 
associated with ingroup helping is empathy, and, as discussed in chapter 2, one of the 
key mechanisms of learning how and who to help is presumably imitation.  It is 
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interesting then that researchers have found empathy to be a predictor of imitation 
behaviour, but only for attractive others (Müller, van Leeuwen, van Baaren, 
Bekkering, & Dijksterhuis, 2013).  This suggests a potential link between empathy 
and attraction.  Moreover, other researchers have found ingroup leaders to be 
perceived as more physically attractive than similar outgroup leaders (Kniffin et al., 
2014).  These two separate strands of research suggest that there may be a link between 
ingroup membership that is strongly associated with empathy (e.g. Stürmer et al., 
2006a; 2005), physical attractiveness of the target, and increased helping.  
Specifically, it is possible that physical attractiveness will amplify the generally agreed 
upon ingroup bias effect, and result in increased prosociality.  People may be more 
ready to empathise with physically attractive others, particularly if they are from the 
ingroup.  In this manner, the plight of an attractive ingroup victim may be more vivid 
and compelling, and thereby of much greater public interest than the plight of an 
outgroup member or of an unattractive other.   
Overview of hypotheses  
Hypothesis 7.1.  In line with the previous studies in this thesis it is predicted 
that there will be increased helping towards ingroup (rather than outgroup) victims.   
Hypothesis 7.2.  Consistent with work on the ‘halo’ effect, as well as studies 
into the effects of beauty on interpersonal helping, it is predicted that attractive victims 
will increase donations compared to unattractive victims.   
Hypothesis 7.3.   For the reasons discussed in the introduction to this chapter, 
it is predicted that attractive ingroup victims will receive disproportionally higher 
donation amounts than all other recipient types (unattractive ingroup, attractive 
outgroup, unattractive outgroup), over and above what one would expect to emerge 
on the basis of the two main effects described in the two previous hypotheses.   
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Hypothesis 7.4.  As already outlined in previous chapters (c.f. Hypotheses 5.5, 
and 6.2.), there is reason to assume that ingroup membership status of a victim might 
have a positive effect on empathic concern for that victim. Although effects on 
empathy were not the principal concern of this present chapter, the present studies did 
again include measures of empathy, meaning that they are well placed to consider 
additional evidence related to this prediction.    
Study 7 
Study 7 begins by testing the effects of facial attractiveness on donation 
decisions (Hypothesis 7.2).  In order to do this, a charity poster was designed that 
included attractive and unattractive male and female faces.  The faces used were 
averaged faces from a database that have been extensively tested for facial 
attractiveness (Braun, Gruendl, Marberger, & Scherber, 2001).  Study 7 inserts these 
faces alongside a charitable appeal to investigate the effects of physical attractiveness 
on prosociality.  Additionally, in order to rule out other characteristics of the faces that 
may account for donation decisions, study 7 includes measures of facial emotion, 
facial expression, and how needy each face looks, alongside soliciting a donation 
amount.   
Method 
Participants 
Two hundred and eighty-four participants were recruited via Crowdflower, a 
similar participant database to Mturk (Buhrmester et al., 2011; Chandler et al., 2014; 
Goodman et al., 2013), and paid around 25 cents to take part in a 2 minute survey.  
Eighty of these participants were excluded for providing duplicate answers 
(identifiable via IP addresses), leaving a total of two hundred and four participants 
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(Mage = 37.03, SD = 12.89; 99 female, 105 male).  All participants were of U.S. 
nationality. 
Procedure 
 Participants were told that they would evaluate a real charity poster.  Each 
participant was randomly assigned to one of four experimental face conditions via 
SurveyGizmo (a survey platform similar to Qualtrics).  Each condition consisted of a 
small amount of text and a large portrait photograph of the victim, either ‘Sophie’, or 
‘Thomas’.  Both Sophie and Thomas were computer generated images, and 
participants were randomly assigned to either a same-sex or opposite-sex face.     
Each stimulus face was morphed (using Morpher 3.0), from an existing 
database of faces, to create an average composite image (Braun, Gruendl, Marberger, 
& Scherber, 2001).  The female ‘attractive’ face was averaged/morphed approximately 
64 times, while the female ‘unattractive’ face was averaged only 4 times.  Similarly, 
the male ‘attractive’ face was averaged 32 times, while the male ‘unattractive’ face 
was averaged 4 times.  In the present study, each face was presented as a portrait, and 
each model wore a plain white t-shirt with shoulders just visible.  Hair was tied back 
or made non-descript, and each face consisted of a neutral expression.  In addition to 
the attractiveness manipulation, each charity poster displayed text soliciting help for a 
homeless person who had suffered from domestic violence (see appendix I).   
Measures  
Participants were paid a small sum for completing the present study and did so 
online; because of this, following Crowdflower guidelines only a handful of measures 
were included (but a larger sample size was obtained).  As in previous studies, each 
participant was asked to make a hypothetical donation, this time ranging from $0 to 
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$12 in $2 increments, creating a 7 point scale.  A series of single item measures 
followed:   
Facial attractiveness.  In order to show that victim faces differed in attraction 
as intended, each participant was asked to rate the facial attractiveness of the victim in 
the poster, ‘I think the person is good looking’.  In case some participants were 
reluctant to say that they found a same-sex face attractive, a more objective norm of 
facial attraction was also measured, ‘Most other people would say the person is good 
looking.’  These two items were combined to form a facial attractiveness rating; α = 
.92.   
Facial emotion.  It is possible that attractive and unattractive faces will be 
perceived by participants as varying in emotional expression, and that the degree of 
facial emotion expressed subsequently affects helping behaviour.  In order to rule out 
this possibility, participants were also asked to rate the facial emotion of the face, ‘The 
person in the poster looks emotional, e.g. sad, happy, etc’.   
Facial neediness.  Similar to facial emotion above, attractive and unattractive 
faces may vary with the perceived level of need.  Specifically, less attractive faces 
may be seen as more needy, while attractive faces may be seen as more competent and 
thereby not needing help.  Facial neediness was therefore measured with the following 
item, ‘The person in the poster looks like they need help.’   
Results 
Manipulation check 
Independent t-tests were conducted to determine whether the attractive and 
unattractive faces differed in perceived attractiveness as intended.  T-tests were also 
conducted in order to determine whether attractiveness varied by victim sex, as well 
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as to rule out that the stimuli did not differ in perceived levels of emotionality or 
neediness.   
The facial group attractiveness manipulation was successful, with more 
average faces seen as more attractive and better looking (m = 5.35, sd = 1.3) than less 
average faces (m = 4.09, sd = 1.4), t(202) = -6.37, p < .001. With regards to the victim 
sex, attractiveness ratings did not differ significantly between male victims (m = 4.81, 
sd = 1.5) and female victims (m = 4.63, sd = 1.5), t(202) = .812, p = .418.  There was 
no significant difference between attractive faces and unattractive faces on facial 
emotion ratings, t(202) = 2.05, p = .476 (attractive faces: m = 3.49, sd = 1.5; 
unattractive faces: m = 3.74, sd = 1.6).  There was a significant difference with regards 
to the perceived level of neediness, with unattractive faces being seen as needier than 
attractive faces (unattractive faces: m = 3.64, sd = 1.7; attractive faces: m = 3.17, sd = 
1.5), t(202) = 2.05, p = .041.  However, this difference was small, and moreover, 
neither attractive nor unattractive faces were perceived as particularly needy on the 
seven point scale.  Finally, there were no significant sex differences on facial emotion, 
with male victims (m = 3.70, sd = 1.5) having similar emotion levels compared to 
female victims (m = 3.54, sd = 1.5), t(202) = .681, p = .497; nor was there a significant 
difference on perceived neediness between male victims (m = 3.45, sd = 1.7) and 
female victims (m = 3.36, sd = 1.5), t(202) = .371, p = .711.   
Taken together, the above analyses demonstrate that the facial stimuli differed 
as intended on attractiveness ratings, with more averaged faces being seen as more 
attractive.  Moreover, there was little difference between the stimuli on other facial 
measures that could explain subsequent helping behaviour (with the possible 
exception of perceived neediness).   
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The effects of facial attractiveness on hypothetical donation amount 
A 2 (attractive vs. unattractive) by 2 (male victim vs. female victim) by 2 (male 
participant vs. female participant) ANOVA was conducted with hypothetical 
donations as the dependent measure (see Table 13).  Facial group did not have a 
significant effect on donation amount, F(1,196) = .065, p = .798, partial η2 < .001; with 
attractive faces receiving similar donation amounts to unattractive faces (not 
supporting Hypothesis 7.2).  There was no effect of victim sex on donation amount, 
with females and males receiving similar amounts, F(1,196) = .032, p = .858, partial 
η2 < .001.  Male and female participants also donated similar amounts overall, 
F(1,196) = .459. p = .499, partial η2 = .002.  Finally, there were no significant 
interaction effects.  Facial group did not significantly interact with the sex of the 
victim, F(1,196) = .003, p = .959, partial η2 < .001; nor did it interact with the sex of 
the participant, F(1,196) = 2.14, p = .145, partial η2 = .011.  Participant sex and victim 
sex did not interact, F(1,196) = 2.71, p = .101, partial η2 = .014.  The three way 
interaction was also not significant, F(1,196) = .347, p = .556, partial η2 = .002. 
The same analysis was repeated, but this time controlling for perceived 
neediness.  Given that previous analyses had suggested that neediness is potentially 
confounded with perceived attractiveness, this would mean that neediness might 
‘muddy’ and obscure existing effects of attractiveness.  As such, perceived neediness 
was added to the above analysis as a covariate to control and partial out its potential 
effects.  Neediness was a significant covariate, F(1,193) = 20.93, p < .001, partial η2 
= .098.  However, the inclusion of the covariate did not meaningfully alter the above 
results, i.e. none of the analyses reported above were close to significance, with one 
exception.  The interaction between sex of the participant and sex of the victim was 
now statistically significant, F(1,193) = 4.36, p = .038, partial η2 = .022.  Simple 
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pairwise comparisons indicated that male participants donated more to male victims 
(£2.60), compared to female victims (£2.07), however this difference was not 
significant, p = .114.  Similarly, female participants donated more to female victims 
(£2.58) than to male victims (£2.10), but again the difference was not significant, p = 
.171.  Looking at the comparisons another way, male victims received more donations 
from male participants (£2.60) than they did from female participants (£2.10) but the 
difference was not significant, p = .150.  Moreover, female victims received more from 
female participants (£2.58) than from male participants (£2.07), but again the 
difference was not significant, p = .137. 
 
Table 13 
The effect of facial attractiveness on hypothetical donations (study 7) 
 Male 
victim 
95% CI Female 
victim 
95% CI 
Male participant     
Unattractive face $2.92 (2.3) 2.2:3.5 $2.33 (1.5) 1.6:3.0 
Attractive face $2.36 (1.9) 1.6:3.0 $2.03 (1.5) 1.3:2.7 
Female participant     
Unattractive face $1.82 (1.4) 1.0:2.5 $2.35 (1.7) 1.6:3.0 
Attractive face $2.29 (1.6) 1.5:3.0 $2.50 (1.9) 1.7:3.2 
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Discussion 
The present study investigated whether facial attraction could affect helping 
towards an identifiable victim in a charity appeal.  The pattern of results was 
unexpected; there were no significant effects of facial attractiveness or victim sex on 
donation amount, nor did the two interact significantly.  These results are inconsistent 
with previous research that has demonstrated a halo effect where more attractive 
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people are more persuasive and likeable (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), and where 
increased helping is demonstrable in opposite-sex pairings (Maria Agthe et al., 2011; 
Nadler et al., 1982).     
 One explanation for the non-significant results may relate to the level of 
identification between the participant and the victim presented in the charity appeal.  
The present study used a charity appeal that visualised a younger person in need, and 
although the age range of the present sample was 18-99, many participants were in 
their late 30s or older.  Such a sample may feel that they are less similar to the young 
homeless person depicted in the charity appeal, and similarity with a victim in need 
has been linked to empathy and caring (Davis, 1994; Krebs, 1975).  If the present 
sample felt they had little in common with the young person depicted in the charity 
poster, then that could explain the low levels of empathy in each condition which may 
have masked any effects on donations.  Moreover, it is important to note that the 
benefits of similarity are not restricted to physical appearance.  A sense of similarity 
on attributes unrelated to the charity appeal (e.g. group membership) can also lead to 
increased empathy, which in turn can lead to increased helping (Batson, Lishner, 
Cook, & Sawyer, 2005).  Again, one might speculate that perceived similarity on those 
other attributes might also have been quite low.  
Study 8 
Study 8 continues to test the effects of facial attractiveness on donation 
decisions, and specifically whether attractive victims will benefit from increased 
prosociality (Hypothesis 7.2).  However, study 8 builds upon the previous study by 
manipulating the nationality of the victim, also testing the prediction that ingroup 
victims will benefit from increased prosociality (Hypothesis 7.1).  The inclusion of a 
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salient shared nationality should increase the likelihood that participants will feel 
something in common with the victim, consequently, a measure of victim 
identification is included.  Additionally, the inclusion of victim group membership 
allows for testing of the prediction that attractive ingroup members will benefit from 
the highest levels of prosociality (Hypothesis 7.3).    
Study 8 doubled the participant payment and was able to include a measure of 
willingness to donate, as well as several exploratory variables such as empathy, and 
the perceived effectiveness and impact of donating.  Disaster scale was not included 
in the present study as the context did not represent a disaster.  The inclusion of the 
empathy measures allowed to, yet again, test the hypothesis that ingroup victims 
would generate more empathic responses (Hypothesis 7.4., c.f. also Hypothesis 6.2.).  
Finally, study 8 includes measures of facial attraction of the victim, facial 
emotion, facial expression (neutral vs. otherwise), perceived neediness, and perceived 
facial similarity.  These measures were included in order to test that the facial stimuli 
remained equivalent on all dimensions except for the intended attractiveness 
manipulation.   
Method 
Participants 
Two hundred and four participants were recruited online (via Crowdflower) 
and paid 50 cents to take part in a five minute survey.  Several participants were 
excluded because they did not identify as being of 'American/US' nationality, which 
was essential for the group membership manipulation in the present study.   
In addition to this a priori exclusion, analysis of two multiple response items, 
designed to check if participants paid attention to the stimuli, revealed that 27 
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participants failed one or both of the attention check questions.  These participants 
demonstrated a lack of attention, as they could not correctly answer which countries 
were involved in the text they had just read, or why donations were being solicited by 
the charity appeal.  Twenty-seven participants were excluded from subsequent 
analyses for this reason.   
Finally, participants who provided a duplicate response (identifiable via IP 
address) were also excluded.  This left a total of 117 participants (66 female, 51 male; 
Mage = 39.32, SD = 11.8) for subsequent analyses.   
Procedure 
 The procedure was nearly identical to that of the previous study, with 
participants randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions that contained 
a charity poster with either ‘Thomas’ or ‘Sophie’.  Therefore, participants were 
randomly assigned to a same-sex or opposite-sex pairing.  Identical images were used 
as in the previous study, with each male or female victim manipulated to be either 
attractive (more average) or unattractive (less average).  The poster was also identical, 
except that each poster now included the image of either an American or European 
flag beneath the text (see appendix I).  Participants were also informed that the study 
was being conducted on behalf of either an American or European charity.  Since all 
participants identified as being of American nationality, this allowed the nationality 
of the charity to be manipulated to either ingroup (American) or outgroup (European).     
Measures 
 All participants were asked to make a hypothetical donation, from $0 to $12, 
presented in $2 increments.  Participants were then asked to answer a series of seven 
point scales as follows: 
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 Willingness to donate was measured with three items, ‘I would be willing to 
donate to help Sophie/Thomas’, ‘I think helping homeless people is the right thing to 
do’, and ‘I think it is important to donate to homeless charities’; α = .78.  
 Empathy was again measured using a modified version of the Impression 
Check Questionnaire which consisted of five items designed to measure situational 
empathy (e.g. Davis, 1980; Stürmer et al., 2006): ‘I feel very concerned for 
Sophie/Thomas’, ‘I feel very compassionate towards Sophie/Thomas’, ‘I have a lot of 
empathy for Sophie/Thomas’, ‘I feel great sympathy for how Sophie/Thomas has 
suffered’, and ‘I feel distressed about Sophie’s/Thomas’ situation’; α = .93. 
 Donation effectiveness and donation impact were measured with the same 
single items as used previously in studies 5 and 6.  Victim identification was measured 
with two items taken before the experimental manipulations, ‘I can identify with 
people who are homeless’, and ‘I can identify with people who have suffered from 
domestic violence’; α = .88. 
As in the previous study, participants were also asked to answer items related 
to the model used in the charity appeal.  Facial attractiveness was measured using two 
items, ‘I think the model in the poster looks attractive’, and, ‘Most other people would 
agree that the model looks attractive’; α = .75.  Additional single items were included 
to measure the following stimulus attributes: facial emotion, ‘I think the model in the 
poster looks upset and emotional’; facial expression, ‘I think the model has a neutral 
expression’; and facial neediness, ‘I think the model looks like they need help’.    
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Results 
Bivariate correlations are presented below in Table 154.  Empathy, donation 
effectiveness and donation impact were relatively strong predictors.  Victim 
identification was correlated with empathy, donation effectiveness, and donation 
impact, but not with donation decisions.  
 
Table 14 
Zero order correlations (Study 8) 
  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1. Hypothetical 
donation 
     
2. Willingness to 
donate 
.523**     
3. Empathy .480** .690**    
4. Donation 
effectiveness 
.386** .699** .616**   
5. Donation 
impact 
.392** .680** .599** .795**  
6. Victim 
identification 
.163 .230* .219* .231* .204* 
Note. ** p < .001. * p < .05. 
 
Manipulation check 
 Independent t-tests were conducted to determine if the facial stimuli differed 
on measures of attractiveness, similarity, facial emotion, neutrality of expression, or 
neediness.  The facial group attractiveness manipulation was again successful, with 
more average faces rated as more attractive (m = 5.43, sd = 1.0) than less average faces 
(m = 4.14, sd = 1.4), t(115) = -5.62, p < .001.  There were also no significant 
differences with regards to the perceived level of emotion in attractive faces (m = 2.51, 
sd = 1.4) and unattractive faces (m = 2.36, sd = 1.0), t(115) = -.662, p = .510.  There 
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were also no significant differences on neutrality of expression, with both attractive 
faces (m = 5.82, sd = 1.4) and unattractive faces (m = 5.83, sd = 1.0) viewed as having 
a neutral expression, t(115) = .015, p = .988.  Finally, and in contrast to the previous 
study, there were no significant differences between attractive faces (m = 3.48, sd = 
1.8) and unattractive faces (m = 3.52, sd = 1.6) on perceived neediness, t(115) = .131, 
p = .896.   
With regards to the sex of the victim, results indicated that female and male 
victims were equally attractive (m = 5.00, sd = 1.4 vs. m = 4.59, sd = 1.2), t(115) = 
1.59, p = .114.  Neutrality of expression was similar for female victims (m = 5.98, sd 
= .92) and male victims (m = 5.68, sd = 1.1), t(115) = 1.51, p = .132.  Perceived 
neediness was also similar for female victims (m = 3.39, sd = 1.7) and male victims 
(m = 3.60, sd = 1.7), t(115) = -.655, p = .514.  There was, however, a significant 
difference between female and male victims on facial emotion, with male victims 
perceived as displaying more facial emotion (m = 2.66, sd = 1.4) compared to female 
victims (m = 2.19, sd = 1.0), t(115) = -2.03, p = .044.  This was only a slight difference 
however, with both male and female victim groups receiving low scores for facial 
emotion.  
Overall, these results indicate that the facial stimuli used in the present study 
were rated equally on most dimensions, except for the intended attractiveness 
manipulation. 
The effects of facial attractiveness group and victim group membership on donation 
decisions 
 A 2 (facial attractiveness: attractive vs. unattractive) x 2 (victim group 
membership: ingroup vs. outgroup) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was 
conducted with hypothetical donations and willingness to donate as the dependent 
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variables.  The multivariate effect of facial group was not significant, Pillai’s Trace = 
.024, F(2,112) = 1.37, p = .258, partial η2 = .024.  The multivariate test for victim 
group membership demonstrated marginal significance, Pillai’s Trace = .048, 
F(2,112) = 2.82, p = .063, partial η2 = .048.  The interaction term was not significant, 
Pillai’s Trace = .031, F(2,112) = 1.78, p = .173, partial η2 = .031.   
Univariate tests indicated that hypothetical donations were significantly higher 
for ingroup members, F(1,113) = 4.92, p = .028, partial η2 = .042 (supporting 
Hypothesis 7.1); with ingroup members receiving increased donation amounts 
compared to outgroup victims (see Table 15 below).  However, the univariate effect 
of victim group on willingness to donate was not significant, F(1,113) = .207, p = .650, 
partial η2 = .002 (see Table 15).  The univariate effect of facial group on hypothetical 
donations or willingness to donate was not significant, F(1,113) = .008, p = .931, 
partial η2 < .001 and, F(1,113) = 2.09, p = .151, partial η2 = .018; respectively (not 
supporting Hypothesis 7.2).  The univariate interaction was not significant for 
hypothetical donations, F(1,113) = .546, p = .461, partial η2 = .005, or willingness to 
donate, F(1,113) = 1.14, p = .286, partial η2 = .010 (not supporting Hypothesis 7.3). 
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Table 15 
Effects of facial group and victim group membership on donation decisions (study 8) 
 Ingroup 
victim 
95% CI Outgroup 
victim 
95% CI Marginals 
Hypothetical 
donations 
     
Attractive face $2.96a (1.9) 2.2:3.6 $2.46a (1.8) 1.8:3.0 $2.71a (1.8) 
Unattractive face $3.17a (1.9) 2.5:3.8 $2.19a (1.3) 1.5:2.8 $2.68a (1.6) 
Marginals $3.06a,b (1.9)  $2.32a,b (1.6)   
Willingness to 
donate 
     
Attractive face 5.51a (1.0) 5.0:5.9 5.18a (.99) 4.7:5.5 5.34a (.99) 
Unattractive face 4.97a (1.2) 4.5:5.4 5.10a (1.2) 4.6:5.5 5.03a (1.2) 
Marginals 5.24a (1.1)  5.14a (1.0)   
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Items that share a subscript are significantly different at p < .05.  
 
Effects of facial attractiveness group and victim group membership on empathy and 
victim identification 
 Empathy has been demonstrated to be an important helping mechanism in 
study 4; moreover, it is possible that attractiveness can influence empathic concern for 
the victim.  Therefore, an exploratory analysis was conducted.  Victim identification 
was also included, to assess whether group membership and attractiveness can affect 
victim identification.  Therefore, the above analysis was repeated, but with empathy 
and victim identification as dependent variables.   
 The multivariate effect of facial group was marginal, Pillai’s Trace = .043, 
F(2,112) = 2.50, p = .087, partial η2 = .043.  The multivariate test for victim group 
membership was not significant, Pillai’s Trace = .004, F(2,112) = .217, p = .805, 
partial η2 = .004.  The multivariate interaction term was not significant, Pillai’s Trace 
< .001, F(2,112) = .020, p = .980, partial η2 < .001.   
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 Empathy.  Univariate tests indicated an effect of facial group on empathy, 
F(1,113) = 4.56, p = .035, partial η2 = .039; with attractive victims receiving greater 
empathic concern than unattractive victims (see Table 16).  In contrast to Hypothesis 
7.4., the effect of victim group membership on empathy was not significant, F(1,113) 
= .425, p = .516, partial η2 = .004.  The interaction was not significant, F(1,113) = 
.007, p = .935, partial η2 < .001.   
Victim identification.  Facial group did not have a significant effect on victim 
identification, F(1,113) = 1.24, p = .267, partial η2 = .011, nor did victim group 
membership, F(1,113) = .059, p = .808, partial η2 = .001.  The interaction was also not 
significant, F(1,113) = .038, p = .845, partial η2 < .001.   
 
Table 16 
Effects of facial attraction and victim group on empathy, donor responsibility,  
and victim identification (Study 8) 
 Ingroup 
victim 
95% CI Outgroup 
victim 
95% CI Marginals 
Empathy      
Attractive  5.40a (1.1) 4.9:5.8 5.25a (1.0) 4.8:5.6 5.32a,b (1.0) 
Unattractive 4.95a (1.0) 4.5:5.3 4.83a (1.2) 4.4:5.2 4.89a,b (1.1) 
Marginals 5.17a (1.0)  5.04a (1.1)   
Victim 
identification 
     
Attractive 4.23a (1.6) 3.5:4.8 4.09a (1.5) 3.5:4.6 4.16a (1.5) 
Unattractive 3.82a (1.6) 3.1:4.4 3.80a (1.8) 3.2:4.4 3.81a (1.7) 
Marginals 4.02a (1.6)  3.94a (1.6)   
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Items that share a subscript are significantly different at p < .05. 
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Multiple predictors of hypothetical donations and willingness to donate 
 A hierarchical multiple regression was conducted with hypothetical donations 
as the outcome variable and with empathy, donation effectiveness, donation impact, 
and victim identification as predictors.  The experimental manipulations, facial 
attractiveness group and victim group membership, were entered in model 1 as control 
variables.  Model 1 had marginal significance, F(2,114) = 2.49, p = .087, adjusted R2 
= .025.  Facial group was not a significant predictor, β = .048, t = .145, p = .885.  
Victim group membership was a significant predictor, with ingroup victim 
membership positively predicting donation amount, β = .742, t = 2.23, p = .027.  Model 
2 was significant, F(6,110) = 7.69, p < .001, adjusted R2 = .257.  Moreover, model 2 
was a significant improvement over model 1, Fchange (4,110) = 9.90, p < .001.  Empathy 
was positively related with donation amount, β = .571, t = 3.29, p = .001.  Donation 
effectiveness was not a significant predictor, β = .036, t = .190, p = .850.  Donation 
impact was not significant, β = .225, t = 1.27, p = .204; and nor was victim 
identification, β = .053, t = .584, p = .560.         
 The analysis was repeated with willingness to donate as the outcome variable.  
Model 1 was not significant, F(2,114) = 1.01, p = .365, adjusted R2 = .018.  As would 
have been expected on the basis of the MANOVA results, facial group was not a 
significant predictor of willingness to donate, β = .291, t = 1.36, p = .175; nor was 
victim group membership, β = .094, t = .441, p = .660.  Model 2 was significant, 
F(6,110) = 29.63, p < .001, adjusted R2 = .597.  Moreover, model 2 was a significant 
improvement, Fchange (4,110) = 43.19, p < .001.  Empathy was positively related to 
willingness to donate, β = .375, t = 4.62, p < .001.  Donation effectiveness was a 
significant predictor, β = .243, t = 2.75, p = .007.  Donation impact was also significant, 
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β = .188, t = 2.28, p = .024.  Victim identification was not significantly related, β = 
.025, t = .591, p = .556. 
Discussion 
The present study investigated whether facial attractiveness group and victim 
group membership would impact on donations towards a charitable appeal.  Contrary 
to what was predicted by Hypothesis 7.2., there was little effect of facial group on 
donation amount; however, in line with Hypothesis 7.1., victim group membership did 
increase donations in the expected direction, with ingroup members benefitting from 
a shared group membership.  This effect was notable for donation amount but not a 
measure that asked participants how willing they would be to help.  Additionally, and 
in contrast to Hypothesis 7.3., there were no significant interactions between the 
attractiveness of the victim and their group membership, despite mean levels being 
generally in the predicted directions.  
Also contrary to what was predicted by Hypothesis 7.4., there was no effect of 
victim membership on empathic concern for the victim.  This may be due to the appeal 
failing to generate sufficient empathic concern, or it could be due to the online 
participant pool being less prosocial than expected.  Both explanations are supported 
with the understanding that participants engaged in the study for small sums of money.   
There were also a number of somewhat exploratory analyses in the present 
study.  There was some evidence to suggest that attractive victims received greater 
empathy, and although this difference was small, it does suggest an area that may be 
worth future investigation.  There was also little effect of either manipulation on victim 
identification.  Although it is not surprising that facial attractiveness did not affect 
identification levels, one would expect victim group to have an effect, again 
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suggesting that the current study failed to generate the empathic concern needed.  
Finally, a number of predictors of helping were explored.  Empathy was a strong 
predictor of both donation amount and willingness to help, while donation 
effectiveness and donation impact were significant predictors of willingness to help 
and not of donation amount.  Victim identification was generally a poor predictor of 
helping in the present sample.   
Study 9 
Study 9 continues to investigate whether ingroup victims will benefit from 
increased prosociality (Hypothesis 7.1), whether attractive victims will benefit from 
increased prosociality (Hypothesis 7.2), and whether attractive ingroup members will 
inspire the highest levels of generosity (Hypothesis 7.3).  Moreover, inclusion of an 
empathy measure again enabled me to also test Hypothesis 7.4., that ingroup victims 
would elicit more empathy. Study 9 also introduces a number of changes.   
Firstly, the previous study raised concerns over the online sample used, so the 
present study uses a traditional student population tested in a laboratory setting.  
Additionally, the charity appeal now utilises the context of student depression, and 
refers to a genuine U.K. charity.  These changes should hopefully render the charity 
appeal more relevant to the tested population, as well as more ecologically valid.  
Study 9 also makes a subtle change to the hypothetical donation measure.  Whereas 
previous studies presented participants with a fixed donation amount, study 9 returns 
to the open response format first used in study 1.  However, in order to avoid the 
inflated estimates that required a log transformation in study 1, the present study asks 
participants to contribute an amount of their choice towards a bake sale.  This change 
again improves the validity of the appeal as bake sales are a common method of 
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soliciting donations in the U.K., while also allowing for a more variable open response 
format without the issues associated with strongly inflated estimates.   
Study 9 also only uses one set of stimuli for male victims.  As discussed in the 
literature in chapter 4, many of the positive effects of beauty on interpersonal helping 
were found in opposite-sex dyads, so the inclusion of so many same-sex pairings could 
at least partly explain the null findings in studies 7 and 8.  Since the student participant 
pool is predominantly female, and since the sex of the stimuli is no longer varied, 
study 9 should benefit from increased power to detect an effect.  
Finally, study 9 includes the same manipulation check measures of facial 
attraction, facial emotion, facial expression (neutral vs. otherwise), and facial 
neediness.  Empathy, donation effectiveness, donation impact, and donation need were 
also included as exploratory predictors.   
Method 
Participants 
 Initially, one hundred and thirty-five undergraduate psychology students (this 
category was used as the ingroup in the study) participated for course credit.  Four 
participants were excluded as they correctly guessed the purpose of one or more of the 
experimental manipulations when asked to do so at the end of the study.  A further 
four participants were identified as outliers on the time spent reading the stimulus.  
More specifically, these four participants spent less than 9.65 seconds reading the 
charity poster and were identified as unusually quick based on interquartile ranges.  
Finally, a further ten participants were excluded for lack of attention reading the 
stimuli, specifically, failing to correctly answer the nationality of the victim in the 
charity appeal.  This left a total of one hundred and seventeen participants (104 female, 
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13 male; Mage = 19.18, sd = 3.5).   As noted in the introduction to study 9, the sample 
is predominantly female; this is a strength for the current design.  The few male 
participants were not removed, however, as it is only presumed that most of the 
participants were heterosexual (this was not measured), and regardless, removal of 
these thirteen participants did not meaningfully alter any of the following results.  
Seventy-one of the participants identified as being of British nationality, with the 
remaining participants identifying with various world nationalities.   
Procedure 
 Participants were invited to evaluate what was ostensibly a real charity 
campaign raising money for a male student with depression.  Participants were then 
randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions: facial attraction (attractive 
vs. unattractive) and group membership (ingroup psychology student vs. outgroup 
accounting student).  Facial attraction was manipulated using the same averaged male 
stimuli faces as in the previous two studies.  Participants saw a full screen portrait of 
Thomas and read that he was a psychology student or an accounting student who had 
developed depression during his course.  They were told that Thomas felt suicidal at 
one point, but that he contacted an organisation called Students Against Depression, 
which is in fact a genuine U.K. registered charity.  The appeal asked for money to help 
students like Thomas (see appendix I).    
Measures 
 Hypothetical donations were measured by asking participants how much they 
would contribute towards a hypothetical bake sale in an open response format.  Such 
events are common in the UK, where participants receive a small good in exchange 
for making a donation towards a charitable cause.  Unlike in study 1, it was not 
necessary to perform a log transformation on this measure, as it did not suffer from 
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huge inflated estimates.  This is likely due to the open response amount being linked 
to a consumable good that has a fairly circumscribed value (most people have some 
idea, for example, what they would pay for a piece of cake in a café).  
Willingness to donate and empathy were identical measures to those used in 
the previous study, except that they now referred to Thomas and 
psychology/accounting students with depression, new alphas α = .78 and α = .86; 
respectively.    
Donation effectiveness, donation impact, and donation need were measured 
with the same single items as used in previous studies.  The present study also 
measured strength of identification as a psychology student which was taken before 
the experimental manipulation, ‘I strongly identify with being a RHUL student’, 
‘Being a psychology student is important to me’, and, ‘I feel that I have much in 
common with psychology students’; α =  .80.    
As in the previous study, participants were then asked to answer items related 
to the model used in the charity appeal.  Facial attractiveness was again measured 
using the same two items as in previous studies; α = 89.  The same single items as in 
the previous study were included to measure facial emotion, facial expression, and 
facial neediness.   
Results 
Bivariate correlations are presented below in Table 17.  All predictors were 
significant predictors of each other, p < .05, with the exception that donation 
effectiveness was not related to hypothetical donation amount.   
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Table 17 
Zero order correlations (Study 9) 
  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. Hypothetical donation       
2. Willingness to donate .303**      
3. Empathy .251** .670**     
4. Donation effectiveness .169 .557** .492**    
5. Donation impact .223* .539** .470** .721**   
6. Donation need .189* .398** .483** .392** .317**  
7. Group identification .207* .321** .207* .381** .327** .394** 
Note. ** p < .001. * p < .05. 
 
Manipulation check 
 Independent t-tests were conducted to determine if the facial stimuli differed 
on key measures.  More averaged faces were again seen as more attractive (m = 5.06, 
sd = 1.0) compared to less average faces (m = 3.19, sd = 1.2), t(115) = -8.81, p < .001.  
However, unlike in studies 7 & 8, there were some differences on other facial 
measures.  Attractive faces were seen as less negatively emotional (m = 2.75, sd = 1.4) 
than unattractive faces (m = 3.95, sd = 2.0), t(115) = 3.65, p < .001.  Attractive faces 
were also seen as more expressive (m = 5.76, sd = .83) than unattractive faces (m = 
5.09, sd = 1.5), t(115) = -2.87, p = .005.  Similar to study 8, there was a tendency to 
view unattractive faces as needier (m = 3.38, sd = 1.4) compared to attractive faces (m 
= 2.70, sd = 1.3), t(115) = 2.31, p = .022.  Overall, these results suggest that the facial 
manipulation was successful.  Although there were differences between attractive and 
unattractive faces on facial emotion and perceived neediness, ratings for both were 
below the mid-point range, suggesting that neither face was perceived as being 
particularly emotional or needy.  Facial expression was above the mid-point range, but 
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for both groups.  Finally, there was little difference between facial attractiveness 
ratings for ingroup and outgroup victims, t(115) = -.213, p = .832.   
The effect of facial attractiveness group and victim group membership on hypothetical 
donations and willingness to donate 
 A 2 (facial group attractiveness: attractive vs. unattractive) x 2 (victim group 
membership: ingroup vs. outgroup) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was 
conducted, with hypothetical donations and willingness to donate as the dependent 
variables.  The following results are reported with strength of identification as a 
psychology student as a covariate; however, the analysis was also run without the 
covariate, and there were no significant differences with the results reported below.  
Similarly, all of the following analyses were repeated with perceived level of 
neediness as a covariate; however, unlike in study 7, perceived facial need was not a 
significant covariate for either hypothetical donations, p = .957, nor for willingness to 
donate, p = .448.     
The multivariate effect of the covariate was significant, Pillai’s Trace = .116, 
F(2,109) = 7.11, p < .001, partial η2 = .116.  However, the multivariate test for facial 
group was not significant, Pillai's Trace = .029, F(2,109) = 1.64, p = .198, partial η2 = 
.029; nor was the multivariate test of victim group membership significant, Pillai’s 
Trace = .013, F(2,109) = .719, p = .490, partial η2 = .013.  The interaction term was 
close to significance, Pillai’s Trace = .051, F(2,109) = 2.94, p = .057, partial η2 = .051.  
These results indicate that there was little effect of facial group or victim group on 
both hypothetical donations and willingness to donate (not supporting Hypotheses 7.1 
& 7.2), although there was a marginal interaction effect (Hypothesis 7.3).  Univariate 
tests were next inspected (see Table 18).    
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 Hypothetical donations.  Although identification was a significant covariate, 
F(1,110) = 5.32, p = .023, partial η2 = .046, there were no significant effects of facial 
group, F(1,110) = 1.65, p = .201, partial η2 = .015.  Victim group was also not 
significant, F(1,110) = 1.42, p = .235, partial η2 = .013.  There was, however, a 
significant interaction between facial group and victim group, F(1,110) = 4.33, p = 
.040, partial η2 = .038.  Pairwise comparisons with a Bonferroni adjustment indicated 
that attractive faces encouraged greater donation amounts when they belonged to 
ingroup victims compared to outgroup victims, p = .031.  Tested differently, attractive 
ingroup members resulted in increased donations compared to unattractive ingroup 
members, p = .029.  This pattern of results is in line with Hypothesis 7.3., in that 
attractive ingroup members clearly elicited the most donations.  
 Willingness to donate.  Identification was again a significant covariate, 
F(1,110) = 12.29, p = .001, partial η2 = .101.  Facial group was not significant, 
F(1,110) = 2.49, p = .117, partial η2 = .022.  Victim group was not significant, F(1,110) 
= .216, p = .643, partial η2 = .002; and, the interaction was not significant, F(1,110) = 
.465, p = .497, partial η2 = .004.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
189 
Table 18 
The effects of facial attractiveness and victim group on donation decisions (study 9) 
 Ingroup 
victim 
95% CI Outgroup 
victim 
95% CI Marginals 
Hypothetical 
donations 
     
Attractive  £2.83a (2.3) 2.2:3.4 £1.93b (.99) 1.4:2.4 £2.38a,b (1.6) 
Unattractive £1.91b (1.3) 1.3:2.4 £2.14a,b (1.3) 1.6:2.6 £2.02a,b (1.3) 
Marginals £2.37a,b (1.8)  £2.03a,b (1.1)   
Willingness 
to donate 
     
Attractive 5.39a (1.4) 5.0:5.9 5.44a (.90) 4.7:5.5 5.41a (1.1) 
Unattractive 5.23a (.78) 4.5:5.4 5.00a (1.0) 4.6:5.5 5.11a (.89) 
Marginals 5.31a (1.0)  5.22a (.95)   
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses.  
Items that do not share a subscript are significantly different at p < .05. 
 
 
 
Effects of facial attractiveness group and victim group membership on empathy  
 The above analyses were repeated but with empathy as the dependent variable.  
Means are displayed in Table 19.  Group identification was a significant covariate for 
empathy, F(1,112) = 5.14, p = .025, partial η2 = .044.  Facial group was not significant, 
F(1,112) = .367, p = .546, partial η2 = .003; nor was victim group, F(1,112) = 1.85, p 
= .176, partial η2 = .016.  The interaction was not significant, F(1,112) = .160, p = 
.690, partial η2 = .001.  These results contradict Hypothesis 7.4., which had predicted 
at least an effect of the victim group membership manipulation on empathy.  As in the 
previous set of analyses, removal of the covariate did not alter the significance levels 
of the above results.   
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Table 19 
The effects of facial attractiveness and victim group on empathy (study 9) 
 Ingroup 
victim  
95% CI Outgroup 
victim 
95% CI Marginals 
Empathy      
Attractive  5.29a (1.1) 4.8:5.7 5.11a (1.0) 4.7:5.2 5.20a (1.0) 
Unattractive 5.24a (.80) 4.8:5.6 4.91a (1.0) 4.5:5.2 5.07a (.90) 
Marginals 5.26a (.95)  5.01a (1.0)   
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses.  
Items that do not share a subscript are significantly different at p < .05. 
 
 
Multiple predictors of hypothetical donations and willingness to donate 
 A hierarchical multiple regression was conducted with hypothetical donations 
as the outcome variable and with empathy, donation effectiveness, donation impact, 
and donation need as predictors.  The experimental manipulations facial attractiveness 
and victim group membership were entered in model 1 as control variables.  Model 1 
was not significant, F(2,112) = .856, p = .427, adjusted R2 = -.003.  Neither facial 
group, β = .267, t = .943, p = .348, nor victim group, β = .265, t = .931, p = .354, were 
significant.  Model 2 had marginal significance, F(7,107) = 1.82, p = .090, adjusted 
R2 = .048, and was an improvement (albeit a non-significant improvement) over model 
1, Fchange (5,107) = 2.19, p = .060.  Empathy was not a significant predictor, β = .249, 
t = 1.45, p = .148.  Donation effectiveness was not significant, β = -.131, t = -.729, p 
= .467.  Donation impact was not significant, β = .155, t = 1.02, p = .308.  The 
perceived need for a donation was not significant, β = .074, t = .415, p = .679.  Finally, 
group identification was not significant, β = .261, t = 1.40, p = .163. 
 The above analysis was repeated with willingness to donate as the outcome 
variable.  Model 1 was not significant, F(2,114) = 1.44, p = .239, adjusted R2 = .008.  
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Facial attractiveness was not a significant predictor, β = .321, t = 1.65, p = .100; and 
victim group membership was not a significant predictor, β = .081, t = .420, p = .675.  
Model 2 was significant, F(7,109) = 18.95, p < .001, adjusted R2 = .520.  Model 2 was 
a significant improvement over model 1, Fchange (5,109) = 25.33, p < .001.  Empathy 
was a significant predictor, β = .512, t = 6.07, p < .001.  Donation effectiveness was 
not significant, β = .128, t = 1.49, p = .139.  Donation impact was not significant, β = 
.119, t = 1.61, p = .109.  Donation need was not significantly correlated, β = .128, t = 
1.43, p = .154.  Finally, group identification was not significant, β = .128, t = 1.43, p 
= .154.   
Discussion 
The present study continued the investigation of the possible effects of facial 
attractiveness and group membership on charitable donations.  Unlike the previous 
two studies however, and in part due to the null findings in these previous studies, 
study 9 utilised a more traditional student sample tested in an experimental laboratory 
rather than online.  The use of a student sample was also purposeful in that an attempt 
was made to increase the similarity of the participants with the victim in the charity 
appeal.   
Contrary to Hypotheses 7.1 and 7.2, the main effects of facial attraction and 
victim group were not significant; however, in line with Hypothesis 7.3., the 
interaction between the two factors had a significant effect on prosociality.  Attractive 
ingroup members benefitted from increased donation amounts compared to 
unattractive ingroup members, and attractive ingroup members also received greater 
donations compared to attractive outgroup members.  These results are consistent with 
the theoretical argument made in the introduction to this chapter that attractive ingroup 
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members will benefit the most from prosociality.  Last but not least, once again no 
support was found for ingroup membership status of the victims affecting empathy 
(contradicting Hypothesis 7.4.).  
 There were a number of changes to the current study that could help to explain 
the difference in the current findings from the previous study.  One explanation is the 
change to a student population testing in a laboratory, raising questions over the 
quality of the data in the previous online studies.  Numerous researchers have justified 
the use of online samples (Buhrmester et al., 2011; Goodman et al., 2013; Riva, 
Teruzzi, & Anolli, 2003).  Online data collection even has the advantage of being 
associated with less social desirability bias (Evans, Garcia, Garcia, & Baron, 2003), 
and researchers have stressed the importance of accounting for desirability bias in 
charity research (Lee & Woodliffe, 2010).  Given this background, I attempted to 
utilise online tools in good faith.  However, at least for my samples, the online data 
obtained was possibly considerably noisier than data obtained with more traditional 
means.  The necessity of a strong salient group membership, something that may be 
amplified in the presence of a researcher or other participants, may make laboratory 
settings more suitable in some cases.   
The change to a student population may also have resulted in increased 
similarity with the victim and increased relevance of the charity appeal.  The present 
study also switched from a general hypothetical question of prosociality (how much 
would you like to donate?) to a more specific question (how much would you donate 
in a charity bake sale?).  This change may have resulted in a more sensitive measure 
that also has more applied value.  Although this latter measure could be partly 
criticised for anchoring the donation decision to the sale of a product, the use of an 
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open response format did allow for increased variability while preventing highly 
inflated donation estimates.     
General Discussion 
The current chapter consisted of three experimental studies.  Each investigated 
the role of facial attractiveness and donation amount towards a charitable appeal.  
Although many of the hypotheses were not supported across the studies, overall, the 
pattern of means across the three studies, and the marginally significant interaction 
results in study 9, were promising.  These patterns suggest that facial attraction may 
well impact upon helping behaviour in an intergroup context.   
No significant support was found for the prediction that attractiveness 
stimulates donations (Hypothesis 7.2., not supported in studies 7, 8, 9); and that 
ingroup membership of the victims will enhance empathic reactions (Hypothesis 7.4., 
no support in studies 8 and 9).  Support for the prediction that ingroup victim status 
will impact positively on donation proclivity was mixed (Hypothesis 7.1., supported 
in study 8 but not study 9). Finally, evidence that the effect of attractiveness on 
donations will be moderated by ingroup/outgroup status of the victims was also mixed 
(Hypothesis 7.3, not supported in study 8, but supported in study 9).  
Unfortunately, despite interesting mean levels that were often in the predicted 
direction, many of the effect sizes were too small to pass conventional null hypothesis 
significance testing (NHST).  There are however a number of criticisms with regards 
to NHST, leading to suggestions that this dichotomous approach is outdated (Fidler & 
Loftus, 2009; Nickerson, 2000; Trafimow & Marks, 2015).  Therefore, the pattern of 
results does not entirely rule out the effect of beauty on prosociality.        
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It may be worth considering why the effect sizes in the current studies were 
not larger.  It could be the case that, despite evidence provided by previous research, 
attraction effects have very small effect sizes.  However, there are alternative 
explanations that bear consideration.  First, it may be that prosocial effects of attraction 
are more likely to manifest in a face-to-face context where the attractive other is 
physically present.  This does not suggest that effects of beauty on prosociality cannot 
be obtained via the use of photographs, but it does suggest that effect sizes would be 
larger if the attractive person was physically present.  This argument is consistent with 
previous findings that found the anticipation of socially interacting with the attractive 
target to drive the positive effect of beauty on interpersonal helping (Agthe et al., 2011; 
Nadler et al., 1982).  Attraction is, after all, presumably linked to sexual selection 
(Grammer et al., 2003), and any such effects would be stronger in a face-to-face 
contact.  This would suggest that physical attraction plays less of a role in situations 
where there is no direct contact between helper and helpee, for example on charity 
appeals.  Future research could explore this possibility.  
 A further consideration relates to the halo effect introduced in chapter 4.  One 
of the key overall findings presented in chapter 4 is that attractive faces are typically 
viewed as more competent, successful, and more intelligent (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).  
Attractiveness may not translate into increased helping if attractive others are seen to 
be more competent and socially successful.  For example, if we want to help others 
who are less well off, and the target of help is physically attractive, then this could 
have a deleterious effect since attractive others are perceived to be more successful 
(Dion, Berscheid, & Walster, 1972; Eagly et al., 1991).  Moreover, it has already been 
established that physical attractiveness is linked to erroneous perceptions of superior 
health (Kalick et al., 1998), therefore attractive others may be seen as less needy.   
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 A third reason is related to the positive dimensions that relate to the halo effect.   
Attractive others are seen as more intelligent, successful, socially competent, and 
gifted (Nisbett, 1980), but they are not seen as being necessarily kinder, less selfish, 
or more prosocial; in fact, there may be an argument for the opposite.  Price, Brown, 
Dukes and Kang (2015) argue that an evolutionary approach would suggest that there 
would be less incentive for attractive others to behave fairly and prosocially, mainly 
due to their ability to find mating partners more easily.  They found that 3D scans of 
attractive body shapes were perceived by others as being less fair and egalitarian in 
imagined situations, and moreover, that attractive males were indeed less fair in a 
dictator game.  If one also considers that prosociality is often linked to reciprocity and 
cooperation in both psychology and experimental economics (Holmes, Miller, & 
Lerner, 2002; Milinski et al., 2002), then donors might be less likely to help attractive 
others if they believe them to be inherently more selfish.  This reasoning is consistent 
with reciprocal altruism theory (Trivers, 1971; Webster, 2003); after all, why help 
someone who is extremely beautiful but unlikely to return the favour?    
 A more practical explanation for the present findings could relate to the type 
of charitable appeal, and the type of poster used to solicit donations across the three 
studies.  The use of a poster, particularly in a non-disaster context, may be subject to 
reduced variability in donation amount, where participants feel that a small donation 
(e.g. £3 or under) is sufficient.  Although this explanation is speculative, it is 
reasonable to assume that different types of charitable appeals will attract different 
levels of mean donation amounts.  The current charitable appeal used a poster format 
that is consistent with text appeals in public locations, where commuters (at least in 
the U.K.) are often asked to text a number to make a small set donation amount.  If the 
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stimulus in the present study reminded participants of a text appeal, then it could 
explain why donation amounts were consistently low across all conditions.   
 Finally, given that across the three studies average ratings of attraction for the 
unattractive faces were at the midpoint level, it is more accurate to say that the present 
studies examined the difference between attractive and ‘normal’ faces.  Future 
researchers interested in the effects of facial attraction in an intergroup context may 
benefit from using more unattractive stimuli; particularly as such stimuli may have 
more profound effects for outgroup members.  Overall, the results provided little 
support for the hypotheses in studies 7 – 9, but they did not entirely disconfirm them 
either, with a pattern of results that suggests there might be a relationship between 
physical beauty and group membership in a prosocial context, which potentially could 
be teased out by further refining the methodology used in the current studies.   
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Chapter Eight 
Discussion Chapter 
 
 The current research programme consisted of nine empirical studies that 
measured donation decisions where a group membership was salient.  Research has 
highlighted the importance of group identities in contexts that relate to helping 
(Brewer, 1999; Hopkins et al., 2007; van Leeuwen & Mashuri, 2012; van Leeuwen, 
2007; Levine, Cassidy, Brazier, & Reicher, 2002; Levine, Cassidy, & Jentzsch, 2010; 
Levine, Prosser, Evans, & Reicher, 2005; Levine & Thompson, 2004; van Leeuwen 
& Tauber, 2012; van Leeuwen, van Dijk, & Kaynak, 2013).  In doing so, these 
researchers, and others, have strongly implicated the role that a social identity 
approach may play in prosocial behaviour (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971).  
The present research programme continues this tradition by investigating a number of 
factors that may pertain to group memberships and charitable helping.  A novel 
contribution was made by investigating how the group membership of the perpetrator 
affected donation decisions for a charitable appeal (studies 1–4).  Moreover, group 
memberships were considered alongside manipulation of reasoning style (studies 5–
6), and alongside manipulation of the facial attractiveness of the victim (studies 7–9).  
Overall, the results suggest that group memberships can and do play a role in 
determining prosociality; although the more novel aspects of the current studies did 
not always interact with group memberships as expected.   
 The remainder of the current chapter provides an overview of the main results 
for the hypotheses in each study, a summary of the main discussion points surrounding 
these predictions is provided (with elaboration in some places), and ends with more 
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general points that are relevant to the hypotheses across the entire thesis.  There then 
follows a discussion of the general strengths and weaknesses of the current research 
programme, as well as alternative avenues for future research to explore which were 
interesting but outside the scope of this thesis.   
Overview of key findings 
Study 1 
In study 1 I manipulated the group membership of the perpetrator (which I 
defined as the person/s held at fault) in a vivid disaster scenario.  Participants were 
told of a plane crash that killed hundreds of victims which was either the fault of an 
airline belonging to their country, to the victims’ country, or to a neighbouring country 
(third-party).  Participants were asked to imagine the scenario without description of 
the countries involved and without knowledge of any country names.  This paradigm 
allowed the experiment to focus participants on a category relationship (e.g. donor-
perpetrator, or victim-perpetrator) in order to examine whether mere category 
activation could influence donation decisions.   
Study 1 found increased prosociality when the donor-perpetrator relationship 
was made salient, supporting Hypothesis 5.1, but the difference was only significant 
in comparison to the third-party condition where the perpetrator was related to a 
neighbouring country.  This is somewhat illogical, as one may expect donors to 
attribute increased levels of victim blame if the victim and perpetrator share a salient 
group membership.  However, the findings from study 1 suggested that donors were 
less prosocial when a third-party outgroup was involved.  Admittedly, this 
interpretation is made tentatively, given that the difference in mean donation amounts 
between victim-perpetrator and third-party perpetrator was not significant.   
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Study 2 
In study 2, I attempted to replicate the results of study 1, but in a military 
context.  A further aim of study 2 was to include measures of empathy and donor 
responsibility in order to better understand the processes underlying donation 
decisions.  Contrary to Hypothesis 5.1, study 2 did not replicate the perpetrator bias 
effect, and contrary to Hypothesis 5.4, a shared perpetrator group membership did not 
affect responsibility to help victims in need.   
Several possible explanations for the null findings were presented.  Firstly, the 
framing of the disaster scenario may have played a role, as the scenario presented was 
less vivid than in study 1.  Nisbett & Ross (1980) proposed that people are more 
influenced by vivid and concrete scenarios than abstract or pallid ones.  Although 
evidence for the vividness effect is mixed (Taylor & Thompson, 1982), more recently 
there has been evidence that vividness can play a role if the message or image is 
congruent to the task presented to participants (Smith & Shaffer, 2000).  Moreover, 
this has been demonstrated in the context of charitable appeals, particularly when the 
appeal and vivid image are both negative, and when a smaller number of victims are 
involved (Chang & Lee, 2010).  If this is true, then it could be the case that the vivid 
and highly negative scenario of a plane crash that affected a few hundred victims may 
have been easier for participants to visualise, and it might thereby have been more 
vivid and influential, than the more abstract incident of military action being taken in 
another country.   
Another explanation for the null findings of study 2 may be linked to perceived 
threat.  It may be that participants felt that the military incursion was justified due to 
the threat of chemical warfare that was specified in the disaster appeal.  This 
interpretation would be in line with research that has found increased anxiety and 
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negative attitudes towards outgroup members when the ingroup is perceived to be 
threatened (e.g. threats to the group’s core values or threats relating to resources and 
power) (Stephan, Ybarra, Martinez, Schwarzwald, & Tur-Kaspa, 1998).   
It is also possible that participants felt little individual responsibility due to the 
framing of the military context, which they may have perceived as falling under the 
jurisdiction of politicians rather than charities.  To investigate this possibility, I 
conducted post hoc analyses on donor responsibility attributions, and found differing 
levels of responsibility attributions for individuals compared to the victims involved 
or the state.  Individual donor responsibility to help was notably at a mid-point level, 
with donors indicating that a greater amount of responsibility to help lay with the 
government and/or the victims directly involved.  While the former attribution is 
perhaps unsurprising, it is interesting that individual donor responsibility to help was 
lowest when a third-party was implicated, and that victims were held responsible for 
their plight even when those victims were not related to the perpetrator.  These results 
(admittedly post hoc and thereby made tentatively) suggest that the findings in study 
1, where a third-party outgroup perpetrator resulted in low donation amounts, may 
indeed be indicative of a systematic effect.   
Finally, I think it worthwhile to note that there was a degree of intentionality 
implied in the study 2 context that was not present in study 1.  Intentionality has been 
linked to less favourable attributions (Lagnado & Channon, 2008), and a focus on 
intentionality has been shown to affect attributions of harm relating to a charitable aid 
(Ames & Fiske, 2013).  Therefore, if participants perceived the context of study 2 to 
be intentional, as opposed to accidental or due to incompetence as in study 1, then this 
may at least partly explain the differing results.    
Study 3 
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Study 3 was again a replication of the perpetrator design in studies 1 and 2, 
however, a number of changes were made.  While I consider the abstract nature of the 
previous studies a strength, it is also true that abstract designs are more difficult for 
participants to visualise.  Therefore, whereas the previous studies used abstract 
language without country names, study 3 provided names of the countries involved.  
In order to broaden the target population, study 3 also switched to an adult online 
population recruited via MTurk.  Finally, I changed the context of the appeal to an 
environmental oil spill, as the framing of the disaster appeal may have played an 
important role in the null findings in the previous study.  Study 3 again did not replicate 
the effects in study 1 (Hypothesis 5.1) and, if anything, the pattern of means in study 
3 suggested lower levels of prosociality when the donor-perpetrator relationship was 
salient.  However, empathy was a strong predictor of helping, and was mediated by a 
sense of responsibility to help the victims (Hypothesis 5.6).  
In discussing these findings, I noted in both studies 2 and 3 (which had null 
effects) that the perpetrator was assigned to a large group (the government in study 2 
and an international company in study 3), but in study 1 the perpetrator may have been 
visualised as a person (the pilot).  Although the airline was mentioned to be at fault in 
study 1, this was done briefly, and it is possible that participants may not have focused 
on the organisation behind the plane crash.  It may be that the effects of a salient 
perpetrator group are somewhat negated in the context of a group level organisation.   
Moreover, although I varied the context in study 3, in hindsight framing the 
appeal as an environmental oil spill may not have been an optimal strategy.  A small 
scale pilot (approx. N = 20) suggested that participants were not reminded of tragic 
events such as the Gulf of Mexico oil spill, but there are other reasons why the 
environmental context may have been inappropriate.  Perpetrator attributions, and 
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effects that may pertain to guilt and donor responsibility, are likely to require human 
involvement and human victims.  In study 3, although people were described as 
victims, it was also the case that emphasis was placed on the damage to local wildlife 
and to the environment, and these categories cannot be easily assigned to a distinct 
group membership.  Therefore, the processes which were involved in perpetrator 
group membership affecting donation decisions in study 1 may not have been activated 
in the environmental context of study 3.   
Finally, study 3 also raised concern over the use of an online sample that was 
incentivised by monetary payments.  Paying participants may impact upon their 
donation amount by making them less prosocial (Vohs et al., 2006, 2008), or even by 
anchoring their donation decisions, although the anchoring effect has been shown to 
be most influential when the anchor is provided by a group member (Hysenbelli et al., 
2013).   
Study 4 
Study 4 was the final study to investigate the effects of perpetrator group 
membership; but it did so in a 2 by 2 design that included victim group membership.  
Victim helping has been related to emotions such as empathy (Stürmer et al., 2006, 
2005), while perpetrator effects have been linked to a negative emotions such as guilt 
that may activate norms pertaining to fairness and responsibility to help (Basil et al., 
2006; Brown et al., 2008; Harvey & Oswald, 2000; Wohl & Branscombe, 2005).  I 
tested the prediction that a salient perpetrator group and a salient victim group could 
interact to affect donation amounts.  Finally, in keeping with the concerns I have 
previously raised over the context of the appeal, study 4 returned to a vivid crash 
scenario, this time a coach crash.  Moreover, although the appeal placed some fault 
with the driver’s country of origin due to poor driving licence regulations, it is also 
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true that the focus of the appeal was placed on the driver of the coach and their 
recklessness.   
Study 4 found donation decisions to be driven by ingroup bias (Hypothesis 
5.2), and also found the predicted interaction between perpetrator group and victim 
group (Hypothesis 5.3).  One might expect participants to feel more responsible when 
the perpetrator was from their own country and when the victim was from a different 
country, but this was not the case.  Participants felt most inclined to help when both 
perpetrator and victim were from their own country and thereby related to them.  
Analyses of empathy and responsibility suggested that both of these variables were 
higher when the perpetrator and victim belonged to the ingroup country, and both 
variables were implicated in the underlying processes driving the effect on donations.  
Donor responsibility also mediated the effect of empathy, which was itself again a 
significant predictor of helping (Hypothesis 5.6).  These findings support the important 
role that group memberships play in affecting prosociality.  Moreover, they also 
suggest that different group memberships (in this case victim and perpetrator) can be 
made salient simultaneously, and that doing so can result in an interaction.   
Study 5 
In order to further understand the processes that lie behind helping effects due 
to a salient group membership, I next conducted a study that manipulated how 
participants reason about donation decisions.  In study 5, participants were primed to 
either a fast intuitive reasoning style where they went with their instinct, or a slower 
analytical reasoning style which was more deliberate.  They then read of a flood 
disaster that occurred in either their own country or elsewhere in Europe.  Although I 
reasoned that intuitive and deliberate thinking styles would lead to different donation 
decisions, I was also interested in whether these reasoning styles would interact with 
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a salient group membership.  I predicted that intuitive thinking styles would benefit 
ingroup victims, while deliberate styles would be less influenced by group 
memberships.   
Study 5 found main effects of group membership and reasoning style on 
donation decisions.  Ingroup members received higher amounts supporting Hypothesis 
6.1 (which was Hypothesis 5.2 in the previous study), and participants primed to a 
deliberate style also donated higher amounts.  There was no interaction, suggesting 
that the two effects influence donation decisions relatively independently of each other 
(although I will discuss reasons shortly as to why this conclusion may be unfounded).  
The demonstration of an ingroup bias that led to higher donation amounts was 
predicted, interestingly however, a deliberate reasoning style has largely been linked 
with deleterious effects on prosociality (Dickert et al., 2011; Small et al., 2007), rather 
than the positive direction found in study 5.   
Small and colleagues have suggested that an intuitive reasoning style is more 
closely related to affective caring responses (e.g. empathy), while a deliberate style is 
more likely to lead to a more callous (albeit efficient and perhaps even utilitarian) 
response.  I argued that the positive effect of deliberate reasoning on donation 
decisions in study 5 was likely due to the targets of help being presented as statistical 
victims, whereas much of the research previously cited utilised the context of 
identifiable victims.  Small and colleagues did compare statistical victims to 
identifiable victims in one study, alongside an intuitive or deliberate prime 
manipulation, and found a null effect of deliberate priming on statistical victims (Small 
et al., 2007).  However, it is worth noting that in their data mean donation levels were 
slightly higher for statistical victims after a deliberate prime, although the difference 
was not significant.  In the present thesis, study 5 did find a significant difference in 
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this direction, suggesting that researchers should not automatically accept the 
conclusion that priming rationality leads to less caring.  It would seem that the context 
matters, or at the very least, how the target of help is framed.   
Finally, with regards to the lack of an interaction, I noted that there was a null 
effect of victim group on empathy levels (not supporting Hypothesis 6.2 (or 
Hypothesis 5.5 in chapter 5)), and also that there was a null effect of reasoning prime 
on empathy (not supporting Hypothesis 5.3).  Since empathy is heavily implicated in 
ingroup helping (see chapter 2), I predicted that reasoning style might affect empathy, 
and thereby interact with group membership.  Specifically, I predicted that an intuitive 
reasoning style would lead to increased empathic responses, since this reasoning style 
would encourage participants to trust their feelings, and since empathic concern for 
victims is considered an affective response that leads to negative arousal that in turn 
leads to helping (Batson & Shaw, 1991; Toi & Batson, 1982).  The operationalisation 
of empathy in this thesis measured feelings of concern and distress towards the target, 
and I reasoned that these feelings would be more accessible and perhaps even 
amplified in individuals who were primed to trust their intuition and ‘gut’ feelings.  
By contrast, a deliberate reasoning style should inhibit the tendency to trust one’s 
feelings since Type 2 reasoning styles have been shown to inhibit Type 1 responses 
(Greene, et al., 2004; Lieberman, 2009).  Presumably, a Type 2 reasoning style leads 
to a more calculated response that is more detached, and this is relevant as past 
researchers have manipulated detachment as method of indirectly manipulating 
empathy (study 1: Toi & Batson, 1982).   
Based on dual-process theories of reasoning, and in particular the Type 1/Type 
2 approach adopted by Evans and colleagues (Evans, 2003; Frankish & Evans, 2009), 
I consider the intuitive reasoning prime used in study 5 to be a Type 1 form of 
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cognition, while the deliberate prime to be a Type 2 process.  Evans (2007) has stressed 
that it is intuition and feeling that truly demarcates Type 1 processes from Type 2.  I 
reasoned that participants exposed to a charity appeal, and primed to trust their 
instincts, would accept the default response to help their ingroup, with this gut 
response perhaps socially learnt at an early age (see chapter 2).  However, the 
distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 processing may be most evident in situations 
where complex information is presented, and where Type 1 reasoning is able to draw 
upon various cues and associations to reach what feels like, to the individual at least, 
a gut feeling or intuition.  In hindsight, I am unconvinced that the flood scenario used 
in study 5 contained enough complex information to observe an interaction.  If the 
scenario presented had been more complex (e.g. due to the level of statistical 
information provided, or due to the scenario presented as a dilemma related to 
helping), then perhaps participants primed to trust their instincts might well have 
focused upon group membership in order to navigate what they perceived to be a 
challenging decision. 
Finally, there may be a simpler explanation to explain the null interaction.  It 
may be the case that the scenario in study 5 was unable to generate sufficient levels of 
genuine empathic concern and distress.  As I have already discussed (see chapter 3), 
one of the key characteristics of a Type 2 deliberate thinking style would be the ability 
to inhibit an automatic response (be it a heuristic or a Type 1 intuition).  If empathy 
levels were not sufficiently generated in study 5, then this could result in a null 
interaction, since a deliberate reasoning style would not have an intuitive response (in 
this case empathic concern for the victims) to inhibit.   
Study 6 
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In study 6 I used the same scenario as before, and continued to investigate 
reasoning prime effects.  Instead of manipulating group membership, I instead 
manipulated anonymity, i.e. whether donation decisions were public or private.  I kept 
the target of help as statistical victims, as there is already much research on identifiable 
victims (Genevsky et al., 2013; Hsee et al., 2013; Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997; Kogut 
& Kogut, 2013; Kogut & Ritov, 2007), and also it was the finding for statistical victims 
that was novel in the previous study.  Moreover, the manipulation of anonymity has 
been demonstrated to be an effective way of assessing reputational effects in donation 
behaviour (Alpizar et al., 2008; Bereczkei et al., 2007; Feinberg, Willer, Stellar, & 
Keltner, 2012; Haley & Fessler, 2005; Milinski et al., 2002; Reyniers, 2013).  The 
manipulation of anonymity offers a practical method of affecting reputational 
concerns while avoiding the obvious problem of social desirability bias.  In study 6, I 
combined an anonymity manipulation with a reasoning style manipulation.  In doing 
so I wished to explore whether reasoning style would interact with reputational 
concerns and thereby affect donation decisions.  Study 6 failed to replicate the 
reasoning prime effects in study 5.  Surprisingly, there was a null effect of the 
anonymity manipulation (contrary to Hypothesis 6.5), and there was again a null 
interaction between reasoning style and anonymity (contrary to Hypothesis 6.6).   
It is difficult to reconcile the lack of an effect of anonymity with previous 
findings (e.g. Alpizar et al., 2008; Haley & Fessler, 2005; Reyniers, 2013).  However, 
it could simply be the case that the anonymity manipulation in study 6 did not have 
sufficient strength to generate reputational concerns.  I assumed that many of the 
student participants would care about presenting a positive donation decision before 
other students, but I may have been mistaken.  Even more likely, I suspect that the 
default response when reading about a charitable appeal overseas is to not help.  If this 
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is true, then participants were already demonstrating a reputational effect by upping 
their donation decision from £0 (which would be the default response) to around £2-
£4.  Why would students up their donation decision even in an anonymous condition?  
This may happen if student participants are conscious of taking part in an experiment 
in their department (they were), or if they had reason to care about the impression they 
gave to the researcher (who was a member of staff), or if they did not feel that the 
experiment was truly anonymous (they were batch tested in a laboratory), of if they 
knew that their data would be analysed for helping responses despite being anonymous 
(they were aware of this).  If these are valid concerns, then donation decisions were 
already affected by reputational concerns, and this would explain why there was no 
further effect of the anonymity manipulation.  
Study 7 
In study 7 I wanted to continue to investigate factors that may interact with a 
salient group membership or otherwise influence how donors reason when solicited 
for a charitable appeal.  I also wished to frame victims as identifiable for the first time.  
Previously, researchers have demonstrated that physical beauty can affect 
interpersonal helping behaviour, and I reasoned that this effect would be more 
demonstrable in the context of an identifiable victim.  Therefore, in study 7 I 
investigated whether beauty would increase donation decisions to a charitable appeal 
by manipulating the facial attractiveness of an identifiable victim.  Male and female 
participants randomly saw an attractive or unattractive face of either gender and were 
asked to make a donation decision, as well as rate the stimuli on facial attributes that 
may explain helping effects, e.g. facial emotion.   
Results indicated that the manipulation was successful, but Hypothesis 7.2 was 
not supported as there was little effect of facial beauty on donation decisions.  
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Moreover, the pattern of results was unexpected, with male participants donating more 
to an unattractive male victim, and female participants donating more to an attractive 
female victim.  Previous researchers have found helping effects due to physical 
attraction to be stronger in opposite-sex dyads (Maria Agthe et al., 2011; Nadler et al., 
1982), presumably due to most participants identifying as heterosexual and wanting 
to impress and/or help a healthy potential mate (Grammer et al., 2003).  However, 
Agthe and colleagues have suggested that the effect is due to higher levels of self-
threat when one is asked to help an attractive victim of the same-sex, with self-esteem 
moderating the effect of beauty on same-sex helping behaviour (Agthe, Sporrle, & 
Maner, 2010).   
Finally, I noted that the online sample used may have had little in common 
with the younger victims on the charity poster, and that the average age of the sample 
was older than the young persons depicted in the appeal.  This may be important, as 
similarity has been linked with prosociality in a number of studies (Bal & van den 
Bos, 2010; Chandler et al., 2008; DeBruine, 2002; Jones, Pelham, Carvallo, & 
Mirenberg, 2004; Mackinnon, Jordan, & Wilson, 2011), and if participants felt little 
similarity with the victim, or little relevance of the charitable context presented to 
them, this could results in the low donation amounts (around $2) in study 7.   
Study 8 
In study 8 I continued to investigate the effects of facial attractiveness on 
donation decisions, but also manipulated victim group membership in order to test for 
an interaction effect.  I also measured identification with the victim, as this was a 
potential issue in the previous study.  Victim group membership affected donation 
decisions in the expected direction, with ingroup members benefiting from greater 
amounts (supporting Hypothesis 7.1).  There was no effect of facial attractiveness on 
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donation decisions (again, contrary to Hypothesis 7.2), and no interaction between the 
two variables (Hypothesis 7.3).  There were no significant effects of either variable on 
empathy levels, and although victim identification levels were higher for attractive 
victims, the difference was not significant (Hypothesis 7.4). 
Given that victim group membership did not affect victim identification, it is 
questionable as to whether the online participant sample truly felt connected to the 
victims in study 8.  Mean victim identification levels were generally at mid-points, 
perhaps suggesting a certain degree of ambivalence from participants towards the 
charity appeal.   
Study 9  
 Due to the above criticisms, in study 9 I utilised a more traditional student 
population.  Study 9 also changed the context to a charity appeal from homelessness 
to helping students with depression.  Additionally, the target was presented as from 
the same university or a different one, making the scenario more relevant to the 
participant population, and the appeal was ostensibly on behalf of a real charitable 
organisation (Students Against Depression).  Finally, as the majority of the sample 
was female in study 9, the target of help was fixed to male gender.  This was due to 
previous research identifying stronger effects of facial attractiveness on helping in 
opposite-sex dyads (Maria Agthe et al., 2011), thus increasing the power of the design.   
Study 9 found no main effects of either victim group membership (Hypothesis 
7.1) or facial attraction (Hypothesis 7.2), on donation decisions.  However, there was 
a significant interaction effect between victim group and facial attractiveness 
(Hypothesis 7.3).  Attractive students from the same university received greater 
donation decisions compared to unattractive students from the same university.  
Attractive ingroup members also received greater donation decisions in comparison to 
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attractive outgroup members.  Finally, there was again a null effect of victim group on 
empathy (Hypothesis 7.4).   
 In discussing the reasons for the significant interaction in this study when 
previous attempts were null, I noted that the changes in context combined with the 
switch to a more traditional sample may have been explanatory.  In particular, 
researchers have noted that group membership effects depend on salience (Levine et 
al., 2005), and testing in a laboratory may result in participants attending to the stimuli 
more carefully.  This may be due to the presence of an experimenter, who in turn may 
serve to amplify the effects of a salient group membership.   
Finally, (Nadler, 1980) suggested that whether attractiveness would result in 
prosociality depends on whether a face-to-face meeting is expected, i.e. the possibility 
of meeting the attractive/unattractive target may drive helping effects.  It is notable 
that in the present study, unlike studies 7 and 8, there was at least the potential for the 
female students in the current study to meet the male target in the appeal (assuming 
they believed the person depicted to be real, which I assume they did).   
Strengths and limitations 
In this section, I discuss some of the strengths and limitations of the current 
research programme.  Although the points covered below are not exhaustive, they do 
serve to discuss several issues which are relevant across the studies.  I begin with an 
issue that can be interpreted to be both a strength and a weakness, i.e. the hypothetical 
nature of many of the contexts I have used.  From an applied perspective, charities are 
interested in boosting mean donation levels, and although donation levels can be 
inferred from several of the studies I have conducted, I believe that experimental field 
studies serve this purpose far better.  Laboratory settings are never fully representative 
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of real life, but this controlled environment is useful for experimental testing.  
Regardless, from an applied perspective the use of hypothetical donation amounts and 
abstract group representations might be seen as problematic.  However, these same 
‘weaknesses’ enable the findings from the present research programme to be applied 
to different theoretical domains.  For example, in studies 1 and 2, I began by 
investigating helping due to perpetrator group membership, but the use of abstract 
perpetrator groups and the inclusion of a third-party perpetrator make the results 
interesting to researchers in other fields, e.g. bystander intervention.   
Similarly, the priming of reasoning style in order to affect prosociality in 
studies 5 and 6 may be of theoretical interest to researchers in a number of fields, as 
is the manipulation of facial attractiveness on prosociality.  I believe that even with 
the use of abstract and hypothetical scenarios, the present research still has some 
applied value, which will be commented on later.  However, I accept that including an 
actual monetary measure of donations would be beneficial.  In a similar vein, the use 
of an implicit or indirect measure (e.g. the Affect Misattribution Test (Payne, Cheng, 
Govorun, & Stewart, 2005), or the IAT (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) 
would allow for greater confidence that responses were not overly influenced by social 
desirability factors.   
Another strength of the present research relates to the variety of contexts used.  
The current research programme assessed donation decisions in the context of a plane 
crash, a military incursion, an environmental disaster, a coach crash, flooding, 
domestic violence and homelessness, and student depression.  In using a variety of 
settings, I acknowledge the importance of the context in prosocial research, and I 
attempt to identify boundary conditions for the significant results which were 
obtained.  However, I acknowledge that the use of varied contexts is a potential 
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weakness when discussing null findings.  A change in context can often provide a 
plausible explanation as to why effects were not observed.  For example, in study 2, I 
argued that null effects may have been partly due to the change from an accidental 
disaster to that of a military context.  Similarly, in study 3, I suggested that an 
environmental disaster was in hindsight not the optimal context in which to study 
perpetrator attributions.  There is a danger then that null findings can always be 
explained via the context, thereby allowing the hypothesis in question to always be 
defensible.  However, when discussing the role of the context in explaining null 
findings I have focused on underlying processes which are based on existing theory.  
For example, in study 2, it was not the military context per se that was problematic, 
but rather the lack of perceived individual responsibility when the government is 
involved and the role of perceived threat.  The former is an obvious issue in hindsight, 
while the latter is a process that has gathered much theoretical attention (Hewstone et 
al. 2002; Stephan et al., 1998).  Similarly, in study 3, I argue that the processes inherent 
in bystander behaviour, blame, and responsibility, are less likely to occur when non-
human victims are involved; and this is supported by research that has shown a more 
positive helping response when a disaster is perceived to have a natural cause (Zagefka 
et al., 2011).  It’s important to note then, that the number of theoretical underlying 
processes linked to a context are limited.  To illustrate, there is little reason to suspect 
that the underlying processes involved in helping flood victims overseas would differ 
substantially from that of helping drought victims overseas.  By focusing on the 
theoretical processes inherent in a context, one can prevent a hypothesis from 
becoming irrefutable. 
My next point refers to the general strength of the results obtained.  Although 
the results could have been stronger in several studies (there were several hypotheses 
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that were not supported or supported only inconsistently), it is also true that significant 
results were obtained and that interesting patterns were observed.  Table 20 below 
shows which hypotheses were supported across studies.  It is evident that across the 
relevant studies there was some support for the prediction that perpetrator group would 
affect donation decisions, but strong evidence for a similar prediction based on victim 
group.  Surprisingly, only one study found support of a victim group effect on 
empathy, despite this being the most tested hypothesis, but all relevant studies found 
empathy to be mediated by a sense of donor responsibility.  Study 5 found reasoning 
style to affect donation decisions, and although a null effect was found in study 6, the 
same pattern was evident.  However, neither studies found evidence to support the 
hypothesis that reasoning style would affect empathic concern.  Finally, one study out 
of three found facial attractiveness to influence donor amounts.   
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Table 20 
General pattern of support across studies for predictions relating to hypothetical donation decisions 
Summary of hypotheses Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 4 Study 5 Study 6 Study 7 Study 8 Study 9 
H5.1 (perpetrator group bias) Yes*1 No No Yes* - - - - - 
H5.2/6.1/7.1 (ingroup victim bias) - - - Yes* Yes* - - Yes* Yes* 
H5.3 (perpetrator-victim interaction) - - - Yes - - - - - 
H5.4 (perpetrator effect on responsibility) - Yes* No Yes* - - - - - 
H5.5/6.2 (victim group effect on empathy) - - - Yes* No - - No No 
H5.6 (empathy mediated by responsibility) - Yes* Yes* Yes* - - - - - 
H6.3 (reasoning style effect on empathy) - - - - No No - - - 
H6.4 (reasoning style-victim group interaction) - - - - Yes2 - - - - 
H6.5 (anonymity effect on donation amounts) - - - - - No - - - 
H6.6 (anonymity and reputation interact) - - - - - No - - - 
H7.2 (facial attractiveness effect on donations) - - - - - - No No No 
H7.3 (attractiveness-victim group interaction) - - - - - - - No Yes* 
H7.4 (facial attractiveness to effect empathy) - - - - - - - No Yes3 
Note: Yes/No indicates that mean levels were/were not in the predicted direction.   
* indicates that mean levels were significant at p < .05. A hyphen indicates that the study did not test that hypothesis.  
1 
Study 1 found an effect in comparison to a third-party perpetrator group but not in comparison with a victim perpetrator group.  
2
Although not statistically significant, intuitive donation decisions to outgroup victims were considerably lower than in other cells.  
3
Although not statistically significant, empathy levels to attractive ingroup victims were slightly higher than in other cell.     
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Although many of the tests conducted were statistically significant, in some respects 
observing similar patterns of data across studies is more important than obtaining a 
significant p value.  There is a long running and lively debate with regards to the 
weaknesses of null hypothesis significance testing (NHST), which I do not have the 
scope to elaborate upon here.  Nonetheless, numerous researchers have pointed out 
that NHST does not offer the logical proof that we desire, and that researchers should 
instead focus on whether a consistent pattern of means is obtained with an adequate 
sample size (c.f. Fidler & Loftus, 2009; Nickerson, 2000).  One journal, Basic and 
Applied Social Psychology, has recently banned the reporting of p values, only 
permitting tables of means to be reported (or Bayesian methods where appropriate) 
(Trafimow & Marks, 2015).  While this decision may represent an extreme approach, 
it does suggest that there is some value in considering whether a predicted pattern is 
evident across studies, rather than focusing on isolated p values.   
 Finally, I consider the exploratory aspects of the current research programme 
a strength.  I started in study 1 by investigating a perpetrator effect that I believed to 
be well-supported in other psychological domains (e.g. forensic psychology), but 
which had been neglected in prosocial research.  However, in each study I attempted 
to explore an interesting aspect which may pertain to donation decisions.  For example, 
in studies 1 to 3 I nuanced the outgroup perpetrator.  Furthermore, several of the 
studies presented attempted to investigate underlying processes, e.g. by considering 
potential effects on empathy.  Despite this, there were of course many interesting 
avenues of research which I did not explore or include in the present research 
programme.  I did not, for example, test the identifiable victim effect, nor did I look 
to test scope insensitivity, as these related areas have received considerable attention.  
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Moreover, I did not consider interesting concepts such as Belief in a Just World 
(Lerner, 1980), Social Dominance Orientation (Pratto et al., 1994), Mortality-Salience 
(Jonas, Schimel, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2002), or even demographic 
demarcations relating to religion or political orientation.  All of these areas are 
potentially of interest to the present line of research.  However, prosocial research is a 
very broad field, and by necessity I focused on areas that I found particularly novel 
and especially relevant.  In doing so, I was forced to focus on a selection of variables 
of interest, and to neglect other extremely interesting and promising areas.   
Future research directions 
Given the point I have just made, I would like to acknowledge several 
interesting avenues of research that were beyond the scope of the current programme 
but may be of interest in the future.  Consideration of perpetrator groups may yield 
more interesting results, particularly if intentionality was manipulated alongside group 
membership.  Framing a negative event as intentional has been shown to negatively 
impact upon prosociality towards a charitable appeal (Ames & Fiske, 2013), but I am 
not aware of the deleterious effects of intentionality having been investigated 
alongside group memberships.  Yet, it is likely that shared group memberships will 
colour judgements that are affected by the intentionality of the agent involved.  For 
example, would the negative effects of intentionality on donations be amplified or 
mitigated by the donor having a shared group membership with the perpetrator?  This 
could be a promising line of research.   
Another interesting avenue for future research relates to donor attributions of 
the perceived scale and perceived harm associated with charitable appeals.  In studies 
       218 
 
 
 
218 
1, 4, and 5, I found that group memberships affected the scale of the disaster, which I 
measured in terms of physical and psychological harm.  Ames and Fiske (2013) found 
intentional harms to magnify the harm associated with an event; however, they did not 
consider how the group memberships of those involved would affect judgments.  
Moreover, they measured only financial harm, whereas the current programme 
included a measure of psychological harm.  Would participants yield different 
estimates of psychological harm surrounding a disaster due to the group memberships 
of those involved?  Again, I believe this would be an interesting avenue to explore in 
the context of group effects and prosociality.   
There are also a number of interesting potential studies that may relate to the 
underlying processes of group memberships.  An interesting question is whether 
perpetrator group membership can affect how psychologically close a group member 
feels to their ingroup.  It is possible that donors may wish to either distance themselves 
from a perpetrator ingroup, and it is this distancing that may lead to increased 
prosociality towards another group.  Alternatively, donors may wish to reaffirm their 
group membership with the ingroup in question, triggering a black sheep effect that 
places the perpetrator as a deviant (Marques et al., 1988).  I suspect that the importance 
of the group in question to the individual’s self-identity, as well as the entitativity and 
distinctiveness of the group would play a role in either process. 
Finally, I noted in study 1 that the significant results obtained were in 
comparison of the ingroup to a third-party outgroup, i.e. significant results were 
obtained only when the outgroup was nuanced into two distinct categories.  It would 
be interesting to demonstrate that bystander effects can be extended from an 
interpersonal emergency helping situation to a charitable helping context that involves 
       219 
 
 
 
219 
intergroup helping.  It may be the case that merely making salient the intergroup 
dimension in a charitable appeal results in less prosociality, but I suspect that the 
relationship between the donor, the victim group, and the perpetrator group is more 
likely to drive helping intentions.  If this is the case, then in situations where a country 
commits an offence against a neighbouring country (e.g. Russia against Ukraine), then 
this may affect the helping intentions of donors who are not from either country.  I 
made this argument previously, when discussing the findings in study 1 with reference 
to Staub’s work on genocide, but I can only make a tentative suggestion as this was 
not the focus of the present research programme.  Nonetheless, I believe the interest 
and relevance of this line of work to be obvious.   
Practical considerations 
 Although I see the present contribution as of more theoretical value than of 
applied value, I believe that the results of the studies would be of interest to 
practitioners.  Many of the ideas and theories that I have investigated could be further 
explored in field settings or focus groups, in order to find practical methods of 
increasing donation amounts.  I begin with consideration of the perpetrator group 
membership effect on donation decisions.  
Charities have inferred the importance of how the victim is presented on a 
charitable appeal and informal observation suggests that many charities focus on the 
victim, on their need, on their suffering, and perhaps on their lack of blame.  This 
approach may be less persuasive if donors do not believe that they are responsible in 
any way for situations that occur overseas.  Some donors may feel disconnected, for 
example when they learn of military strife in Syria.  However, even in examples like 
Syria, western nations such as the U.K. may be involved in the antecedents leading to 
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military action.  For example, the U.K. government was heavily criticised for allowing 
British firms to sell chemical war agents (capable of creating the deadly sarin nerve 
agent) while a civil conflict was raging in the Syrian capital (Milmo, McSmith & 
Kumar, 2013).  Distressingly, traces of the sarin nerve agent were reportedly found in 
blood samples of the victims.  One can only assume that U.K. donors would feel a 
greater degree of guilt and responsibility were they to learn of their shared relationship 
with the perpetrator.  In scenarios like this, charities may wish to consider making such 
a relationship salient.  At the very least it would combat indifference from donors who 
feel that the situation is ‘not our problem’.    
With regards to victim group membership, charities may wish to consider 
focusing appeals locally where possible.  This is a fairly straightforward comment as 
charities (and journalists) have perhaps known for some time the benefit of reporting 
local news.  Where the issue is not isolated to a local community, emphasising a shared 
group membership where possible may be effective.  For example, Levine and 
Thompson (2004) found that a salient European group membership resulted in 
increased donations from U.K. participants to a European cause.  Group memberships 
need not be limited to nationality, however.  For example, stressing that a victim is a 
football fan may result in increased donations from football supporters.  If charities 
can target appeals to relevant group memberships, this should increase donation 
amounts, possibly via encouraging empathy from the donor (although I found little 
support for this hypothesis myself, there is still considerable evidence in the field cf. 
chapter 2).  Moreover, given how heavily empathy has been implicated in helping 
behaviours, charities may wish to focus their marketing teams on campaigns that are 
particularly adept at encouraging empathy.  This may involve campaigns that 
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encourage a greater degree of perspective taking.  Rather than tell a potential donor of 
a victim’s plight, it may be better to encourage them to engage in a ‘thought exercise’ 
where they take the perspective of the victim.   
 With regards to reasoning style, this may represent a novel avenue for charities 
to explore.  For charity workers, the real benefit of recognising reasoning style as a 
donation factor may lie in being able to avoid inadvertently activating a particular 
style.  When the appeal focuses on an identifiable victim, it may be wise to avoid an 
analytical style, e.g. by emphasising cost-benefits or by making the financial sum 
needed salient.  By contrast, the studies I have conducted suggest that when the appeal 
involves a large number of statistical victims, it may be wiser to encourage a more 
analytical thinking style so that donors do not intuitively feel that their donation will 
not make a difference.   
 Finally, with regards to facial attractiveness, charity ‘chuggers’ who raise 
money at street level will likely be more successful if they are attractive.  This claim 
is largely based upon findings in business and marketing research (cf. chapter 4) which 
show that attractive others are more persuasive.  With regards to online and print 
campaigns, the role of attractiveness is more nuanced.  If possible, charities may depict 
attractive victims, in order to assess if this increases donation amounts.  However, 
charities may wish to take care that, in using an attractive victim, this does not impact 
upon perceived neediness.  If attractive victims are considered more healthy and 
successful, then this could counter any prosocial effects encouraged due to beauty.   
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Concluding comment 
  
I began with a simple question.  Given the vast sums donated in the charity sector, and 
the number of lives that desperately depend upon such aid, why do we give so much 
less to other nationalities that need our help?  In order to better understand the 
underlying reasons behind this question I drew upon a social identity approach.  This 
led me to conduct further research into how a salient group membership can impact 
upon donation decisions.  In order to build upon work by past researchers I considered 
the perpetrator group in a charitable context, investigated how perpetrator groups and 
victim groups may interact, and considered for the first time how factors such as 
reasoning style and attractiveness may interact with salient group memberships.  The 
research I have conducted does not authoritatively settle any questions in the field of 
prosociality, nor was that my aim.  However, I believe I have provided at least some 
evidence that the variables I have manipulated are important; particularly if we want 
to more fully understand donation behaviour that is so vital in our society.      
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Appendix A: Study 1 vignettes with manipulations in bold and underlined 
  
Donor perpetrator IV   
 
There has been a disaster in another country caused by a cargo plane crashing into a large 
nuclear facility.  The plane was from a national airline from your country, and although the 
plane had no passengers and the pilots evacuated safely, the crash caused a huge explosion 
which killed hundreds of workers.  Media reports also show that the initial blast set off a 
chain of smaller explosions, and that thousands of local residents need urgent medical 
treatment as fires continue to spread.  The inhabitants of one nearby city have been forced 
to evacuate the region due to the threat of radiation and experts estimate that hundreds of 
thousands will never be able to return to their homes.  An official spokesperson 
from your country has said, "We have to accept that our safety procedures did not work.  It's 
clear that our government needs to accept responsibility - not only right now when aid is 
needed the most, but also in the future to ensure that correct safety regulations are in place 
to ensure that such a tragedy never happens again."  
 
 
Victim perpetrator IV 
 
There has been a disaster in another country caused by a cargo plane crashing into a large 
nuclear facility.  The plane was from a national airline from the same country, and although 
the plane had no passengers and the pilots evacuated safely, the crash caused a huge 
explosion which killed hundreds of workers.  Media reports also show that the initial blast 
set off a chain of smaller explosions, and that thousands of local residents need urgent 
medical treatment as fires continue to spread.  The inhabitants of one nearby city have been 
forced to evacuate the region due to the threat of radiation and experts estimate that 
hundreds of thousands will never be able to return to their homes.  An official spokesperson 
from the country has said, "We have to accept that our safety procedures did not work.  It's 
clear that our government needs to accept responsibility - not only right now when aid is 
needed the most, but also in the future to ensure that correct safety regulations are in place 
to ensure that such a tragedy never happens again."  
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Third party IV 
 
There has been a disaster in another country caused by a cargo plane crashing into a large 
nuclear facility.  The plane was from a national airline from a different country, and although 
the plane had no passengers and the pilots evacuated safely, the crash caused a huge 
explosion which killed hundreds of workers.  Media reports also show that the initial blast 
set off a chain of smaller explosions, and that thousands of local residents need urgent 
medical treatment as fires continue to spread.  The inhabitants of one nearby city have been 
forced to evacuate the region due to the threat of radiation and experts estimate that 
hundreds of thousands will never be able to return to their homes.  An official spokesperson 
from the country has said, "We have to accept that our safety procedures did not work.  It's 
clear that our government needs to accept responsibility - not only right now when aid is 
needed the most, but also in the future to ensure that correct safety regulations are in place 
to ensure that such a tragedy never happens again."  
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Appendix B: Study 2 vignettes with manipulations in bold and underlined 
 
A humanitarian appeal has been called after bombs were dropped in another country.  They 
were dropped by your country’s government after they received threats involving the use of 
chemical weapons.  The threats were made by an extremist rebel group after ongoing 
political conflict.  Media reports show that the initial bombings killed hundreds, and that 
thousands of local residents need urgent medical treatment.  The inhabitants of one town, 
where the rebel groups were thought to have been hiding, have been forced to evacuate the 
region.  Experts estimate that thousands will never return to their homes.  An international 
charity has urgently requested aid to help provide food and medical supplies. 
 
A humanitarian appeal has been called after bombs were dropped in another country.  They 
were dropped by that country’s own government after they received threats involving the 
use of chemical weapons.  The threats were made by an extremist rebel group after ongoing 
political conflict.  Media reports show that the initial bombings killed hundreds, and that 
thousands of local residents need urgent medical treatment.  The inhabitants of one town, 
where the rebel groups were thought to have been hiding, have been forced to evacuate the 
region.  Experts estimate that thousands will never return to their homes.  An international 
charity has urgently requested aid to help provide food and medical supplies. 
 
A humanitarian appeal has been called after bombs were dropped in another country.  They 
were dropped by a neighbouring country’s government after they received threats involving 
the use of chemical weapons.  The threats were made by an extremist rebel group after 
ongoing political conflict.  Media reports show that the initial bombings killed hundreds, and 
that thousands of local residents need urgent medical treatment.  The inhabitants of one 
town, where the rebel groups were thought to have been hiding, have been forced to 
evacuate the region.  Experts estimate that thousands will never return to their homes.  An 
international charity has urgently requested aid to help provide food and medical supplies. 
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Appendix C: Study 3 vignette with manipulations in bold and highlighted 
 
An environmental disaster has occurred off the coast of Estonia, a small European country.   
The disaster was caused by an oil spill which resulted in over a million barrels of crude oil 
polluting the local sea. The disaster was the fault of Venoco Oil Industries, a successful 
U.S./Estonian/Latvian company. Venoco has created thousands of jobs in the 
U.S./Estonia/Latvia, but today they are accused of destroying wildlife and plunging Estonia 
into economic crisis.  Media reports show that the oil spill has killed thousands of animals 
and destroyed local fishing communities.  Experts estimate that it will take 10 years before 
waters are clean again, with the damage estimated at over $1 billion.  Venoco, which had 
previously created over 22,000 jobs in the U.S./Estonia/Latvia, has been accused of taking 
short cuts which led to lapses in safety procedures. A spokesperson has said, "A disaster like 
this destroys American/Estonian/Latvian reputation as a country with responsible business 
practices." A local charity, based in Estonia, are asking for donations to help save the lives of 
thousands of animals affected by the spill.   
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Appendix D: Study 4 news report with manipulation in bold and underlined 
 
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING NEWS REPORT: 
 
Horrific coach crash affects [ingroup/Esturian] families 
 
A coach carrying nearly 100 [ingroup/Esturian] tourists crashed earlier today leaving few 
survivors.  Witnesses say that the driver, who was [ingroup/Esturian], was speeding and lost 
control of the vehicle in bad weather conditions. 
 
A similar accident happened last year after a [ingroup/Esturian] driver lost control of a truck. 
Experts say that the death toll was higher this time due to the number of passengers and 
delays in the emergency services arriving. 
 
An official [ingroup/Esturian] spokesperson has said, "We have to toughen up our driving 
licence requirements or there will be future tragedies. It's too easy to get a licence for 
passenger vehicles in this country." 
 
Local charities are asking for donations to support the surviving victims, especially those who 
lost their families in the accident. 
 
 
Caption: Coach crash kills [ingroup/Esturian] tourists 
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Appendix E: Study 5 and study 6 deliberate prime and instructions 
 
Please answer the following six questions carefully. Try to answer every question correctly. 
You are not allowed to use a calculator. 
Think carefully and take your time. 
 
1. If an object travels 5 metres in 60 seconds, how many metres will it travel in 360 
minutes? 
2. If a number is divided by 4 and then 3 is subtracted, the result is 0. By your 
calculation, what is the number? 
3. If a plane flies at 35,000 feet and descends at a rate of 2,500 feet per minute, how 
long will it take to reach 20,000 feet? 
 
[page break] 
 
4. If team A scored twice as many points as team B, and team A scored 28 points, by 
your calculation how many points did team B score? 
5. A restaurant has 30% of its tables outside. If the restaurant has 40 tables, how many 
tables are outside? 
6. A business makes £42 profit on each television set it sells and £25 profit on each DVD 
player it sells. If the business sold 15 television sets and 25 DVD players, would they 
make more profit from television sets or from DVD players? 
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Appendix F: Study 5 and study 6 intuitive prime and instructions 
 
Please answer the following six questions as quickly as possible.  Use one word to describe 
your feelings, there is no right or wrong answer. 
 
Go with your gut feeling and trust your first instinct. 
1. When you hear the word 'failure', what do you feel?  
2. When you hear the word 'baby', what do you feel?  
3. When you hear the word 'disaster', what do you feel?  
 
[page break] 
 
 
4. When you hear the word 'love', what do you feel?  
5. When you hear the word 'infection', what do you feel?  
6. When you hear the word 'happy', what do you feel?  
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Appendix G: Study 6 anonymity manipulation in bold and underlined 
 
On the next page you will read about a disaster which happened in another country.  You will 
be [asked to discuss the disaster with another student / tested at the end of the study on 
how much you remember].   
 
Please indicate to the researcher that you have finished.  The researcher will ask you to wait 
a minute before pairing you with another student to discuss why you donated the way you 
did.   
If you would like to change your donation amount, please do so now in the box below: 
 
 
 
  
       261 
 
 
 
261 
Appendix H: Study 5 and study 6 vignette with manipulation in bold and underlined (study 
6 had only an outgroup target) 
 
Devastating floods affect [ingroup/Esturian] families 
 
Devastating floods continue to affect many [ingroup/Esturian] cities. Authorities announce 
that at least 2,100 people have been killed, and thousands more are believed to be injured 
and left homeless. 
The [ingroup/Esturian] government has been criticised for not investing in flood barriers 
despite early warnings. Although some critics say that the victims reacted slowly and many 
lived on a riverside and should have been more prepared for bad weather. 
As Christmas approaches, survivors are left struggling to salvage their few possessions from 
the wreckage. The lucky ones are facing financial ruin. Those not so fortunate, will have to 
cope with the loss of loved ones. 
Charities are asking for donations in order to help [ingroup/Esturian] survivors with food, 
better temporary accommodation and bereavement support. 
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Appendix I: Study 7 and study 8 charity posters (study 7 did not display a flag, study 8 
displayed a U.S. or E.U. flag) 
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Appendix J: Study 9 charity posters  
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